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By global standards, the U.S. Supreme Court is unusual in a number of
respects, but one of its most distinctive characteristics is its reluctance to engage in
comparative constitutional analysis. Much has been said on the normative question
of whether and in what ways the Court ought to make use of foreign constitutional
jurisprudence. Rarely, however, do scholars broach the underlying empirical
question of why some courts make greater use of foreign law than others.
To identify the causes of comparativism, a behind-the-scenes investigation was
conducted of four leading courts in East Asia: the Japanese Supreme Court, the
Korean Constitutional Court, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, and the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal. The results of this investigation highlight the crucial
role of institutional and resource constraints in shaping judicial behavior but also
pose an unexpected challenge to traditional conceptions of the role and function of
constitutional courts.
Evidence from interviews conducted with numerous justices, clerks, and senior
administrators suggests that a combination of mutually reinforcing factors creates
the conditions necessary for comparativism to thrive. The ﬁrst factor is institutional
capacity. A court that lacks institutional mechanisms for learning about foreign
law, such as the recruitment of law clerks with foreign legal expertise or the use of
researchers who specialize in foreign law, is unlikely to make more than sporadic
use of foreign law. The second factor is legal education. Even the most elaborate of
institutional mechanisms for facilitating comparativism is unlikely to be eﬀective
unless it is backed by a system of legal education that produces an adequate supply
of lawyers with both an aptitude and appetite for comparativism.
Investigation of the reasons for which courts engage in comparativism also
reveals a hidden underlying phenomenon of judicial diplomacy. Unlike other
judicial practices such as textualism or originalism, comparativism is not merely a
means by which judges perform legal and adjudicative functions; it can also be a
form of diplomatic activity. When constitutional courts demonstrate mastery of
foreign law or host foreign judges, their goals may not consist exclusively, or even
primarily, of writing stronger opinions or winning over domestic audiences. They
may also be competing with one another for international inﬂuence or pursuing
foreign policy objectives, such as promotion of the rule of law and judicial independence in other countries. The concept of judicial diplomacy helps to explain why
constitutional courts engage in a number of practices that are only tenuously related
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to the act of adjudication. Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely practices
constitutional comparativism, it is an active practitioner of judicial diplomacy in
other forms.
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INTRODUCTION: THE DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICAN
AND GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
By global standards, American constitutionalism is unusual—or, as some
prefer to say, exceptional1—in many respects. Much of what makes it so
atypical can be traced directly to the U.S. Constitution itself. The Constitution is very old. It is also very rarely amended. The average constitution has
a 38% chance of being revised in any given year and is replaced every
nineteen years.2 The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, is the oldest surviving
constitution in the world.3 It has lasted twelve times longer than the average
constitution, and it has not been amended in over twenty years.4

1 See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. R EV. 1335, 1405-11 (2006) (discussing various
features of American constitutional law that “explicitly reﬂect the extent to which America is an
exceptional nation, diﬀerent from any other,” and describing the Constitution itself as “the focal
point of American exceptionalism,” “our holiest of holies,” and “our ark of the covenant”); David
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Inﬂuence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. R EV.
762, 854 (2012) (discussing the view that the U.S. Constitution “lies at the very heart of an
‘American creed of exceptionalism,’ which combines a belief that the United States occupies a
unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart
from other countries”).
2 See ZACHARY ELKINS , TOM GINSBURG & JAMES M ELTON , THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL C ONSTITUTIONS 101, 129 (2009) (calculating a mean “predicted amendment rate” of
0.38 per year and a median lifespan of nineteen years for the world’s constitutions).
3 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 852-53.
4 The most recent amendment, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, was adopted in 1992 and
stands as an object lesson in the diﬃculty of amending the U.S. Constitution: over two hundred
years elapsed between its proposal and its ratiﬁcation. See David S. Law & David McGowan,
There Is Nothing Pragmatic About Originalism, 102 NW. U. L. R EV. C OLLOQUY 86, 93 & n.34
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Whether one considers these characteristics of longevity and stability
praiseworthy—and some do not5—they have as a purely empirical matter
rendered the Constitution increasingly out of sync with the global mainstream.
Since World War II, constitutional drafting around the world has become
characterized by the widespread adoption of a core set of generic constitutional rights that extend beyond the negative civil and political liberties
found in the Bill of Rights.6 The U.S. Constitution, a relic of the late
eighteenth century, has not partaken of these trends. Instead, it omits a
signiﬁcant number of provisions that have become highly popular, while
including others that have become highly atypical.7
(2007) (using the history of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to illustrate the diﬃculty of
adopting even the most popular of constitutional amendments).
5 See, e.g., S ANFORD L EVINSON , OUR U NDEMOCRATIC C ONSTITUTION : WHERE THE
C ONSTITUTION GOES W RONG (AND HOW W E THE P EOPLE CAN C ORRECT IT) 9 (2006)
(arguing that the U.S. Constitution has become “signiﬁcantly dysfunctional” to the point of
warranting a constitutional convention); LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: 23
PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY 4-5
(2007) (bemoaning the “political ossification” and “grotesque” inequities that have resulted from
failure to engage in more than “insuﬃcient tinkering” with the Constitution over the last two
centuries); Michael Ignatieﬀ, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (dubbing the
U.S. Bill of Rights “a late eighteenth-century constitution surrounded by twenty-ﬁrst-century
ones, a grandfather clock in a shop window full of digital timepieces”), in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND H UMAN R IGHTS 1, 11 (Michael Ignatieﬀ ed., 2005).
6 See, e.g., Philip Alston, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights (enumerating a
“core set of civil and political rights which is reflected almost without fail” in new national constitutions and international human rights instruments alike), in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); David
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF . L. R EV.
1163, 1200-01 (2011) (identifying the twenty-ﬁve most “generic” rights-related constitutional
provisions in the world, and documenting their rise in popularity from 1946 through 2006);
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on
Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. L EGAL STUD . 499, 501 (2000) (observing that most post-war
constitutions combine distinctive elements with a “common core of human rights provisions that
are strikingly similar”).
7 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 804-06 (identifying the most “generic” rights-related
provisions found in constitutions, and documenting the extent to which the U.S. Constitution
both omits highly popular provisions and includes highly unpopular provisions); see also, e.g.,
Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism,
107 M ICH . L. R EV. 391, 395, 399 (2008) (noting that the sheer age and “correspondingly
anachronistic concerns” of the Constitution, and “its comparatively few enumerated rights,”
“especially of a substantive rather than a procedural nature,” all stand in “marked contrast to [the]
paradigmatic post-1945, rights-protecting constitutions” prevalent elsewhere in the world);
Ignatieﬀ, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that the U.S. Constitution is atypical in its omission of
socioeconomic and welfare rights, its phrasing of rights in negative terms, and its inclusion of
rights that “do not feature in other democratic systems,” such as the right to bear arms); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? (deeming the
U.S. Constitution “distinctive” in its omission of social and economic rights), in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS , supra note 5, at 90, 92.
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Other odd features of American constitutionalism are attributable not to
the Constitution, but rather to the Supreme Court. Interpretive and
argumentative approaches popular in the United States barely register in
other countries, and vice versa. For example, originalism has become a
ﬁxture of judicial, academic, and even popular debate in the United States8
but, as a former Canadian Supreme Court justice has observed, it is “simply
not the focus, or even a topic, of debate elsewhere.”9
As distinctive as the presence of originalism, however, is the absence of
comparativism.10 It is diﬃcult to identify a national high court that pays less
attention to foreign constitutional jurisprudence than the U.S. Supreme
Court.11 Indeed, the Court’s reluctance to engage foreign courts in a “global
8 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2009) (describing
“the elevated space originalism occupies within American legal and political culture”).
9 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 33 (1998) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “international
impact” has diminished due in part to its preoccupation with originalism); see also, e.g., Greene, supra
note 8, at 3-6 (discussing the “global rejection of American-style originalism”); Ozan O. Varol, The
Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1242, 1262-77
(2011) (noting the “prevailing view” that “originalism is primarily an American obsession,” and
discussing at length the rare counterexample of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s use of originalist
reasoning to defend a strict separation of church and state). Although it is an overstatement to say
that originalism is not discussed anywhere else in the world, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s assessment is
not terribly far oﬀ the mark. Singapore, Malaysia, and to some extent Australia are rare examples of
countries other than the United States where originalist arguments are frequently encountered. See
PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 262-66) (on file with author) (discussing the espousal of “hard originalism” in Singapore);
Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780, 783-84 (2014)
(listing Malaysia, Turkey, Singapore, Australia, and the United States as countries where some form
of originalist methodology has taken hold).
10 See, e.g., Ignatieﬀ, supra note 5, at 1, 8-10, 14 (identifying “legal isolationism,” or the unwillingness of American judges to consider “foreign human rights precedents,” as a form of “American
exceptionalism” in the area of human rights, and observing that “[i]n the messianic American
moral project, America teaches the meaning of liberty to the world; it does not learn from
others”); Frank I. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety? (“[E]xceptional reluctance by the American
judiciary to pay heed to foreign constitutional law may seem . . . both the toughest to explain and
the most embarrassing of all the types of U.S. exceptionalism in the ﬁeld of human rights . . . .”),
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN R IGHTS , supra note 5, at 241, 244.
11 See, e.g., MICHAL B OBEK , C OMPARATIVE R EASONING IN EUROPEAN S UPREME
C OURTS passim (2013) (canvassing the ways in which high courts throughout Europe make use of
foreign law); RAN HIRSCHL, C OMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE R ENAISSANCE OF C OMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (2014) (discussing the frequency with which the Canadian
Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court, among others, cite foreign law); BASIL
M ARKESINIS & J ÖRG FEDTKE, J UDICIAL R ECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW S OURCE
OF INSPIRATION ? 61-108 (2006) (surveying judicial use of foreign law in Italy, France, England,
Germany, Canada, and South Africa); THE USE OF FOREIGN P RECEDENTS BY C ONSTITUTIONAL J UDGES passim (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) (surveying the use
of foreign precedent by constitutional courts in sixteen countries, including the United States);
Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience with Comparative
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judicial dialogue”12 on matters of common concern has itself become an
object of criticism from both foreign jurists13 and members of the Court

Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 227, 244 (2009) (reporting that over half of the
South African Constitutional Court’s decisions over the preceding fourteen years cited foreign law,
and that “the justices have the benefit of up to five clerks selected from applicants around the
world”); Brun-Otto Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue
(noting on the basis of personal experience as a member of the German Constitutional Court that
foreign decisions are consulted “extensively,” and that it is standard for the preparatory materials
relied upon by the Court to incorporate any relevant comparative literature that is available in
German), in J UDICIAL R ECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW S OURCE OF INSPIRATION?,
supra, at 295, 297-98; Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture
Before the Courts: Cross-Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 S UP. C T. ECON. R EV. 215,
268 (2013) (concluding on the basis of statistical analysis of private law and criminal law decisions
by ten European high courts that citation of foreign law “is not an isolated phenomenon in Europe
but happens on a regular basis”); Johanna Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies: A Strategic
Account of Comparative Citation, 38 YALE J. INT’ L L. 423, 424 & n.5, 425 (2013) (citing Uganda,
India, South Africa, Japan, Namibia, France, Taiwan, and Hungary as examples of countries where
courts frequently consider foreign and international law in the course of their deliberations);
David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 W ASH . L. R EV. 523,
558-61 (2011) (documenting the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s extensive behind-the-scenes
usage of foreign law); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 S TAN. L.
R EV. 131, 135 (2006) (observing that “[c]onsultation of foreign law seems to be the rule, not the
exception” when national courts engage in constitutional interpretation); Cheryl Saunders, Judicial
Engagement with Comparative Law (“The practice of referring to foreign constitutional experience
is growing, in terms not only of the number of jurisdictions that engage in it but also of the range
of comparators on which courts draw.”), in C OMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571, 574, 586
(Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Li-ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of
Transnational Judicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in
Malaysia and Singapore, 19 C OLUM. J. ASIAN L. 428, 431-32, 497-518 (2006) (noting a “steady
traﬃc of foreign cases in both Malaysian and Singaporean courts”); Transcript of Interview of U.S.
Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 820 (2009)
[hereinafter Justice Ginsburg Interview] (expressing hope that the Court’s reluctance to “take account
of international law and . . . refer to decisions of other tribunals” is a “passing phase,” and that the
more accepting attitudes of the early nineteenth century toward judicial usage of foreign law will
return); cf. Brian Flanagan & Sinéad Ahern, Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey
of Common Law Supreme Court Judges, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12-14 (2011) (noting a “paucity of
judges who are on record as sceptics about the use of foreign law,” and reporting that, out of fortythree supreme court judges surveyed from common law jurisdictions, twenty-three responded that
they “regularly” referred to foreign law in rights-related cases, while none claimed to avoid foreign
law altogether).
12 E.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004) (positing a
“growing dialogue” among judges “around the world on the issues that arise before them”); Law &
Chang, supra note 11, at 527, 535-68 (critiquing on both conceptual and empirical grounds the use
of the “dialogue” metaphor to describe the judicial practice of citing foreign law).
13 See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 38-39 (observing that the Supreme Court’s failure to
engage with relevant jurisprudence from other courts decreases the relevance and appeal of its own
decisions to other courts); Michelman, supra note 10, at 241 (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court
has “earn[ed] itself a mildly pariah status” by standing “noticeably aloof” from the practice among
judiciaries in democratic countries of “treating each other’s judgments as required reading”).
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itself.14 Although references to foreign law in a succession of high-profile
constitutional decisions toward the tail end of the Rehnquist Court attracted
tremendous attention,15 the actual number of constitutional cases in which
the Court cites foreign law remains very low in absolute terms and may
even be declining. From 1986 through 2010, less than 0.3% of opinions in
constitutional cases—majority, concurring, and dissenting alike—cited
foreign case law.16 Moreover, all of the citations that did occur date back to
14 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Kind”: The Value
of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575, 584 (2005)
(arguing that it is no more problematic for judges to consider foreign law than to consult treatises
or legal scholarship, and listing various questions on which “comparative law inquiry could prove
enlightening or valuable”); Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 820; Sandra Day O’Connor,
Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED . LAW. 20,
20-21 (1998) (“[O]ther common law courts which have struggled with the same basic constitutional
questions . . . have something to teach us . . . . Our ﬂexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from
other legal systems, is what will enable us to remain progressive, with systems that are able to cope
with a rapidly shrinking world.”); William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks
(“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our own country generally,
have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other countries.”), in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: P AST, P RESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN–AMERICAN
S YMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Jeﬀrey Toobin, Swing
Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, N EW
YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 50 (“If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of
freedom, it does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other nations and other
peoples can deﬁne and interpret freedom in a way that's at least instructive to us . . . . Liberty isn’t
for export only.” (quoting Justice Kennedy)); Stephen Breyer & Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justices,
Supreme Court of the United States, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for
American Constitutional Adjudication, Discussion at the American University Washington
College of Law ( Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/
2005/050113.cfm (disclosing Justice Breyer’s view that it is “important” for the Justices to show
other courts that “we read their opinions”); Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address to the 97th Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_04-04-03 (“Ultimately, I believe the
‘comparativist’ view that several of us have enunciated will carry the day—simply because of the
enormous value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of others.”).
15 See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 653-57 (2005) (noting
the controversy over judicial citation of foreign law in constitutional cases decided mostly in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, such as Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)); see also, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi
& Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. R EV. 743, 755 (2005) (arguing
that the importance of the constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court cites foreign law has
risen over time).
16 See Angioletta Sperti, United States of America: First Cautious Attempts of Judicial Use of Foreign
Precedents in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES, supra note 11, at 393, 405. That ﬁgure includes citations to speciﬁc foreign
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the Rehnquist Court; none occurred during the ﬁrst six years of the Roberts
Court.17 Nor is there reason to suspect that the U.S. Supreme Court
routinely consults foreign law in the course of its deliberations without
revealing that it has done so.18
Vast quantities of ink have been spilled over the normative question of
whether, and in what ways, courts ought to engage with foreign law.19
decisions in concurring opinions but excludes references to international law and non-countryspeciﬁc references to foreign practices, such as the “law of nations.” Id. at 395-98; see also Sarah K.
Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’ L L. 409, 419-20 (2003)
(ﬁnding “a remarkably low number” of U.S. Supreme Court cases over the preceding decade “in
which there is even a passing reference to foreign law or legal practice”); David Zaring, The Use of
Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L EGAL STUD . 297, 299,
314 (2006) (noting that, in absolute terms, “the Supreme Court uses less foreign law now than it
has at any other time in its history,” and that “the federal courts as a whole” are not “citing foreign
tribunals any more frequently now than they were 60 years ago—once the increase in the total
number of opinions is accounted for”).
17 See Sperti, supra note 16, at 405; see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 S T . L OUIS U. L.J.
1119, 1121 (1996) (“[I]n a very few instances in the less-distant past, the United States Supreme
Court has looked to international ‘human rights’ norms in determining whether certain forms of
punishment violated our Eighth Amendment . . . . But this approach, however, even within its
limited scope of application, was short-lived and has now been retired.”).
18 Although many courts make a habit of researching and considering foreign law without
divulging in their opinions that they do so, see infra Part I, those courts tend for a variety of
reasons to be civil law courts. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing citation
conventions among civil law courts). By contrast, the opinions rendered by common law courts
tend to be relatively transparent about the sources taken into consideration. See, e.g., Michel
Bastarache, How Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 190, 200 (2009) (reporting that “attribution is systematic and considered mandatory”
whenever the Canadian Supreme Court draws upon foreign jurisprudence); Law & Chang, supra
note 11, at 533 & nn.33-35 (discussing, and rejecting, the possibility that the Canadian Supreme
Court “looks habitually to the South African Constitutional Court for guidance and inspiration”
but simply fails to acknowledge when it has done so); infra text accompanying notes 244-50
(discussing the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal’s strong norm of fully disclosing all foreign
authorities considered). But see Roger Alford, Outsourcing Research About Outsourced Authority,
OPINIO J URIS (Nov. 22, 2006, 10:43 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/11/22/outsourcing-researchabout-outsourced-authority, archived at http://perma.cc/VT2L-5WJG (noting the number of
research requests received by the Library of Congress from “judicial agencies” pertaining to
foreign election law and constitutional court decisions, and concluding that “even in cases . . . that
did not cite foreign authority[,] it appears the Court considered foreign experiences in rendering
its decision, and relied on the Library of Congress to provide that information”).
19 See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
17-102 (2010) (advocating a judicial posture of “engagement,” as opposed to “resistance” or
“convergence,” toward foreign law); M ARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 109-65 (proposing
various criteria for judicial use of foreign law); S LAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 65-103 (arguing that
participation in a global “community of courts” and “common judicial enterprise” enables judges to
“learn from one another’s experience and reasoning” and thus improve the quality of their
decisionmaking); JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS C OMMON TO ALL M ANKIND ”:
FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN C OURTS 3 (2012) (arguing that “sometimes it is appropriate for
our courts to make use of foreign legal materials”); Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on
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Rarely, however, have scholars writing in this vein broached the empirical
question of why some courts make greater use of foreign law than others.20
The question is not as easily answered as it might appear. Two of the
explanations that come most readily to mind—namely, isolationism on the
part of judges, and political controversy over the use of foreign law—prove
inadequate, especially when courts outside the United States are considered.
1. The judicial isolationism hypothesis. — It is tempting to think that judicial
reluctance to use foreign law might simply reflect isolationism or parochialism
on the part of judges, but there are several problems with this explanation.
First, it is somewhat circular. To say that some judges refuse to engage with
foreign law because they are isolationist is akin to saying that some people
tend to vote Republican because they are Republicans. Labeling behavior is
not the same as explaining behavior. Even if there are judges who can be
described in some sense as isolationist, that merely begs the question of why
they hold such views while others do not.
Second, the extent to which judges engage with the rest of the world
does not appear to play a crucial role in determining whether they will
practice comparativism. Foreign interaction is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for comparativism to occur. On the one hand, comparativism can
be a routine occurrence even if foreign interaction is restricted, as shown by
the example of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court.21 On the other hand,

“Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. R EV. 653, 658-61 (2006) (listing various “heavy-weights” on
both “the left and right” who have oﬀered arguments for and against judicial citation of foreign
law, and observing that the debate has “spilled over into contemporary political parlors”); Michael
Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L
L. 171, 184 (2008) (arguing that “[i]nternational engagement” can help judges to “enhance their service
to their own courts, enlarge their thinking and improve the efficiency of their judicial service”); Law,
supra note 15, at 653-59 (providing an overview of the heated normative debate over the propriety of the
Supreme Court’s use of comparative analysis in constitutional cases); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at
1166 (noting the “extensive, if not tiresome, normative debate” over judicial citation of foreign and
international law, and citing numerous examples); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 40 (exhorting the
U.S. Supreme Court to join in the “global dialogue on human rights and other common legal
questions” by considering the decisions of courts elsewhere); see also Antonin Scalia, Outsourcing
American Law: Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation 5 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 152,
2009), available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20090820-Chapter2.pdf (lamenting
that the citation of foreign law in constitutional cases appears to be the “wave of the future”).
20 See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 40 (observing that, “despite the tremendous scholarly interest
in the international migration of constitutional ideas, the actual empirical evidence on the nature and
scope of reference to foreign law . . . remains thin”); Ryan C. Black & Lee Epstein, (Re-)Setting the
Scholarly Agenda on Transjudicial Communication, 32 L AW & S OC. INQUIRY 791, 792 (2007) (urging
“empirically minded” scholars to remedy the lack of “rigorous theoretical and empirical research
devoted to understanding the exchange of law among nations”).
21 See infra Sections IV.B & IV.E ( juxtaposing the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s habitual
usage of foreign law with its heavily restricted opportunities for engagement with foreign courts).

2015]

Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy

937

frequent interaction with foreign courts and foreign judges does not guarantee
a thriving practice of comparativism. For evidence of this fact, we need look
no further than the U.S. Supreme Court, which is well connected to foreign
courts but nevertheless shuns comparativism. Across the ideological spectrum,
the Justices are in high demand internationally as both guests and hosts, and
they do not turn their backs on the rest of the world. Indeed, the Court hosts
overseas visitors so often that it has developed the equivalent of a diplomatic
oﬃce for dealing with them.22
Nor is it only the advocates of comparativism who enjoy foreign contact.23
Even Justices known for their opposition to comparative constitutional
analysis24 frequently visit foreign courts and participate in international
conferences.25 As unlikely as it might be for Justice Scalia to cite Taiwanese
22 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 98-99 (describing “the formation of an actual ‘foreign
policy’ arm of the U.S. federal judiciary” in the form of the Committee on International Judicial
Relations); International Judicial Relations, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ijr/home.nsf/
page/intl_activities (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9N7V-8U3F (describing
the Federal Judicial Center’s international activities and its Oﬃce of International Judicial Relations).
23 See sources cited supra note 14 (quoting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O’Connor, and the
late Chief Justice Rehnquist). In the speciﬁc context of treaty interpretation, even Justice Scalia
has advocated a comparativist approach. See Alford, supra note 19, at 657 & n.23 (citing Olympic
Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
24 See Law, supra note 15, at 655-56 (quoting various opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas
critical of foreign law usage); Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other
Countries Think?, S LATE (Apr. 9, 2004, 5:03 PM), http://slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2004/04/foreign_exchange.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FAD8-XSYR (likening
the exchanges within the Court over the use of foreign legal materials to “a Punch and Judy show,”
in which “[j]ust about every time the court cites foreign materials, Scalia and/or Clarence Thomas
dissent”). But cf. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 60-61 (quoting Justice Scalia’s
discussion of Australian, Canadian, and English election law in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995), and querying “how . . . a judge who denounces so strongly
references to foreign law when opposing moves to decriminalise sodomy or restrict the application
of the death penalty [can] nonetheless invoke foreign examples himself ”); Ryan C. Black et al.,
Upending Global Debate: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Transnational Law to
Interpret Domestic Doctrine, 103 GEO. L.J. 1, 32 tbl.4 (2014) (ﬁnding empirically that, through 2008,
Justice Scalia referred to foreign countries and foreign tribunals more often than Justice Breyer);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World (noting Justice Scalia’s insistence that American
judges “look to the national decisions of other treaty parties” when interpreting international
treaties, and citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), as an
example), in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS , supra note 5, at 277, 283.
25 See Scalia, supra note 17, at 1122 (“I welcome international conferences . . . in which the
judges of various countries may exchange useful insights and information . . . .”); Jada F. Smith,
Royalties and Teaching Help Fill Bank Accounts of Justices, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES , June 21, 2014, at
A16 (noting that, while Justice Breyer “traveled to the most foreign countries,” Justice Scalia “took
more trips than any of his colleagues in 2013, ﬁling for reimbursement on 28 excursions, including
one to Peru, one to Germany and two trips to Italy”); Bill Mears, Justices’ Finances Show Overseas
Travel, Book Royalties, Gifts, CNN.COM ( June 20, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/
20/us/scotus-justices-ﬁnances, archived at http://perma.cc/LQ7A-SGPT (describing all of the
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constitutional precedent, for example, he is one of the few jurists from
anywhere in the world to have visited the Taiwanese Constitutional Court in
person.26 Indeed, the globetrotting Justice Scalia—who once taught comparative law27—is second only to Justice Breyer in the extent of his foreign
travel.28 In short, whatever reasons certain members of the Court may have
for denouncing the use of foreign law in constitutional cases,29 those reasons
do not stem from a lack of foreign contact or rank xenophobia.
2. The political controversy hypothesis. — Alternatively, it might be argued
that the degree of judicial comparativism depends on the degree of political
controversy surrounding it. Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of this
hypothesis comes from the United States, where judicial aversion to foreign
law coincides with unusually intense opposition to comparativism.30 Justices
who dare to cite foreign law have faced calls for impeachment and even
death threats,31 while nominees to the Court now take care to disavow the
use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.32 Meanwhile, a nationwide
justices as “busy travelers,” revealing that Justice Scalia is “neck-and-neck” with Justice Breyer in
the extent of his overseas travel, and noting Justice Thomas’s participation together with Justice
Kagan at an international legal conference in Argentina).
26 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 555.
27 See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 3 (1986) (statement of Sen. John
Warner) (summarizing then-Judge Scalia’s teaching experience at the University of Virginia).
28 See Smith, supra note 25; Mears, supra note 25 (describing Justice Scalia as “neck-and-neck”
with Justice Breyer in the extent of his overseas travel, as revealed by their financial disclosure forms).
29 See Law, supra note 15, at 655-56 (quoting various criticisms leveled by Justice Scalia
against other members of the Court for citing foreign law).
30 Compare, e.g., K EN I. K ERSCH , C ONSTRUCTING C IVIL LIBERTIES : DISCONTINUITIES
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103-11 (2004) (describing how
“judicial ﬂirtation with treaties and international human rights agreements” in the years immediately following World War II “occasioned a swift and serious political response,” including calls for
a constitutional amendment to limit the Treaty Power), M ARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at
55 (describing the tone of the American debate over judicial comparativism as “surprisingly
strident”), and Alford, supra note 19, at 664 (noting a “groundswell of opposition” in the United
States to constitutional comparativism “from various corners and for a variety of reasons”), with,
e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 30, 141 (noting that the practice of citing foreign law “has never
been seriously contested” in Canada).
31 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 581-82 (noting various congressional bills and resolutions against the use of foreign law by the federal courts, and quoting the death threat made
against Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg for their support of comparativism); Law, supra note 15, at
657 n.17 (citing examples of negative political and popular reaction to citation of foreign law by
members of the Court).
32 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 680 (“[A] judge's willingness to rely on comparative
experiences in constitutional interpretation quickly has become an important test for many
senators in judging a judicial nominee's qualiﬁcations.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle and the Challenge of Resisting—or Engaging—Transnational Constitutional Law,
66 ALA. L. R EV. 105, 110 n.24 (2014) (citing the conﬁrmation hearings of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan); David M. Herszenhorn, Court Nominee Criticized As
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campaign to enact laws limiting or prohibiting judicial usage of foreign law
continues to gain traction. As of this writing, legislatures in thirty-four
states33 as well as Congress34 have considered taking measures against
judicial comparativism; in eleven states, some type of action has passed the
legislature.35 Not surprisingly, experimental evidence suggests that citation

Relying on Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES , June 26, 2009, at A13 (reporting on congressional criticism of
public remarks by then-Judge Sotomayor that were supportive of comparativism).
33 Support for the campaign appears to draw upon a combination of opposition to judicial usage
of foreign law in general and animus directed at Islamic law in particular. See FAIZA PATEL ET AL.,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1-13 (2013), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf; Kimberly Railey, More States Move to Ban Foreign Law,
USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2013, at 4A. The thirty-four states where laws against judicial use of foreign
law have been introduced or enacted as of this writing are Alabama, where voters have passed a
constitutional amendment placed on the ballot by the legislature, S.B. 4, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ala. 2013); Alaska, H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2011) (lapsed due to committee inaction);
Arizona, where legislation was enacted in 2011, ARIZ. R EV. S TAT. § 12-3103 (2011); Arkansas, H.B.
1348, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (lapsed due to committee inaction); Florida, FLA .
S TAT. § 61.0401 (2014); Georgia, S. Res. 808, 152d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014)
(committee proceedings pending); Idaho, which passed a nonbinding resolution, H. Con. Res. 44,
60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); Indiana, S.B. 460, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2013); Iowa, H.F. 76, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2013); Kansas, where legislation was
enacted in 2012, KAN. S TAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2012); Kentucky, H.B. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess (Ky.
2014); Louisiana, where legislation was enacted in 2010, LA . R EV. S TAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010);
Maine, H.P. 811, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); Michigan, H.B. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2011); Minnesota, where the bill in question was withdrawn by its author, S.F. 2281, 87th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2012); Mississippi, H.B. 44, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); Missouri,
where a bill passed by the legislature was vetoed by the governor, S.B. 267, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013); H.B. 757, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Mo. 2013); Nebraska, Leg. B.
647, 102d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011); New Hampshire, H.B. 1422, 2011 Gen. Court, 162d Sess.
(N.H. 2011); New Jersey, where the bill in question was withdrawn, Assemb. B. 3496, 214th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); New Mexico, S.J. Res. 14, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2012) (lapsed due
to committee inaction); North Carolina, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 416; Oklahoma, which enacted a
ban in 2013, OKLA . S TAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2013); Pennsylvania, H.B. 2029, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2011); South Carolina, S. 60, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013); S. 81, 120th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013); South Dakota, which passed a law in 2012, S.D.
C ODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012); Tennessee, which passed legislation in 2010, TENN. C ODE.
ANN. § 20-15-102 (2010); Texas, H.B. 288, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2012); S. 1639, 83d Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2013); Utah, H.B. 296, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); Vermont, S. 265, 2014 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2014); Virginia, H.B. 1322, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); Washington,
which enacted a law in 2013, W ASH. R EV. C ODE § 2.28.165(4)-(6) (2013); West Virginia, H.R.
2216, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); and Wyoming, H.J. Res. 0005, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wyo. 2013); H.J. Res. 0004, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
34 See Law, supra note 15, at 656 n.16 (citing various bills and resolutions introduced in Congress).
35 The states in question are Alabama (where legislative action has placed a constitutional
amendment on the ballot), Arizona, Florida, Idaho (where the legislature passed a nonbinding
resolution), Missouri (where the law was vetoed by the governor), Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See supra note 33 (citing the relevant bills and resolutions).
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of foreign law may undermine rather than bolster public acceptance of
Supreme Court opinions.36
It is not diﬃcult to imagine that such pressure might have an eﬀect on
the Justices. Time and time again, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its
sensitivity both to public opinion37 and to the elected branches.38 In reality,
however, the Justices do not behave as if they are simply slaves to public
opinion, as evidenced by the fact that a number of them have made a point
of publicly advocating comparativism.39 If their goal is truly to avoid
controversy or criticism, the last thing they should do is take a public stand
in favor of something very controversial. Yet this is precisely what some of
them do, and the political controversy hypothesis cannot easily account for
their behavior.
The behavior of courts in other countries is even harder for the political
controversy hypothesis to explain. In East Asia, popular and political
attitudes toward comparativism do not vary much from country to country,
yet there are signiﬁcant variations in the level of foreign law usage. Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong share similarly welcoming attitudes toward
foreign law, yet the Japanese Supreme Court makes much less use of
foreign law than the Korean or Taiwanese Constitutional Court or the

36 See Brett Curry & Banks Miller, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places? Foreign Law and
Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 P OL. & P OL’ Y 1094, 1107-08 (2008) (reporting the results of
an experiment conducted upon undergraduate students in which citation of foreign law in
fabricated Supreme Court decisions decreased support for the Court among subjects with low
levels of political knowledge).
37 The Supreme Court’s responsiveness to public opinion has been repeatedly documented
by political scientists, see, e.g., KERSCH , supra note 30, at 110 (noting that “virulent political
reaction” and “critical commentary” against judicial use of treaties to advance human rights led
courts to abandon “bold reasoning” that deemed treaties such as the U.N. Charter to be selfexecuting); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. P UB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (ﬁnding that “the policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the United States”); Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous
Branch (surveying the literature, and noting ﬁndings to the eﬀect that the Court may follow
public opinion more closely than Congress), in THE J UDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE C OUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND C ONTEMPORARY
C ONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 130-33 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005), and
more recently by legal scholars as well, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE W ILL OF THE P EOPLE:
HOW P UBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE S UPREME C OURT AND SHAPED THE
M EANING OF THE C ONSTITUTION passim (2009).
38 See A NNA HARVEY , A M ERE MACHINE : THE S UPREME C OURT , C ONGRESS , AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (2013) (showing empirically the extent to which the Court
defers to congressional preferences, particularly those of the House of Representatives).
39 See supra note 14 (quoting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O’Connor and the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist).
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Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.40 Because the level of comparativism
varies even when the degree of controversy surrounding it does not, the
degree of controversy obviously cannot explain the variation in the level of
comparativism.
This is not to suggest that political controversy has no eﬀect on the
practice of judicial comparativism. But it is never the only factor at play,
and in many countries, it is not even an important factor. The role of
institutional factors, by contrast, is widely overlooked and underestimated.
Legal scholars and political scientists alike tend to depict judicial behavior
as a function of the legal views and policy preferences that judges hold,
subject to constraints imposed by the political environment.41 Yet the
structure and practices of institutions such as courts and law schools also
have profound eﬀects on the preferences and capabilities of judges and
lawyers.42 Judicial and popular attitudes may help to explain whether judges
want to engage in comparativism, but they cannot explain how those
attitudes arose in the ﬁrst place. Nor do those attitudes determine whether
judges are even capable of practicing comparativism. For answers to such
questions, we must also consider the implications of the institutional
environment for judicial behavior.
40 See infra Sections II.B, III.B, IV.B, V.B (discussing attitudes toward comparativism and
levels of comparativism in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong).
41 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, at xii (2d ed. 2013) (“To generalize grossly,
law professors have tended to view the Justices as driven by felt obligations of ﬁdelity to distinctively legal ideals, while political scientists have regarded them as ideologically motivated actors
with political agendas.”); id. at xvii (acknowledging “the now familiar insight that loosely ‘political’
values and concerns inﬂuence Supreme Court decision making”); J EFFREY A. S EGAL &
HAROLD J. S PAETH , THE S UPREME C OURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL M ODEL R EVISITED
48-114 (2002) (contrasting the “legal model” of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which holds that
judicial decisions are “substantially inﬂuenced” by a combination of case-speciﬁc facts and
governing law, with the “attitudinal model,” which holds that “the Supreme Court decides disputes
in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices,” and the
“rational choice model,” which holds that the justices pursue a broad range of goals in strategic
ways); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics,
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 629 (2000) (noting that emphasis on the “sharp dichotomy” between
legal and political explanations for judicial behavior has been “most pronounced when scholars of the
Court are engaged in competition over models of judicial behavior”).
42 See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors
in Political Life, 78 AM. P OL. S CI . REV. 734, 789 (1984) (contrasting mainstream political science,
which treats preferences as exogenous, with “new institutionalism,” which argues that preferences
develop “through a combination of education, indoctrination, and experience” and emphasizes the
role of institutions in inculcating preferences); Whittington, supra note 41, at 615 (“Individuals
cannot be conceptualized as autonomous, free choosers who just happen to ﬁnd themselves in a
particular institutional context. Institutions do not merely impose constraints on choices; they
constitute preferences.”).
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This Article argues that a combination of symbiotic institutional factors
must exist in order for judicial comparativism to thrive. The ﬁrst factor is
institutional capacity: a court that lacks the institutional capacity to learn
about foreign law is, in a literal sense, incapable of engaging in comparativism in more than ad hoc fashion. Institutional capacity may not be a
suﬃcient condition for comparativism to occur, but it is a necessary condition. The second factor, without which the ﬁrst cannot exist, is a system of
legal education that values and inculcates the practice of comparativism.
High levels of judicial engagement with foreign law are dependent upon the
availability of institutional mechanisms for learning about foreign law, such
as the availability of clerks or researchers with foreign legal expertise. Such
mechanisms are unlikely to be eﬀective, in turn, unless they are backed by a
system of legal education that produces an adequate supply of lawyers with
both the ability and the desire to engage in comparativism.
The eﬀects of institutional variation can be observed only by studying
institutions that actually vary from one another. In other words, the study
of judicial comparativism requires a comparative approach. The heart of this
Article, therefore, is an in-depth look at the operation of the most prominent constitutional courts in East Asia, an increasingly important region of
the world that nevertheless receives relatively little scholarly attention.43
43 See, e.g., H IRSCHL , supra note 11, at 4, 17, 163, 211-13 (noting the “near-exclusive focus” of
the ﬁeld of comparative constitutional law on “a small number of overanalyzed, ‘usual suspect’
constitutional settings or court rulings” drawn from “a dozen liberal democracies,” and the
resultant fact that the “constitutional experiences of entire regions,” including much of Asia,
“remain largely uncharted terrain, understudied and generally overlooked”); M ARK TUSHNET ,
ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2014) (suggesting
that “South and East Asia are relatively neglected areas of study” “[p]artly because of language
issues”); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Design in Divided Societies (observing that “[f]or nearly two decades,” the comparative
constitutional law literature has been “oriented around a standard and relatively limited set of
cases: South Africa, Israel, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United
States, and to a lesser extent, India”), in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED S OCIETIES:
INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 3, 8 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Rosalind Dixon & Tom
Ginsburg, Introduction to R ESEARCH HANDBOOK ON C OMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1, 13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“It is probably the case that 90% of comparative work in the English language covers the same ten countries, for which materials are easily
accessible in English.”); The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’ L. J. C ONST. L. 519,
530 (2005) [hereinafter Scalia–Breyer Conversation] (“We have referred to opinions of India's
Supreme Court. But I confess that fewer opinions from other Asian nations come to our
attention.” (quoting Justice Breyer)); see also, e.g., Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, Preface to
CONSTITUTIONAL C OURTS: A COMPARATIVE S TUDY, at v-vi (Andrew Harding & Peter
Leyland eds., 2009) (introducing a collection consisting of eight chapters on European courts,
three on African courts (including one on South Africa), two on Asian courts, and one survey
chapter on Latin American courts, and acknowledging explicitly that the selection of courts was
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The speciﬁc courts in question are the Japanese Supreme Court (JSC), the
Korean Constitutional Court (KCC), the Taiwanese Constitutional Court
(TCC), and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA). Although
Asian courts do not have a reputation for engaging in comparativism,44 the
reality is that all four of these courts make substantially greater use of
foreign law than the U.S. Supreme Court.
Investigation of these courts sheds light on not only the institutional
mechanisms, but also the hidden motivations behind judicial comparativism.
Interviews with numerous judges and other oﬃcials disclose that courts
practice comparativism not only to enrich or justify their decisions, but also
to pursue what might best be described as judicial diplomacy.45 Courts engage
in a variety of activities, ranging from translation of their own opinions and
citation of foreign law to engagement with international organizations, that
are not aimed simply at crafting stronger opinions or winning over domestic
audiences. These activities also constitute strategies for competing or cooperating with other courts in pursuit of political, economic, and diplomatic
constrained by “the availability of scholars with the appropriate interest and expertise”); JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: C RITICAL P ERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE W ORLD (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001) (containing six chapters on
European jurisdictions, ﬁve chapters on former British territories, and only two chapters on other
jurisdictions—namely, one on Japan and one on Central America); M ARKESINIS & FEDTKE,
supra note 11, at 62-108 (analyzing the use of comparative law in Italy, France, England, Germany,
Canada, and South Africa).
44 See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law (reporting
that there is “little judicial dialogue” in Asia, and that Asian courts tend either to refrain from
engaging in “explicit comparative analysis” or to focus on a narrow set of “common law jurisdictions,”
depending upon whether they hail from a civil law or common law tradition), in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165, 1173, 1176 (Michel Rosenfeld &
András Sajó eds., 2012); Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND . J. GLOBAL
L EGAL S TUD . 27, 33 (2010) (noting the grudging approach of Japanese courts to the domestic
application of international law, and describing the resistance oﬀered in the name of “Asian values”
to the “liberal universalism” of rights discourse).
45 See Alford, supra note 19, at 669-70 (observing that, for the first time ever, “we have Supreme
Court Justices who are . . . actively embracing global constitutionalism in an eﬀort to perform
functions akin to foreign diplomats,” and citing Justices Breyer and Kennedy as examples); Ken I.
Kersch, The Supreme Court and International Relations Theory, 69 ALB. L. REV. 771, 774-75, 787 (2006)
(observing that “the justices may frequently understand themselves as diplomats, representing
American values and explaining American practices to what is often an ignorant, misinformed, or
hostile world,” and that the tendency of legal scholars to treat the “‘globalist’ turn” in deciding
domestic constitutional cases “as an issue of interpretive theory” has obscured the extent to which the
Justices have employed “a whole range of ‘diplomatic’ justifications” for their behavior); Law &
Chang, supra note 11, at 570 (likening the TCC’s extensive use of foreign jurisprudence to “a form of
judicial diplomacy” that can counteract Taiwan’s severe diplomatic isolation by “generat[ing] badly
needed support and acceptance among the international community”); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6,
at 1181 (arguing that the adoption of constitutional ideas from other countries can be an attractive
strategy for “marginal states” to “court[] foreign approval and enhance[] their legitimacy”).
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objectives. Comparativism is part of a repertoire of judicial strategies for
achieving goals of an international character.
Part I explains the methodology behind this Article and the measurement
challenges that it is designed to address. On the one hand, a full account of
how and why courts engage in comparativism cannot be gathered simply by
reading judicial decisions. Quantitative data collection that relies on the
coding of judicial opinions is particularly inadequate because many courts do
not disclose in their opinions the extent of their foreign legal research. On the
other hand, a qualitative case study approach runs into the problem that it
can be diﬃcult to generalize from a small number of cases. This Article
responds to these challenges by combining extensive interview-based
research with a case selection strategy designed to isolate the eﬀect of
particular variables.
Parts II, III, IV, and V oﬀer detailed accounts of the comparativist practices and foreign dealings of the JSC, KCC, TCC, and HKCFA respectively.
Each case study highlights a number of variables that cannot be captured by
reading the court’s decisions, such as the gap between foreign law usage and
foreign law citation and the institutional mechanisms for conducting foreign
legal research. The relevant institutional characteristics of the four courts, as
well as the U.S. Supreme Court, are summarized in Table 1. Across the
board, each court’s institutional capacity for comparativism is highly
correlated with the degree to which it actually uses foreign law. The KCC,
TCC, and HKCFA are better equipped to perform foreign legal research
than the JSC, which in turn enjoys decisive advantages over the U.S.
Supreme Court. It is no coincidence that the JSC’s level of foreign law
usage falls between that of the KCC, TCC, and HKCFA, at the high end of
the spectrum, and the U.S. Supreme Court, at the low end.
Part VI canvasses a variety of legal and political explanations for
comparativism, such as a shortage of domestic jurisprudence or a court’s
need for credibility in the eyes of domestic audiences. Although there is
truth to many of these explanations, they do not tell the whole story.
Drawing upon the wealth of information provided by the case studies, Part
VII highlights the fact that courts sometimes engage in comparativism for
reasons that have less to do with adjudication than diplomacy. Among East
Asian courts, comparativism serves goals that range from cultivating international influence and prestige, to promoting the rule of law in other countries,
to reassuring foreign investors, to fulfilling treaty-based sovereignty
arrangements. Comparativism is not always, however, the preferred judicial
strategy for advancing such goals. Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely
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practices constitutional comparativism, it is an active practitioner of judicial
diplomacy in other forms.
Part VIII makes the basic but widely overlooked point that comparativism is shaped as much by the ability of judges to use foreign law as by
their desire to do so. Courts and judges operate within institutional and
resource constraints that deﬁne the outer limits of their capabilities. These
constraints include the range of institutional mechanisms within a court for
learning about foreign law, and the extent to which legal education generates
an adequate supply of lawyers and judges with both the ability and the desire
to consult foreign law.
The Conclusion reﬂects on both the inevitability of judicial diplomacy
and the obstacles that courts face in their pursuit of international inﬂuence
and prestige. Notwithstanding the globalization of constitutional law, it
remains diﬃcult for constitutional courts to be fully global in either inﬂuence or intellectual reach. Instead, courts belong to jurisprudential networks
or legal families, and they tend to exhibit little interest in, or inﬂuence over,
courts that fall outside their own groups.
I. THE CHALLENGES OF MEASURING COMPARATIVISM:
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
Comparativism can be deﬁned and measured in more ways than one. In
order to understand what we are attempting to explain and how it can be
measured, we must draw two distinctions. The ﬁrst is the distinction
between foreign law and international law. Although scholars sometimes
lump foreign law together with international law under the umbrella
category of “transnational law,”46 foreign law usage and international law
usage do not occur for exactly the same reasons. In particular, judicial usage
of international law often enjoys a stronger legal basis than judicial usage of
foreign law.47 Therefore, the two phenomena cannot be treated as fungible
46 E.g., Black et al., supra note 24, passim (exploring the conditions under which the Justices
cite “transnational law,” without distinguishing between foreign law and international law).
47 The most obvious diﬀerence is that countries often consider themselves bound by international law, whereas they are by deﬁnition not bound by foreign law. See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at
75 (noting that, “[u]nlike the legally binding and warranted application of other bodies of law,” the
practice of referring to “foreign law” is “purely voluntary”); JACKSON, supra note 19, at 169
(noting that “much international law is binding, or potentially binding, on all nations” whereas
“comparative foreign law is not”); David S. Law, Constitutional Convergence and Comparative
Competency: A Reply to Professors Jackson and Krotoszynski, 66 ALA . L. R EV. 145, 146-47 (2014)
(noting that it is normatively plausible for courts to pursue convergence with international law, but
not convergence with foreign law). It is also the case that constitutions often contain provisions
expressly authorizing or even obligating courts to take heed of international law. See Tom
Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diﬀusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate

946

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 927

for purposes of explanation. This Article concerns itself with judicial usage
of foreign law as opposed to international law.
The second crucial distinction is between judicial citation of foreign law
and judicial usage of foreign law. Citation of foreign law is a narrow phenomenon that can be measured simply by reading judicial opinions. Usage of
foreign law is a broader phenomenon that can be much harder to observe.
Perhaps because citation is so easily observed and quantiﬁed, it is tempting
to conﬂate citation and usage, or to treat citation as a convenient proxy for
usage.48 However, the two are not the same, and neither is a satisfactory
proxy for the other, for several reasons.
First, courts frequently fail to cite their sources. Numerous courts make
a habit of researching and weighing foreign law yet rarely, if ever, divulge
their research by citing it explicitly in their published opinions.49 The
copious citation practices followed by courts in common law jurisdictions
such as Canada, South Africa, and the United States may reliably indicate

International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. R EV. 201, 207-10 (listing the number and percentage of
constitutions written after 1945 that explicitly reference or incorporate treaties or customary
international law). By contrast, constitutions are much less likely to explicitly endorse judicial
usage of foreign law. Apart from the constitutions of South Africa or Zimbabwe, it is unclear
whether any national constitutions do so, and even the South African constitution gives foreign
law less favorable treatment than international law. See S. AFR. C ONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39
(“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . (b) must consider international law; and (c)
may consider foreign law.”); ZIM. C ONST., 2013, § 46 (“When interpreting this Chapter, a
court . . . may consider relevant foreign law . . . .”).
48 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 24 (referring interchangeably to the “using” and “citing” of
transnational law).
49 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 97, 174 (noting that judges in France and Slovakia frequently
consider foreign law but consider it improper to cite foreign law in their decisions); MARKESINIS &
FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 62-65 (discussing France and Italy, and noting that, although French judicial
opinions as a rule do not cite foreign law, the avocats généreaux who advise the Cour de cassation “are
nowadays expected to consult foreign law when preparing their recommendations”); LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM
& GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 4-5 (2000) (revealing that the Hungarian Constitutional Court is
influenced by the jurisprudence of several countries, especially Germany, but explicitly cites only the
European Court of Human Rights); Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 234, 240 (noting that variations
in “citation style” may explain why the supreme courts of France, Italy, and Spain cite foreign decisions
less frequently than other supreme courts in Europe, and that study of citations alone “cannot capture
when judges do not disclose the origin of their inspiration coming from foreign cases or contacts with
their peers abroad,” or when courts issue documents other than decisions that reflect their knowledge of
foreign law); Gábor Halmai, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation (dividing “constitutional jurisdictions” into three categories: those which do not use foreign law,” such as the U.S.
Supreme Court; “those which do use foreign law but do not do so explicitly,” such as Hungary; and
“those which do so explicitly,” such as South Africa), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 1328, 1329; Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557
(discussing the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s decision not to cite foreign law).
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the use of foreign law,50 but such practices are far from universal.51 The
opinion-writing conventions of civil law courts, for example, may disfavor
the explicit citation of any case law, much less foreign case law.52 As a
50 See, e.g., Bastarache, supra note 18, at 200 (reporting that “attribution is systematic and
considered mandatory” whenever the Canadian Supreme Court draws upon foreign jurisprudence); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 523, 533 & nn.33-35 (discussing, and rejecting, the
possibility that the Canadian Supreme Court “looks habitually to the South African Constitutional
Court for guidance and inspiration” but simply fails to acknowledge when it has done so); infra
text accompanying notes 244-50 (noting that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal makes a point
of disclosing any foreign authorities on which it has relied).
51 See, e.g., B OBEK , supra note 11, at 84 (describing the style of English judicial decisions as
“open and discursive” and “not hiding anything,” “[i]n contrast to the judicial reasoning styles in a
number of Continental jurisdictions”); M ITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. L ASSER, J UDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A C OMPARATIVE A NALYSIS OF J UDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND L EGITIMACY 3-5
(2004) (summarizing the manner in which common law observers tend to contrast the opinionwriting practices of common law and civil law courts); M ARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at
62-66 (citing Italy and France as examples of countries where courts give considerable attention to,
but do not cite, foreign law); Bryde, supra note 11, at 297 (noting that “the German Constitutional
Court has developed a style of reasoning where it basically cites only its own precedents”);
Saunders, supra note 11, at 580 (observing that “features of the process of adjudication . . . associated with common law and civil law legal systems” may help to “explain diﬀerences
in the extent of explicit reference to foreign constitutional experience in judicial reasoning”).
52 Citation practices vary within the civil law world, but French and German constitutional
adjudication share in common their tendency to cite only a narrow range of domestic legal sources.
The French judicial style is famously restrictive and frowns upon citation of anything but codiﬁed
domestic law. See JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 73-74
(2006) (describing the “style” of French judgments as “simply giv[ing] a result, which follows from
the rule,” “but not . . . provid[ing] the reasons,” in a manner “more like the minutes of a committee
meeting, which do not attempt to summarise the debates that went on before the decision was
reached”); BOBEK , supra note 11, at 97-99 (dubbing the French judicial style “the example[] of a
legal tradition which hides more than it explicitly tells,” and noting that legislation is “essentially
the only visible authority to which a French judicial decision is allowed to refer”); LASSER, supra
note 51, at 31-35 (observing that the manner in which French Cour de cassation decisions are written
“eﬀectively denies access to anything but the numerical citation and the syllogistic application of
the codiﬁed law”); id. at 329-30 (discussing how French legal theory denies judicial decisions the
status of “law”). To some degree, Dutch and Italian judicial opinions share similar characteristics.
See Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 253 (noting that “some courts may not be able to cite foreign
law (or even anything else beside the applicable codes and statutes) openly, either due to a legal
prohibition or to a social constraint,” and that “[t]his seems to be the case particularly in France
and Italy”); Elaine Mak, Why Do Dutch and UK Judges Cite Foreign Law?, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 420,
430-31 (2011) (observing that the Dutch Supreme Court was historically inﬂuenced by the French
Cour de cassation and tends to render short opinions that do not cite foreign law, even if foreign
materials were considered).
By contrast, the German legal tradition—to which the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese legal
systems all trace their roots—is “relatively open” to consideration of a wide range of sources.
B OBEK , supra note 11, at 120. According to a member of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court
(the Bundesverfassungsgericht), “[t]here are no fundamental objections against referring to
international and foreign sources in German courts in general or the Constitutional Court in
particular,” and the Constitutional Court consults the work of other courts “extensively.” Bryde,
supra note 11, at 296-97. Notwithstanding its willingness to consider foreign law in its deliberations,
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result, judicial citation of foreign law may be poorly correlated with judicial
usage of foreign law.53
Second, courts can and do use foreign law in ways that have little, if any,
inﬂuence on the opinions they issue. Most scholarship on judicial usage of
foreign law focuses on the kind of usage that manifests itself explicitly or
implicitly in judicial decisions.54 There are other ways, however, in which
courts make use of foreign law. For example, courts have been known to
establish research institutes dedicated to comparative law, publish translations of judicial opinions, issue reports about foreign law, join international
organizations, and host international conferences. All of these activities
constitute judicial usage of foreign law in the sense that they involve
deliberate exposure to, or dissemination of, foreign law. It is not always the
case, however, that these activities occur primarily or exclusively for the
purpose of enriching judicial deliberations or adorning judicial opinions
with foreign citations. Creation of a research institute that specializes in
foreign law might be intended, for instance, to enhance a court’s international prestige and inﬂuence, or to facilitate legislative or constitutional
reform activities by other government institutions, or to create a repository
of knowledge for the beneﬁt of the general public.55
In short, it is diﬃcult to measure judicial usage of foreign law using
quantitative techniques because neither the frequency nor the range of
usage can be reliably observed simply by reading judicial decisions. A
qualitative case study approach that involves in-depth investigation of a

however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s style of reasoning generally excludes the citation of foreign
law. See BOBEK , supra note 11, at 141 (counting only three comparative references among all of the
court’s published decisions in 2008); Bryde, supra note 11, at 297 (observing that the court’s
tendency to cite “only its own precedents” has resulted in “a huge gap between the sources of the
decision cited and those actually inﬂuencing the judges”).
53 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527 (warning that “the frequency with which a court
cites foreign law in its opinions is an extremely unreliable measure of the extent to which the court
actually makes use of foreign law”).
54 See, e.g., J ACKSON , supra note 19, at 17-102 (calling upon judges to “engage” with foreign
law by evaluating whether, and to what extent, foreign law holds valuable lessons for domestic
jurisprudence).
55 The research institute established by the KCC, for instance, publishes reports on foreign
law but has no responsibility for performing foreign legal research in connection to pending cases;
such research is handled by an entirely diﬀerent set of foreign law specialists. Thus, whatever
purpose the institute actually serves, the connection between the creation of the institute and the
adjudication of actual cases is tangential at best. See infra subsection III.D.6 (discussing the KCC’s
creation of a Constitutional Research Institute that performs comparative constitutional research
unrelated to pending cases); see also, e.g., Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 240 (noting that the
French Cour de cassation, which rarely cites foreign law explicitly in its own decisions, issues an
annual report that “regularly considers developments in other jurisdictions”).
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speciﬁc court is, in theory, well suited to overcoming this type of problem.56
However, a case study approach suﬀers from potential drawbacks of its
own. If the cases selected for study are too diﬀerent in too many ways, it
becomes impossible to attribute similarities or diﬀerences across cases to
any speciﬁc variable.57 Ideally, one would compare cases that share many
background characteristics in order to isolate the eﬀect of a smaller number
of variables.
This Article addresses these challenges by employing what social scientists
call a structured-focused comparison of most-similar and most-diﬀerent cases,
which seeks to combine the best of both worlds.58 On the one hand, a case
study approach permits the kind of probing investigation that is necessary
to unearth accurate information about usage, as opposed to citation, of
foreign law. Extended discussion with court personnel who possess ﬁrsthand knowledge is a particularly rich source of such information. On the
other hand, the disadvantages of the case study approach can be mitigated
through a combination of case selection and data collection strategies.
Section I.A sets forth the logic behind the selection of most-similar and
most-diﬀerent cases, while Section I.B elaborates upon the structuredfocused approach to data collection.
A. Case Selection: Most-Similar Versus Most-Diﬀerent Cases
The reliability of the case study approach is inherently improved by
collecting data on multiple countries rather than a single country, but the
selection of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular has the further
methodological advantages associated with comparing “most similar cases.”59
56 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527 (urging “[s]cholars who wish to understand or
measure a particular court’s usage of foreign law” to “supplement quantitative research methods,
such as statistical analysis of citations to foreign law, with qualitative approaches that are capable
of probing more deeply, such as interviews with court personnel”).
57 See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 104 (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2002); Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in
Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 135 (2005).
58 See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS : THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL L EGAL
S YSTEMS 18 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008) (explaining the methodological merits
of “structured-focused comparison,” and oﬀering a fruitful example of its application to the study
of courts); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT , C ASE S TUDIES AND THEORY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE S OCIAL SCIENCES 67-72 (2005) (explaining the origins and merits of
“structured, focused comparison”).
59 Hirschl, supra note 57, at 133-35 (observing that the selection of “most similar cases” is a
“standard case selection principle[] in inference-oriented, controlled comparison in qualitative,
‘small-N’ studies” that “control[s] for variables or potential explanations that are not central to the
study” and thus helps isolate the eﬀect of the key variables of interest).
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Selection of cases that share much in common makes it possible to isolate
the eﬀect of the diﬀerences that remain. Not only are all three countries
geographically adjacent, but they also belong to the same legal and geopolitical groupings. All three are democracies with German-inﬂuenced civil law
systems and similar ways of training and promoting judges. South Korea
and Taiwan share the added similarities of being former Japanese colonies
that received German law through a Japanese ﬁlter and subsequently
experienced democratization and a renaissance of judicial review at roughly
the same time in the late 1980s. Furthermore, all three countries are closely
aligned with the United States in security and economic matters. Finally,
none of the three countries possesses a constitutional provision that either
endorses or limits judicial consideration of foreign or international law.60
These similarities make it possible to rule out a number of explanations
for variation among the three countries. A ﬁnding that one of the three
courts makes greater use of foreign law than the others, for example, cannot
be attributed to the existence of a career judiciary, the historical inﬂuence of
German law, or close relations with the United States because those characteristics are common to all three countries. Likewise, because none of the
three countries possess constitutional provisions that address judicial usage
of foreign law, there is no possibility that the presence or absence of such
provisions accounts for diﬀerences among the three countries.
The fourth case study, Hong Kong, is included for precisely the opposite
reasons. An invaluable complement to the study of most similar cases is the
study of most different cases.61 A combination of most similar and most
different cases can rule out competing explanations in ways that an analysis of
most similar cases alone cannot. Suppose, for example, that three highly
similar courts both engage heavily in comparativism, but it is unclear which
(if any) of their many shared characteristics explains their behavior. If a
fourth court that shares only one of those characteristics behaves the same
way, that characteristic becomes more plausible as an explanation.62 Alterna-

60 See supra note 47 (noting provisions in the constitutions of South Africa and Zimbabwe
that explicitly authorize judicial usage of foreign law). As an empirical matter, it is far from clear
whether the existence of such provisions actually aﬀects the degree to which courts use foreign
law. See Kalb, supra note 11, at 425 (observing that the degree of judicial “engagement with foreign
and international law does not seem to vary measurably” as between countries that possess or lack
constitutional provisions addressing the use of foreign law).
61 See Hirschl, supra note 57, at 139-42 (explaining the logic of the “most diﬀerent cases”
approach).
62 See id. at 139-41 (observing that analysis of “most different” cases can isolate and emphasize
the explanatory power of the few “key independent variables” that the cases share in common).
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tively, if a fourth court shares none of those characteristics in common yet
still behaves the same way, then the explanation must be sought elsewhere.
Within East Asia, Hong Kong ﬁlls the role of a most diﬀerent case. As a
wealthy, industrialized society, it shares enough in common with the other
three jurisdictions that comparisons can plausibly be made. The inclusion of
Hong Kong in the analysis also rounds out the list of jurisdictions with
judicial review in East Asia and yields a relatively comprehensive picture of
the region as a whole.63 In numerous respects, however, Hong Kong is
unlike the other three cases. It belongs to diﬀerent legal and geopolitical
families: whereas Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all possess a German legal
tradition and rely upon the United States for their security, Hong Kong has
a strongly British legal tradition and forms part of China. Unlike the others,
Hong Kong is not a sovereign state but instead a “Special Administrative
Region” of China that enjoys heightened autonomy.64 One aspect of this
autonomy is that Hong Kong’s courts are not answerable or inferior to any
court in mainland China.65 Hong Kong is therefore unusual within East
Asia, and indeed globally, in combining vigorous judicial review by independent courts with a lack of democratic self-rule66 and oversight by an
authoritarian central government.67 Finally, Hong Kong’s constitution
63 The only East Asian country with judicial review that this Article does not cover is Mongolia.
See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 164-200 (2003) (describing the often vigorous practice of judicial review in Mongolia).
64 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA , art. 2 (H.K.) (authorizing the HKSAR to “exercise a high
degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power”); Danny
Gittings, Hong Kong’s Courts Are Learning to Live with China, 19 H.K. J., July 2010, at 1, 1, available
at http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/193248/1/Content.pdf (describing the 1984 agreement, the
Sino–British Joint Declaration, “under which Britain agreed to restore Hong Kong to China in
1997, in return for generous promises about the high degree of autonomy Hong Kong would enjoy
under a ‘one country, two systems’ formula”).
65 See Gittings, supra note 64, at 1 (describing the HKCFA’s existence and power of ﬁnal
adjudication as “a key part of the deal struck between London and Beijing in 1984” that was
subsequently enshrined in the Sino–British Joint Declaration).
66 Only half of Hong Kong’s relatively weak legislature, the Legislative Council, is directly
elected, while the head of the government, the Chief Executive, is selected by interest groups or
“functional constituencies” that are largely sympathetic to China from a list of candidates
approved by Beijing. See DANNY GITTINGS , INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG BASIC
LAW 107-13 (2013) (explaining why the “functional constituency” system for selecting Hong Kong’s
Chief Executive confers outsized inﬂuence upon a “small circle” of roughly 200,000 voters and
prevents pro-democracy candidates from winning); id. at 129-40 (describing how the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress blocked the introduction of universal suﬀrage for
Legislative Council elections, and observing that the “functional constituency” system empowers
“economically important but numerically small” groups).
67 See S TANDING C OMM . N AT ’ L P EOPLE ’ S C ONG., DECISION OF THE S TANDING
C OMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL P EOPLE’S CONGRESS ON ISSUES R ELATING TO THE
S ELECTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG S PECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
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contains several provisions that explicitly authorize or contemplate judicial
usage of foreign and international law.68
B. Data Collection: A Structured-Focused Approach
This case selection strategy of combining most-similar and mostdiﬀerent cases is paired with a “structured-focused” approach to data
collection, meaning that the investigation of each case is structured around
the same set of questions.69 For each of the four courts, the following
questions are addressed sequentially: (1) the level of each court’s foreign law
usage, (2) the level of each court’s foreign law expertise, (3) the jurisdictions
most frequently considered by each court, (4) the mechanisms that each
court possesses for learning about foreign law, and (5) the extent of each
court’s interaction with foreign courts. The table at the end of this Article
provides further structure and focus for the data by summarizing and
contrasting the relevant institutional characteristics of the four East Asian
courts plus the U.S. Supreme Court. Use of a structured-focused approach
ensures that similar data is collected on each court and facilitates inferences
about the eﬀect of a consistent set of variables. This approach also yields
beneﬁts for the overall study of courts and comparativism: it promotes the
development of a cumulative body of scholarship by furnishing a template
for data collection on additional countries and courts.
The data for the case studies were collected as follows. In Japan, interviews
were conducted in 2008, 2009, and 2013 with a variety of judges, oﬃcials, and
scholars, including eight sitting and retired members of the JSC itself; two
judges assigned to the JSC as research judges or chōsakan, who perform the
functions of law clerks; and judges sent abroad to study foreign law at
government expense. Likewise, the original data in this article on the KCC
derive from interviews conducted by the author in 2011, 2013, and 2014 with a
combination of judges, oﬃcials, and scholars, including a retired member of
R EGION BY UNIVERSAL S UFFRAGE AND ON THE M ETHOD FOR FORMING THE L EGISLATIVE C OUNCIL OF THE H ONG KONG S PECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE R EGION IN THE Y EAR
2016, at 3-4 (Aug. 31, 2014), available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/ﬁlemanager/template/en/doc/
20140831a.pdf (requiring the screening of candidates for Chief Executive of Hong Kong by a
“nominating committee” dominated by interest groups sympathetic to Beijing on the grounds that
“the Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country [China] and loves Hong Kong”);
Tony Cheung et al., Beijing Emphasises Its Total Control over HK, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.),
June 10, 2014, at A1 (describing the position formally taken by China’s State Council that Hong
Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” is itself “subject to the central government’s authorisation,” and
that it remains the central government’s prerogative to oversee Hong Kong’s government).
68 See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
69 A EUROPE OF R IGHTS , supra note 58, at 18; see also G EORGE & B ENNETT , supra note
58, at 67-72.
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the KCC; three senior oﬃcials responsible for relations with foreign courts
and oversight of legal research; three Constitutional Research Oﬃcers (the
Korean equivalent of law clerks); a researcher at the newly established
Constitutional Research Institute, a subsidiary of the KCC; several judges
sent abroad by the Korean judiciary to study foreign law; a prosecutor; and
several scholars with prior judicial experience. The bulk of the fieldwork in
Taiwan consisted of confidential, face-to-face interviews conducted in 2011
and 2014 with thirteen current and former justices of the TCC and ten
current and former law clerks.70 In Hong Kong, interviews were conducted
in 2014 with three members of the HKCFA, two law clerks at the HKCFA,
two former lower-court judges, and a variety of local scholars and attorneys.
II. THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation
The JSC rarely cites foreign law in its decisions. A recent empirical
analysis suggests that actual citations to foreign precedent appear in roughly
5% of the JSC’s constitutional decisions.71 The rarity of explicit citations to
foreign precedent reﬂects in part the fact that, compared to a common law
court such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the JSC writes relatively concise,
lightly footnoted opinions in a style more characteristic of many civil law
courts.72
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage
Like the KCC and TCC, the JSC is signiﬁcantly more likely to perform
foreign law research than to cite foreign law in its opinions. Unlike the
KCC or TCC, however, the JSC has neither routinized nor institutionalized
the practice of researching foreign law. The overall attitude at the JSC

70 The interviews in Taiwan were conducted by the author, on some occasions in conjunction
with Professor Wen-Chen Chang and once with the participation of Professor Carol Lin, in a
combination of Mandarin and English tailored to the interviewees. Professor Chang was a law
clerk to former Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng of the TCC but is not included in the count of
interviewees.
71 See Akiko Ejima, A Gap Between the Apparent and Hidden Attitudes of the Supreme Court of
Japan Towards Foreign Precedents (identifying 11 cases in which foreign law was cited, out of a total
of 234 constitutional cases decided from 1990 through mid-2008), in THE USE OF FOREIGN
P RECEDENTS BY C ONSTITUTIONAL J UDGES , supra note 11, at 273, 277, 283.
72 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (contrasting the opinion-writing and citation
practices of civil law and common law courts).
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toward such research is perhaps best described as one of indiﬀerence, rather
than either enthusiasm or hostility.
On the one hand, consideration of foreign law is distinctly uncontroversial.
None of the justices I interviewed could think of any case in which a judge
or justice had resisted or criticized the consideration of foreign approaches
to a particular legal question. This lack of resistance to comparative legal
analysis was attributed to the fact that Japanese law is itself of largely
foreign origins. Those foreign origins are primarily German, but American
inﬂuence is also obvious in the area of constitutional law.73 In the words of
one justice, there is “nothing to prevent” the JSC from engaging more
heavily in comparative analysis.74
On the other hand, neither the justices nor the clerks perform foreign
legal research as a matter of course. Several justices echoed the sentiment
that foreign legal research is “neither encouraged nor discouraged” but is
instead conducted when “necessary for the case,”75 and in most cases, it is
“not so necessary.”76 By their own account, Japanese judges are, for the most
part, “not so interested” in foreign law. The fact that lawyers tend not to
employ foreign law in their briefs and arguments to the JSC also contributes to the JSC’s “limited motivation” to learn about foreign law.77 One
justice characterized the JSC’s use of foreign law as “far behind compared to
global standards.”78
When foreign legal research does occur, it may occur either upon the
initiative of a law clerk79 or at the request of a particular justice. Whether
foreign law research is considered “necessary” varies with both the area of
law and the speciﬁc topic under consideration. My sources estimated that
foreign legal research is conducted in less than 10% of cases; according to
one justice, the total is perhaps “less than 1%” of all cases heard, amounting

73 See David S. Law, The Myth of the Imposed Constitution (discussing American involvement in
the drafting of Japan’s post-war constitution and the consequent characterization of the Japanese
constitution as “imposed”), in S OCIAL AND P OLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF C ONSTITUTIONS
239, 242-44 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
74 Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013).
75 Interview with Justice H, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013).
76 Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013).
77 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
78 Id.
79 See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L.
R EV. 1545, 1579 (2009) (describing how successful career judges are recruited by the judicial
bureaucracy to serve as law clerks, or chōsakan, on the JSC for several years).
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to “a few occasions per year.”80 However, these estimates reﬂect usage of
foreign law across the JSC’s entire docket.81 Unlike either the TCC or
KCC, the JSC is a court of general jurisdiction, and only a small fraction of
its docket consists of constitutional cases.82 Several justices agreed that the
JSC is more likely to consider foreign law in constitutional cases than in
other areas of law,83 but as one justice observed, the court is typically
confronted with a “lack of important constitutional litigation,” which may
help to explain its overall lack of foreign law usage.84
Not only the composition, but also the sheer size of the JSC’s docket
may have consequences for its usage of foreign law. As Japan’s highest court
of general jurisdiction, the JSC faces a massive docket of over 12,000 cases
annually,85 most of which it lacks discretion to reject.86 Even though Japan
has only one-third the population of the United States, the JSC’s docket is
even greater than that of the U.S. Supreme Court87 (which, unlike the JSC,
80
81

Interview with Justice H, supra note 75.
For most purposes, the JSC divides its docket into civil, criminal, and administrative cases
and does not track constitutional cases as a distinct category. See infra note 85 (citing oﬃcial court
statistics that employ these three categories).
82 Professor Ejima’s analysis of the 15,885 JSC decisions rendered from 1990 through mid2008 and included in the TKC database found only 234 cases (or 1.5% of the total) that contained
any mention of the Japanese Constitution. See Ejima, supra note 71, at 275, 277. One judge who
worked at the JSC as a chōsakan for nearly ﬁve years indicated that he encountered fewer than
twenty-ﬁve cases in total that involved a constitutional question.
83 See Interview with Justice H, supra note 75; Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. Other
areas of more frequent foreign law usage reportedly include intellectual property cases and,
increasingly, corporate law cases. See id.
84 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
85 In 2012, the most recent year for which the JSC has released statistics as of this writing,
the JSC received 12,311 new cases (8169 civil and administrative cases and 4142 criminal cases) and
decided 12,594 existing cases (8336 civil and administrative cases and 4258 criminal cases). See
S UPREME C OURT OF JAPAN, C IVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE C ASES: NEWLY FILED ,
R ESOLVED , AND P ENDING, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/
B24DMIN1-1.pdf (reporting the numbers of civil and administrative cases ﬁled and decided in
2012); S UPREME C OURT OF JAPAN, C RIMINAL AND OTHER C ASES: NEWLY FILED ,
R ESOLVED , AND P ENDING, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/
B24DKEI01.pdf (reporting the numbers of criminal cases ﬁled and decided in 2012).
86 See HIROSHI ITOH , THE S UPREME C OURT AND B ENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN
J APAN 47 (2010) (noting that 1996 revisions of the Japanese civil code that were intended to
increase the JSC’s discretion over its civil docket have failed to signiﬁcantly alleviate the JSC’s
workload); John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public
Trust (noting that, “[u]nlike the United States Supreme Court and most state supreme courts in
the United States,” the JSC “does not exercise any signiﬁcant discretion over its docket”), in LAW
IN JAPAN: A TURNING P OINT 99, 105 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); Law, supra note 79, at 1577-78
(detailing the JSC’s “overwhelming” docket, which rivals that of the U.S. Supreme Court in
absolute size but consists largely of cases that the JSC cannot decline to hear).
87 See The Justices’ Caseload, S UP. C T . U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3WFE-2CDW.
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can and does dismiss the vast majority of its cases at will) and far greater
than that of either the KCC or the TCC (which receive roughly 150088 and
50089 petitions per year, respectively). All other things being equal, the
more cases that a court must hear, the less time that it can spend per case,
and the less likely that it can aﬀord to perform foreign legal research.
Nevertheless, docket pressure alone cannot explain the JSC’s modest use of
foreign law. Both the Israeli Supreme Court and the Indian Supreme
Court, for example, face daunting caseloads,90 yet both are known for
engaging in comparative analysis.91
Consideration of foreign law becomes more likely if another court is
known for its extensive jurisprudence on a topic with which the JSC itself
has relatively little experience. The leading example is electoral malapportionment. In 1976, the JSC declared unconstitutional an electoral apportionment scheme for the legislative lower house that weighted rural voters
ﬁve times as heavily as urban voters.92 To date, the 1976 malapportionment
88 In 2013, the KCC received 1480 new cases and disposed of 1585 existing cases. See Case
Statistics of the Constitutional Court of Korea, C ONST. C T. KOREA , http://english.ccourt.go.kr/
cckhome/eng/decisions/caseLoadStatic/caseLoadStatic.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/UH4T-SJTK (reporting the cumulative number of cases ﬁled and decided
through the present); see also C ONSTITUTIONAL C OURT OF KOREA , TWENTY YEARS OF THE
C ONSTITUTIONAL C OURT OF KOREA 121 (reporting an annual average of 1214 ﬁlings from
September 1988 through August 2007). A backlog of cases means that it is possible for the KCC to
decide more cases in a given year than it receives.
89 Justices of the Constitutional Court: Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, DEP’ T S TAT .
JUD . YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/report/eg-1.htm (last visited Feb. 28. 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/J594-SBQ4.
90 See Suzie Navot, Israel: Creating a Constitution—The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme
Court (1994–2010) (noting that the Israeli Supreme Court “is the ﬁrst, last, and only” court in
Israel with jurisdiction over most disputes concerning “government institutions and state organs”
or “between citizens and the State”), in THE USE OF FOREIGN P RECEDENTS BY C ONSTITUTIONAL J UDGES , supra note 11, at 129, 136; Nick Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian
Supreme Court’s Workload, 10 J. EMPIRICAL L EGAL S TUD . 570, 578-79 (2013) (reporting that the
Indian Supreme Court currently receives roughly 70,000 ﬁlings per year).
91 See Navot, supra note 90, at 135 (noting that over 20% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s citations over the period from 1948 to 1994 were to foreign law); id. at 141-42 (reporting that over the
period from 1994 to 2010, roughly one in three of the Israeli Supreme Court’s constitutional
decisions cited foreign law); Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in
Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’ L L. 218, 239-40 (2006) (ﬁnding that
the Indian Supreme Court referred to foreign law in roughly one-quarter of its decisions between
1950 and 2005); Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second
Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. P A . J. C ONST. L. 284, 284 n.1 (1998)
(characterizing the Israeli Supreme Court as “the most important comparative constitutional law
institute of the world,” and giving credit to the court’s “practice of employing clerks from all over
the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”).
92 See Law, supra note 79, at 1547-48 (discussing Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Control
Commission, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 S AIKŌ S AIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 223 ( Japan)).
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decision is one of only nine cases in which the JSC has ever held a law
unconstitutional, and it remains the most momentous decision rendered by
the court since its establishment in 1947.93 At the time of the decision, the
JSC knew that the U.S. Supreme Court had already compiled a signiﬁcant
body of jurisprudence on the issue of electoral malapportionment, but the
manner in which the JSC became aware of the relevant American case law
stands as a lesson in the importance of in-house foreign legal expertise. In
1976, the chief chōsakan at the JSC, Jiro Nakamura, was a common law expert
and was familiar in particular with the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
decisions in Baker v. Carr94 and Reynolds v. Sims.95 Nakamura was reportedly
responsible for introducing both cases to the members of the JSC.96
C. Jurisdictions Considered
To the extent that the JSC considers foreign case law, it is most likely to
evaluate the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht, and in recent years the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR).97 Interest in German jurisprudence is a natural consequence of the extent to which Japanese law is modeled on German law,
while the extensive role played by the American occupation in the drafting
of Japan’s post-war constitution makes American constitutional jurisprudence of particular interest in Japan. Notably absent from the list are two
courts from the English-speaking world, the Canadian Supreme Court and
South African Constitutional Court, both of which enjoy a reputation in the
English-language comparative constitutional literature for exporting their
constitutional jurisprudence.98
93 See id. (counting eight cases as of 2009 in which the JSC had struck down a law as unconstitutional). In late 2013, the JSC held a law unconstitutional for only the ninth time since its
establishment in 1947. See Tomohiro Osaki & Reiji Yoshida, Top Court Shoots Down Unequal
Inheritance Rights, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/04/national/
top-court-shoots-down-unequal-inheritance-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/KK7Q-DKB5
(describing the JSC’s decision to overrule several earlier decisions and hold unconstitutional a
provision of the Civil Code that limits illegitimate children to one-half the inheritance of
legitimate children). Prior to the 2013 case, the last time the JSC struck down a law was in 2008, in
a case that also involved explicit formal discrimination against illegitimate children. That case
involved eligibility for citizenship as opposed to inheritance. See Law, supra note 79, at 1547.
94 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
95 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
96 See Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
97 See, e.g., id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 75.
98 See, e.g., S LAUGHTER , supra note 12, at 74 (singling out the South African Constitutional
Court and the “Canadian Constitutional Court” [sic] as “disproportionately inﬂuential” and
“highly inﬂuential, apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more
established constitutional courts”); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
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Although the justices themselves are generally not avid consumers of
legal scholarship, one justice explicitly credited the expansion of comparative constitutional scholarship in Japan for increasing both the degree to
which the JSC performs foreign legal research and the range of jurisdictions
that the JSC considers.99 Scholarly translation and analysis of foreign law is
facilitating the citation of foreign law by lawyers, which in turn makes it
more likely that the chōsakan and the justices will consider it “necessary” to
conduct their own research into foreign law.
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise
The Japanese judiciary has a longstanding practice of sending promising
recruits abroad to study foreign law. Even so, however, the justices and
clerks of the JSC tend on average to possess less foreign legal expertise than
their Korean, Taiwanese, or Hong Kong counterparts, as summarized below
in Table 1.
The beginnings of this practice were modest. In the early 1960s, Japan
sent one judge per year to the United States to earn an LL.M. with the
support of the Fulbright Foundation, and Germany was subsequently added
as a destination with a combination of private and public funding.100 The
scope of the study-abroad program has grown substantially over time. In
any given year, the judiciary will recruit roughly 100 to 120 judges from its
in-house training institute.101 From this number, approximately thirty will
be selected by the judicial bureaucracy early in their careers to study

Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 558
n.316 (2005) (identifying the Canadian Supreme Court as “one of the most inﬂuential domestic
courts worldwide on human rights issues”); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now
Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES , Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (noting that many legal scholars have
“singled out” the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court as “increasingly inﬂuential”).
99 See Interview with Justice F, supra note 74; cf. Giorgio Fabio Colombo, Japan as a Victim of
Comparative Law, 22 M ICH . S T. INT’ L L. R EV. 731, 747 (2014) (observing that “almost every
Japanese law professor reads (and very often speaks ﬂuently) at least one, but often more than one
foreign language among German, English and French, and has a deep knowledge of a foreign
jurisdiction,” and arguing that “Japanese legal scholars are probably the best comparative lawyers
in the world”).
100 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 76; Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
101 The Shiho Kensyujo, or Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI), is a mandatory
training program operated by the judiciary at government expense for those who pass the Japanese
bar examination. Judges and prosecutors are recruited directly from the LTRI. See Law, supra note
79, at 1552.
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abroad.102 At least half of that group goes to the United States, while the
remainder is typically distributed among the United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, France, and perhaps also Australia.
At present, the majority of Japanese judges who study abroad do so as
visiting scholars or court observers rather than degree candidates.103 Of the
roughly twenty judges studying abroad in the United States in the 2013–2014
academic year, three-quarters took up residence at law schools as visiting
scholars, while the remainder were assigned to courts in various cities as
observers.104 The General Secretariat, the administrative arm of the JSC,
maintains a list of approximately fifteen American law schools that have
regularly accepted Japanese judges as visiting scholars and are approved
destinations.105 Although being sent abroad to study is no longer as exceptional as it once was, it is still considered a sign of professional promise and
distinction.
The practice of sending judges abroad has borne at least some fruit in
the area of constitutional law. Several prominent judges who studied
abroad, such as Jiro Nakamura, Yasuo Tokikuni, and Kojo Toshimaro,
became known for importing ideas from American constitutional litigation
to Japan, as in the case of the 1976 electoral malapportionment decision.106
There have also been instances in which the JSC’s law clerks—who are
themselves elite career judges assigned to the JSC on a temporary basis107—
have exposed the justices to foreign ideas and ways of thinking.108
Nevertheless, the overall impact of the study-abroad program on the
judiciary and the JSC in particular appears to be limited. The General
Secretariat’s objectives in sending judges abroad are to “widen their views”
and expose them to foreign legal systems that have inﬂuenced Japanese

102 Judges are selected for study abroad by the Jimusōkyoku or General Secretariat of the
Supreme Court, the powerful administrative arm of the judiciary that also selects judges to serve
as chōsakan on the JSC and to work at the General Secretariat itself. See id. at 1556-58.
103 See Interview with Judge 7, Japanese District Court Judge, in Location Concealed (Sept.
10, 2013) (estimating that roughly twenty of the hundred or so members of his judicial cohort
studied in the United States as visiting scholars, while only ﬁve or six did so as LL.M. candidates).
104 See id.
105 See id. In years past, the few judges who went abroad typically did so as LL.M. candidates.
See Interview with Justice A, supra note 76. Today, a relatively small number who undergo a more
rigorous selection process that includes a competitive examination still have the opportunity to earn
an LL.M. at government expense. See Interview with Judge 7, supra note 103.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
107 See Law, supra note 79, at 1556-57, 1579.
108 See id. at 1583 n.241 (recounting the story of one justice’s exposure to the constitutional
theory of John Hart Ely courtesy of a law clerk).
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law.109 Several justices opined that, in reality, most judges have little
opportunity to retain their foreign language skills after returning to Japan
and become largely indistinguishable from those who were never sent
abroad. In addition, relatively few of the justices themselves are likely to be
alumni of the judiciary’s study-abroad program. The ﬁfteen seats on the
court are allocated among diﬀerent segments of the legal profession on the
basis of an informal quota system, and under current practice, six of the
ﬁfteen justices are selected from the ranks of the career judiciary.110 It is
thus unlikely that more than one or two of those justices at any given time
will have personally taken advantage of the study-abroad program.
The remaining nine justices may be exposed to foreign law in other
ways. Typically, four of the nine are former attorneys from private practice,
two are former prosecutors, two are former government bureaucrats, and
one is a former law professor.111 The frequent practice of selecting a former
diplomat to occupy one of the two seats allocated to the bureaucracy has
both the goal and the eﬀect of equipping the court with native expertise in
international law.112 It is also not unusual for one of the former attorneys on
the court to have practiced international business law. The academic on the
court is especially likely to have extensive exposure to foreign law. Law
professors in Japan are much more likely to engage in comparative legal
scholarship and to possess foreign legal training than their American
counterparts,113 and a number of the professors to have served on the JSC
have been renowned for their expertise in foreign law. Regardless of how
they acquire foreign legal expertise, however, the justices who already
possess such expertise are also the ones who are most likely to “go to the
library themselves” to research foreign law.114
The chōsakan, elite career judges who are selected by the General Secretariat to assist the JSC for several years as law clerks,115 are neither required
nor expected to possess foreign legal training or foreign language skills.
109 Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in
Tokyo, Japan ( July 19, 2013).
110 See Law, supra note 79, at 1551, 1564-74 (elaborating at length upon the manner in which
seats on the JSC are ﬁlled in practice).
111 See id. at 1568-69.
112 See id. at 1571.
113 See Colombo, supra note 99, at 747 (“[A]lmost every Japanese law professor reads (and
very often speaks ﬂuently) at least one, but often more than one foreign language … and has a
deep knowledge of a foreign jurisdiction among the most ‘prestigious’: France, Germany, England
or the US.”); infra Table 1 (contrasting the foreign educational credentials of constitutional law
professors at elite Japanese and American law schools).
114 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
115 See Law, supra note 79, at 1557.
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However, the fact that a particular judge has studied abroad is considered
an “advantage” for purposes of chōsakan recruitment.116 In addition, the
General Secretariat reportedly attempts to ensure that the JSC has at least
one German-trained and one French-trained chōsakan (out of a total of
thirty-seven) to address any needs for German or French legal research that
may arise. In recent years, roughly half of the chōsakan at any given time are
likely to have studied law overseas, a fact that reflects both the growing scope
of the judiciary’s study-abroad program and the recruitment advantage
enjoyed by alumni of the program. Most of the former chōsakan interviewed
by the author reported that they had at some point performed foreign legal
research, either upon their own initiative or at the request of a justice.
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts
The JSC’s level of interaction with foreign courts falls between the
extremes of the TCC, which is frequently thwarted by Taiwan’s lack of
diplomatic recognition,117 and the KCC and HKCFA, both of which possess
strong institutional ties to courts elsewhere.118 Members of the JSC have
regular opportunities to make oﬃcial visits to foreign courts and jurisdictions. Each year, ﬁve of the ﬁfteen justices are eligible to take a one-week
overseas trip at the court’s expense. Their destinations have run the gamut
from the usual suspects (such the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECtHR) to
courts that are somewhat oﬀ the beaten path, such as the Supreme Court of
the Vatican City State, the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Constitutional Court of Slovenia.
The extent to which individual justices actually travel overseas varies
widely. In this respect, the JSC is probably no diﬀerent from any other
court.119 Over the course of roughly a decade on the JSC, one exceptionally
well-traveled justice met judges from twenty-eight countries and visited
every continent except South America, but this individual had served as a
diplomat prior to joining the court and was by all accounts highly atypical.
116
117

Interview with Justice F, supra note 74.
See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 540-43, 548-57 (describing Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and various consequences for the judiciary of this isolation); infra Section IV.E.
118 See infra Sections III.E, V.E.
119 The same could be said, for example, of European courts. See B OBEK , supra note 11, at 50
(observing of Continental courts that “it tends to be always the same few members of the court
who participate in the various international meetings”). Particular justices may have unique
responsibilities that demand greater travel, such as the KCC member who represents South Korea
before the Venice Commission, or the TCC member who played a leadership role in the International Association of Women Judges.
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A more typical member of the JSC might journey abroad every other year.
Several justices cited the pressures of the JSC’s enormous docket as a factor
preventing more frequent travel.120
Like many other courts, the JSC regularly welcomes judicial visitors from
other countries, although its efforts at aﬃrmative outreach pale in comparison
to those of the KCC. The JSC does host a prominent legal figure from abroad
on an annual basis. Past guests have included the chief justices of the United
Kingdom Supreme Court, the French Cour de cassation, the German
Supreme Court, the ECtHR, and the U.S. Supreme Court. The guest is
typically selected on the basis of group discussion among the fifteen justices.
III. THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation
It is relatively rare for the KCC to actually cite foreign law in its opinions. Sources inside the KCC estimated that foreign law, in the form of
judicial precedent or otherwise, is explicitly cited in no more than 5 to 10%
of decisions.121
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage
Although the KCC is reluctant to cite foreign law, it has embraced the
use of foreign law. The degree to which the KCC has routinized and
institutionalized foreign legal research is breathtaking. Its mechanisms for
researching and analyzing foreign law range from specialized researchers
hired specifically for their foreign legal credentials, to the establishment of a
freestanding research institute that publishes comparative constitutional
scholarship and monitors the work of constitutional courts around the world.
Sources inside the KCC gave estimates of how frequently foreign legal
research is conducted that ranged from 60% of cases to “always.”122 The
decision to research foreign law in a given case is usually made by the
Constitutional Research Oﬃcer (CRO) responsible for preparing the bench
memorandum. As discussed below, CROs are roughly equivalent to law
clerks but are signiﬁcantly more experienced and much more likely to
120
121

See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the size of the JSC’s docket).
See, e.g., Interview with Oﬃcial A, Current or Former Constitutional Research Oﬃcer of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, in Location Concealed (Feb. 25, 2011); Interview with
Oﬃcial B, Current or Former Constitutional Research Oﬃcer of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Korea, in Seoul, Korea ( July 6, 2011).
122 Interview with Judge 1, Korean District Court Judge, in Location Concealed (Date Concealed) (quoting a judge employed at the KCC).
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possess foreign legal training than their American counterparts. On rare
occasions—perhaps 5 to 10% of the time—foreign legal research will be
performed at the speciﬁc request of a justice.123
C. Jurisdictions Considered
The jurisdictions most often considered by the KCC are Germany, the
United States, and Japan, in roughly that order. Interest in the case law of
the ECtHR is growing, and research on French law is also conducted from
time to time. The KCC’s attention to German and Japanese law is partly a
legacy of the imposition of Japanese law during the colonial period. Because
Japanese law at the time was inspired by German law, Korean law borrows
heavily but indirectly from German law as well. Research on German law is
conducted at least half of the time.124
American law receives attention in approximately 20% of cases and is
especially likely to be considered in freedom of expression and habeas
corpus cases. The lack of social and economic rights in the U.S. Constitution was identiﬁed by several sources as a factor that limits the relevance of
American jurisprudence to the KCC. However, the use of American law is
on the rise. Korean emphasis on the acquisition of English-language skills
and interest in professional opportunities for American-trained lawyers
have helped to tip the balance of foreign legal training away from German
law toward American law. It is widely felt among younger Koreans, including law students, that English opens a wider range of professional opportunities than other languages such as German.
Japanese law is considered in a small, and declining, proportion of cases,
in the neighborhood of 15%. Cases involving older statutes that date back to
Japan’s occupation of Korea continue to call for Japanese legal research.
However, Japan was described as oﬀering “little constitutional jurisprudence” and “little to learn” because the JSC is “too conservative” and “never
strikes anything down.”125 Through the mid-1980s, the training curriculum
for Korean judges included a Japanese language requirement. It is perhaps
both a cause and a symptom of declining judicial interest in Japanese law
that the requirement was abandoned in the late 1980s.
Like the JSC and TCC, the KCC appears to pay relatively little attention
to courts from common law jurisdictions other than the U.S. Supreme Court.

123
124

See Interview with Oﬃcial A, supra note 121.
See id.; E-Mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to
author (Aug. 30, 2013, 03:37 EST) (on ﬁle with author).
125 Interview with Oﬃcial A, supra note 121.
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Neither the Canadian Supreme Court nor the South African Constitutional
Court was identified as a major influence or regular point of comparison. A
recently retired justice opined that the KCC is “expanding its repertoire,
slowly” and cited as evidence the deliberate recruitment of researchers to
specialize in the European Court of Human Rights.126 However, when asked
about the actual impact of the ECtHR, a veteran court oﬃcial indicated that
its jurisprudence is considered “from time to time,” but “not that often.”127
The holdings in the KCC’s library oﬀer a rough but quantiﬁable proxy
for the court’s interest in speciﬁc jurisdictions and in foreign law more
generally. Of the roughly 125,000 volumes held by the library, 55% are of
foreign origin.128 The library’s constitutional law collection is skewed even
more heavily in a comparative direction. German volumes make up 28% of
the collection, while Korean volumes make up only 25.5%.129 Englishspeaking jurisdictions (including the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the rest of the Commonwealth) together contribute 18.6% of the total,
while Japan by itself accounts for 16%. Leading the remainder are France
with 5% and Austria with 1.3%.
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise
The KCC’s means of learning about foreign legal systems are remarkably
varied and extensive. Its repositories of foreign legal expertise include: (1) the
justices who have studied overseas; (2) the permanent law clerks who possess
foreign legal expertise; (3) the law clerks hired as specialists in foreign law;
(4) the law professors who work for the court on a part-time basis; (5) experts
hired by the parties; and (6) the newly established Constitutional Research
Institute. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. The Justices Themselves
With respect to the proportion of its membership that has studied law
abroad, the KCC falls between the JSC and the TCC. Four of the nine
126 Interview with Justice A, Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Korea, in Seoul, Korea (Sept. 6, 2011).
127 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Korea (Aug. 22, 2013).
128 The ﬁgures reported here were provided to the author by the KCC library’s circulation
desk in the form of a spreadsheet dated October 30, 2014. As of that date, the KCC’s library
contained a total of 125,941 titles, of which 56,830 (or 45.12%) were classiﬁed as domestic in origin.
129 Per the statistics cited above in note 128, the library holds 19,890 volumes on constitutional law, 14,813 of which are of foreign origin. In the area of constitutional law, German volumes
outnumber Korean volumes by a margin of 5647 to 5077.
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justices have studied law overseas: three hold LL.M. degrees from the
United States (two from the University of Michigan, one from Southern
Methodist University), and one studied criminal law at the Max Planck
Institute in Germany.130 The members of the KCC have all traditionally
been recruited from the career judiciary or the prosecutor’s oﬃce; no law
professor has ever been appointed to the KCC.
The level of foreign training possessed by the justices is likely to grow
over time as a result of the Korean judiciary’s expanding study-abroad
program.131 At present, the Korean judiciary provides funding for roughly
sixty judges to study overseas for one year at government expense.132 Judges
who apply successfully for this program are awarded full tuition and a
stipend that is slightly lower than their usual judicial salary.133 Another
forty or so judges are given a lower level of ﬁnancial support to study
abroad for a shorter period of six months as visiting scholars.134 Judges are
ordinarily eligible to apply for the study-abroad program from their seventh
through tenth years of service. Given that there are roughly two hundred
judges in any given cohort, the overall proportion of Korean judges who
study abroad at some point approaches, if not exceeds, one-half.135
Moreover, the Korean Supreme Court has recently announced a dramatic
expansion of the program: all judges appointed after 2003 have now been
promised the opportunity to study abroad, albeit as visiting scholars rather
than degree candidates.136
The oﬃcial application for overseas study lists as possible destinations
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Switzerland, Japan, China, Spain, Russia, Australia, and Italy, but the list is not
exclusive, and other countries may be requested “with enough evidence of
necessity.” Judges express their preferences for particular institutions from a
list approved by the Korean Supreme Court, which allocates applicants
among the various institutions. The judges themselves are then responsible
130 See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to
author (Sept. 5, 2013, 20:57 EST) (on ﬁle with author); E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to author (Sept. 5, 2013, 19:39 EST) (on ﬁle with author).
131 The Korean Ministry of Justice operates a comparable program for prosecutors.
132 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122.
133 See id.; R EPUBLIC OF K OREA J UDICIARY , OFFICE OF C OURT A DMIN ., P ERSONNEL
ADMIN. AGENCY, 2013 NYEONDO HAEUEYEONSU ANNAE [2013 STUDY ABROAD GUIDE] 67 (on ﬁle with author).
134 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122.
135 There are roughly 200 judges in any given cohort, which means that approximately 800
judges are within the four-year eligibility window at any given time. Meanwhile, over the course of
any given four-year period, roughly 400 judges will be selected for some form of overseas study.
136 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122.
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for gaining admission to the institutions to which they are assigned. As a
practical matter, a major obstacle to a successful application is demonstration
of the requisite language skills: some judges attend cram school on weekends
in order to muster the necessary TOEFL score.
Notwithstanding the historical importance of German and Japanese law,
roughly two-thirds of Korean judges opt for English-speaking jurisdictions,
with a particular bias in favor of the United States. For the 2013–2014
academic year, out of a total of sixty-ﬁve judges receiving full funding for
their overseas studies, forty-three selected English-speaking countries, of
whom the overwhelming majority (thirty-ﬁve) chose the United States
(thirteen as LL.M. students and twenty-two more as visiting scholars).137
The United Kingdom has three, Canada and Australia each have two, and
one opted for the Netherlands (which the Korean judiciary classiﬁes as an
English-speaking jurisdiction for purposes of study abroad).138 By contrast,
eight judges went to German-speaking countries (six to Germany itself, one
to Austria, and one to Switzerland).139 Only two chose Japan, which is now
tied with China and is less popular than either France (ﬁve judges) or Spain
(three judges).140
Both the judicial preference for English-speaking countries, and the level
of familiarity in Korea with American law more generally, are likely to grow
in the future. A number of Korean judges attributed the preference for
English-speaking countries to the heavy premium that Korean society
places on the acquisition of English-language skills. Judges view time spent
in the United States as an opportunity for their children to be exposed to
the American educational system and to learn English. Law students in
particular value English for the access that it gives them to the American
legal market as well as elite Korean law ﬁrms, which have recruited large
numbers of foreign-qualiﬁed lawyers.141 These trends are both reﬂected and
reinforced by government regulation of Korean legal education. The law
school accreditation committee established by the Korean ministry of
education has adopted guidelines that call upon Korean law schools to oﬀer

137 See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to
author (Oct. 1, 2013, 19:28 EST) (on ﬁle with author).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See Anthony Lin, Made In USA, A SIAN LAW ., July 2013, at 16, 16-17 (citing statistics on
the prevalence of foreign-qualiﬁed attorneys at top Korean law ﬁrms, and noting that the “vast
majority of foreign lawyers at Korean ﬁrms are Korean Americans or Korean nationals who
studied law in the United States”).
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at least eight courses in foreign languages.142 Although some law schools
oﬀer courses in Japanese and Chinese, the majority of the foreign-language
oﬀerings are in English.143
2. Constitutional Research Oﬃcers (CROs)
Compared to their counterparts elsewhere in East Asia or in the United
States, the justices of the KCC enjoy access to higher levels of research
assistance and foreign legal expertise. The KCC has at its disposal four
types of support personnel who possess varying levels of foreign legal
training and perform a combination of distinct and overlapping tasks:
Constitutional Research Oﬃcers (CROs), Constitutional Researchers
(CRs), Academic Advisers, and researchers at the KCC’s Constitutional
Research Institute.
Of these four types, the CROs are most analogous to law clerks of the
American variety but are more numerous and more experienced. Most
CROs are permanent employees who have passed the infamously demanding Korean bar examination144 and are comparable in rank and pay to career
judges. They are hired not by individual justices, but by the President of
the KCC upon a collective vote of the justices.145 Relatively demanding
eligibility requirements are imposed by statute: a CRO must be a judge,
prosecutor, or attorney; a legal academic of assistant professor rank or
higher at an accredited university; a “Grade 4 or higher” public employee
with ﬁve or more years of experience in “law-related positions in state
agencies”; or a holder of a doctorate in law with ﬁve or more years of “lawrelated” experience in a state agency, university, or other research institute
speciﬁed by KCC regulation.146 Those who pass the selection process serve
for renewable ten-year terms. A relatively inexperienced CRO may possess
two to four years of experience; some possess over a decade of experience
and have served longer than the justices themselves.
142 See E-mail from Yukyong Choe, Research Fellow, Judicial Policy Research Institute,
Supreme Court of Korea, to author (Sept. 9, 2013 10:00:27 CST) (on ﬁle with author) (citing
Ministry of Education, Science & Technology Directive 3.1.2.5).
143 See id.
144 Historically, the bar pass rate in Korea has rarely exceeded 5%. See Kyong-Whan Ahn,
Law Reform in Korea and the Agenda of “Graduate Law School,” 24 WIS . INT’ L L.J. 223, 227 (2007).
Both the bar examination system and the bar pass rate are currently in ﬂux due to profound
reforms of Korean legal education, including the introduction of American-style graduate law
schools that award J.D. degrees in lieu of undergraduate law programs. See Thomas Chih-hsiung
Chen, Legal Education Reform in Taiwan: Are Japan and Korea the Models?, 62 J. L EGAL EDUC. 32,
34 (2012) (discussing legal education reforms in Korea).
145 See C ONSTITUTIONAL C OURT OF K OREA , supra note 88, at 115-16.
146 Id. (referencing the Constitutional Court Act as amended as of 1991).
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The KCC also has at its disposal a number of temporary CROs. The
Korean Supreme Court has a longstanding practice of dispatching judges to
assist the KCC. Likewise, the Ministry of Justice regularly loans prosecutors to the KCC to serve as CROs. As of this writing, the KCC has over
seventy CROs in total, including ﬁfty-six regular CROs (ﬁve of whom are
currently seconded to the Constitutional Research Institute), fourteen
judges on loan from the Korean Supreme Court, four prosecutors on loan
from the Ministry of Justice, and two temporary CROs on loan from
miscellaneous government agencies (one from the Korean equivalent of the
Internal Revenue Service and another from the Ministry of Government
Legislation).
Under reforms initiated by the KCC’s newly installed chief justice in 2013,
a majority of the CROs are assigned to individual justices. Court administrators assign to each justice the equivalent of three and a half CROs.147
Typically, each justice is assigned two regular CROs plus a career judge on
loan from the Korean Supreme Court. In addition, each justice shares a
CRO from the prosecutor’s oﬃce with one other justice. With the exception of a handful who perform administrative or supervisory roles, the
remaining CROs are divided by subject matter into three teams: liberty
rights (meaning civil and political rights), economic and property rights,
and social welfare rights (a category that includes pension and social
security issues). The KCC’s Constitutional Researchers and Academic
Advisers, who possess extensive foreign legal expertise,148 are also divided
among the three subject-matter teams. The clerks assigned to individual
justices handle routine cases, especially those that can be dismissed for
jurisdictional or justiciability reasons. Diﬃcult or controversial cases are
referred to the subject-matter teams for group discussion.
Over half of the regular CROs have studied law overseas, and all are
guaranteed the opportunity to do so at government expense after three or
four years of service.149 As of this writing, out of ﬁfty-six regular CROs,
twenty-ﬁve have studied in the United States as either LL.M. candidates or
visiting scholars, while six have studied in Europe (speciﬁcally, Germany,
France, and Spain). This geographical breakdown reﬂects a signiﬁcant shift
147 The justices do not have the ability to select their own CROs from the overall pool. Otherwise, explained one administrator, “there would be a big mess, even war” among the justices over the
most capable CROs. E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea,
to author (Aug. 29, 2013, 22:24 EST).
148 See infra subsections III.D.3, III.D.4 (discussing the foreign training of the KCC’s Constitutional Researchers and Academic Advisers).
149 See Interview with Oﬃcial B, supra note 121 (indicating that “literally everyone” who
works as a CRO will eventually have studied law overseas).
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in emphasis away from Germany toward the United States. A veteran
administrator at the KCC reminisced that most of the initial cohort of
CROs circa 1988 had studied law in Germany before joining the KCC and
came of age at a time when German was widely taught in Korean high
schools. By contrast, more recent CROs who arrive at the KCC with the
intention of studying in Germany sometimes switch to the United States.
The longer history of judicial review in the United States was cited as one
factor. Other reasons for the shift toward the United States resemble those
given by judges participating in the Korean Supreme Court’s study-abroad
program, including the opportunity for children to learn English.
Foreign legal study is not limited to enrollment at academic institutions.
The KCC also stations CROs directly with foreign courts. Since 2011, the
KCC has arranged for CROs to spend six months at the U.S. Supreme Court
performing research on specific topics. To be selected for this program, a
CRO must have previously studied in the United States as either a visiting
scholar or LL.M. candidate. Likewise, the KCC has dispatched CROs to the
German Constitutional Court to perform analogous research. Prior work
experience can also be a source of foreign legal expertise, as in the case of one
CRO who clerked at the South African Constitutional Court before joining
the KCC.
Nor does the study of foreign law cease once CROs have returned
home. In recent years, the CROs have organized study groups that translate
prominent works of foreign legal scholarship into Korean. The resulting
translations are distributed internally within the KCC.150 Other study
groups have focused on German and Spanish constitutional law. The KCC
also regularly hosts international conferences that present additional
opportunities for learning about foreign law. Both speakers at the court’s
ﬁrst international symposium in 2012 hailed from Germany, while the
December 2013 international symposium on the topic of welfare policy and
constitutional adjudication featured prominent scholars from Germany,
France, and the United States.
3. Constitutional Researchers (CRs)
As if the foreign legal expertise of the CROs were not enough, the KCC
further bolsters its foreign legal research capabilities through the use of both
150 In 2006, for example, the U.S. constitutional law study group collectively translated the
second edition of Professor Chemerinsky’s constitutional law treatise, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW: P RINCIPLES AND P OLICIES (2d ed. 2002), and in 2009, it selected
Professor Farber’s treatise on the First Amendment, DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2002).
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Constitutional Researchers (CRs) and Academic Advisers. The deﬁning
characteristic of CRs, as opposed to CROs, is that CRs are required to hold
advanced degrees in foreign law and are hired speciﬁcally for their expertise
in foreign law. Also unlike CROs, CRs are not permanent employees but
instead work for the court under one-year contracts that are renewable up to
a maximum of ﬁve years. As of this writing, a total of ﬁve CRs are divided
among the three subject-matter teams.
CRs are asked to perform foreign legal research in one of two ways.
First, the head of a team may ask a CR to write a memorandum on how a
pending case would be decided in a foreign jurisdiction. Second, CRs
routinely ﬁeld requests from CROs for focused research on foreign law in
connection with speciﬁc cases. However, there is nothing to prevent
experienced or knowledgeable CROs from choosing to handle foreign legal
research themselves rather than delegate it to a CR.
The educational backgrounds of the CRs reﬂect the emphasis attached
to certain countries. As of this writing, one holds a doctorate in German
law, another holds a doctorate in Japanese law, and three were trained in the
United States (two J.D. holders and one S.J.D. holder). The two CRs
assigned to the civil and political rights team are both U.S.-trained. The
social rights team has one U.S.-trained CR and one German-trained CR,
while the Japanese-trained CR is attached to the economic and property
rights team. Because expertise on particular countries is unevenly allocated
across teams, CRs routinely receive requests for help from other teams.
CRs are also expected to provide coverage of additional countries according
to their language skills. For example, U.S.-trained CRs have been asked to
research British law, while the German-trained CR may be tasked with
Austrian legal research.
Expertise on speciﬁc countries tends to be in greater demand for certain
topics than for others. For example, civil and political rights cases were
described by a CR as requiring more foreign legal research, “especially into
U.S. law.” By contrast, U.S. law is viewed as less relevant to social welfare
rights cases “because we know the U.S. Constitution doesn’t have social
rights provisions.”151
4. Academic Advisers
The KCC also hires three professors in the ﬁelds of constitutional and
administrative law as “Academic Advisers” on a contractual basis. One
Academic Adviser is currently attached to each of the three subject-matter
151

Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 127.
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teams. Academic Advisers have part-time contracts and spend two days per
week at the KCC participating in team discussion of pending cases and
consulting with the justices and head CRO.
The standards of Korean legal academia ensure as a practical matter that
the professors who are recruited by the KCC possess extensive comparative
legal expertise. Constitutional law professors who lack foreign law degrees
are a rare breed in Korea. Historically, it was diﬃcult to ﬁnd employment
as a constitutional law professor in Korea without German legal training or
language skills. Among younger generations of scholars, however, training
in common law jurisdictions in lieu of Germany has become increasingly
common, if not typical.
5. Experts Hired by the Parties
The KCC holds oral argument in only a small handful of highly important
or controversial cases, on the order of one or two cases monthly.152 In these
rare cases, both sides to the dispute tend to retain foreign law experts alongside
regular counsel.153 These experts—many of whom are former CROs in private
practice or legal academia—submit written opinions then present their
opinions at oral argument.154
From time to time, court-appointed attorneys may also perform foreign
law research, but the amount is likely to be limited. By statute, all litigants
before the KCC must be represented by counsel,155 and the KCC has the
power to appoint state-funded attorneys not only for indigent parties, but also
whenever it would be in the public interest to do so.156 Roughly sixty attorneys
per year are appointed from a list of eligible attorneys that includes former
members of the KCC and former CROs as well as numerous individuals
nominated by the Korean Bar Association.157 Although these attorneys
sometimes research foreign law, most are not foreign law experts,158 and the
extremely modest compensation that they receive—a flat rate of roughly $700

152 See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to
author (Mar. 15, 2014, 08:00:09 EST) (on ﬁle with author).
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, supra note 88, at 122 (citing the Constitutional
Court Act).
156 See id. at 123.
157 See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 152. In 2012, the KCC appointed a total of
sixty-two lawyers. See id.
158 See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to
author (Mar. 11, 2014, 03:32 CST) (on ﬁle with author).
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per case—further limits the amount of foreign legal research that they can be
expected to conduct.159
6. The Constitutional Research Institute
In 2011, the Korean legislature authorized the creation of a Constitutional
Research Institute (the Hunbeob Jaepan Yongu Won, or CRI) under the
auspices of the KCC. The CRI is billed on its website as “a hub for research
and education on constitution[s] and constitutional adjudication.”160 The
KCC announcement of the CRI’s creation hails South Korea for being “the
ﬁrst among some 80 countries having specialized and independent constitutional adjudication bodies to have created a research institution under the
authority of a constitutional court.”161 The CRI was established during the
tenure of former KCC Chief Justice Kang-Kook Lee, who desired that the
KCC become the standard-bearer for constitutional adjudication in Asia and
fashion a viable jurisprudential alternative to the traditionally dominant
European and American models.162 The CRI would further these goals, it
was argued, by equipping the KCC with the capacity to analyze, critique,
and improve upon foreign approaches.
Led by the former dean of a prominent Korean law school, the CRI is
housed in a separate building from the KCC and boasts a staﬀ of approximately twenty-ﬁve researchers. Most of the CRI’s researchers are contract
employees limited to a maximum term of ﬁve years, and CROs on loan
from the KCC serve in supervisory roles. The researchers are divided into
four teams: Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Systems (or Legal
Institutions), Basic Rights, and Instruction (or Education). With the
exception of the Education Team—which is also the smallest of the four
159
160

See E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 152.
Greetings, C ONST. C T. KOREA: CONST. R ES . INST., http://ri.ccourt.go.kr/eng (follow
“About CRI” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PU5N-K4YD.
161 Constitutional Research Institute Opens on Jan. 10, C ONST . CT . K OREA , ( Jan. 10, 2011,
13:16:22), www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/news_view.jsp?seq=106, archived at http://
perma.cc/8E3M-W2AF. A senior KCC oﬃcial acknowledged that the Peruvian Constitutional
Court also possesses its own dedicated research institute, the Centro de Estudios Constitucionales,
albeit one that is much smaller in scale. The Argentinian Supreme Court also possesses a research
institute. See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Argentina (describing the creation of a Foreign Research
and Reference Institute within the Argentinian Supreme Court Library), in THE IMPACT OF
FOREIGN LAW ON DOMESTIC J UDGMENTS 4, 7 (The Law Library of Congress, Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-judgment/impact-of-foreign-law.pdf.
162 See Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 127. The KCC has openly proclaimed its goal of promoting throughout the world a “Korean system of constitutional justice” that
“diﬀers from the German or U.S. models.” The 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional
Justice Ends in Success, CONST. CT. KOREA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/
introduction/news/newsDetail.do?bbsSeq=18, archived at http://perma.cc/864R-ZEVB.
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teams—the work of the CRI has thus far emphasized the study of foreign
constitutional law in one form or another.163 Its publications include annual
reports on worldwide trends in constitutional adjudication and bimonthly
e-mail newsletters that have touched on a wide range of countries from
Algeria and Belgium to Peru and Serbia.164
On occasion, the CRI does address explicitly domestic issues. For
example, the Legal Systems team’s responsibilities include the study of
constitutional issues surrounding Korean reuniﬁcation. Even this issue,
however, has called for foreign legal research (on the topic of German
reuniﬁcation), and the majority of the research papers generated by the
Legal Systems team have focused on various aspects of constitutional justice
in other countries, such as the operation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
amicus curiae system and France’s transition from abstract to concrete
judicial review in 2008.
CRI researchers are akin to the KCC’s in-house CRs in several respects:
they possess advanced degrees in foreign law, and their primary responsibility
is foreign legal research. Three-quarters hold doctorates, while the remainder
hold a J.D. or LL.M. from the United States. However, the two types of
researchers perform complementary functions. Those at the KCC perform
comparative research dictated by the adjudication-related demands of
speciﬁc cases, whereas those at the CRI propose and pursue in-depth
comparative research projects, free from the urgency of having to resolve
pending cases. In other words, although researchers at both the KCC and
CRI perform foreign legal research, those at the CRI do so proactively as
opposed to reactively.
To expand its geographic coverage, the CRI also hires Korean-speaking
“foreign correspondents” who reside in other countries and either possess
legal training or work in the legal profession. Foreign correspondents are
responsible for keeping the CRI apprised on a regular basis of constitutional
adjudication in their respective countries. A recent vacancy announcement
for positions in “Spanish-speaking countries,” for example, provides that
correspondents will be required to submit bimonthly reports, for which they
will be paid approximately $180 each.165

163 The remit of the Education Team is to educate prospective attorneys, government employees, and the general public on issues of constitutionalism and the rule of law.
164 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 127.
165 A copy of the vacancy announcement is on ﬁle with the author.
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E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts
In stark contrast to the TCC, the KCC’s level of engagement with
foreign courts can only be described as extremely high. Its international
outreach eﬀorts are made possible by a combination of ambitious goals,
considerable resources, and unhindered access to foreign audiences. The
KCC boasts publicly of “transferring its experience and knowledge to a
number of other countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia,
Thailand, and Turkey.”166 The court’s heavy commitment to foreign
interaction is reﬂected by the existence of a full-time International Aﬀairs
Division with responsibility for organizing international conferences,
receiving foreign delegations, and supporting overseas visits by members of
the court.167
The KCC has capitalized upon its involvement in international organizations to boost its inﬂuence and status in a number of ways. In 2006, South
Korea became the ﬁrst and only Asian member of the Venice Commission,
the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters and the
practical equivalent of an intergovernmental think tank for promoting
constitutionalism and the rule of law.168 A visit to Europe by the president
of the KCC coincided with a desire on the part of the Commission to
expand its membership and inﬂuence to Asia, and South Korea was soon
thereafter invited to join the organization. Within the KCC, the invitation
was widely construed as “evidence of global recognition” and acceptance of
the KCC as the “epitome of Korean liberal democracy and rule of law.”169
Thus far, South Korea’s representatives on the Commission have been
drawn from the KCC,170 and the KCC’s own account of its ﬁrst twenty
166
167

The 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice Ends in Success, supra note 162.
See Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, in
Seoul, Korea (Dec. 19, 2014) (indicating that staﬃng levels at the International Aﬀairs Division
doubled to roughly twenty people to cope with preparations for the World Conference of
Constitutional Justice hosted by the KCC); Organization, CONST. C T. KOREA ,
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/introduction/organization/organization.do (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5VL2-BYQD (disclosing the existence of the “International Aﬀairs Division” within the KCC’s “Planning and Coordination Oﬃce”).
168 The Venice Commission is known formally as the European Commission for Democracy
Through Law and was founded following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but its ambitions and
operations now extend well beyond legal reform in the former Soviet bloc countries. See Paolo G.
Carozza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2003) (summarizing the history and goals of the Venice Commission).
169 See Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 127.
170 As of this writing, the South Korean delegate to the Venice Commission is Justice Il-Won
Kang of the KCC. See Members of the Venice Commission, COUNCIL EUR.: VENICE C OMMISSION,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/839W-6ZWD.
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years brags of its responsibility as the “constitutional court of a country
with a ﬂourishing constitutional system” for “assisting newly democratizing
countries” via the Venice Commission.171
The KCC is not content merely to participate in international judicial
organizations, but instead aggressively pursues leadership opportunities.
With the encouragement and ﬁnancial support of the Venice Commission,
the KCC established in 2010 the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts
(AACC),172 a regional organization that mirrors the Commission’s objectives173 and counts as its charter members the constitutional courts of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uzbekistan,
in addition to the KCC itself. The KCC has made no secret of either its
role in the AACC or its desire to enhance Korean inﬂuence and status
through such initiatives. The AACC’s website praises the KCC’s “leading
role” in launching the organization and characterizes the AACC’s ﬁrst
meeting as “a good opportunity for Korea to enhance its international status
as chair country that led the AACC’s creation and also to promote to the
world about [sic] its economic development and judicial advancement.”174
Korean leadership, if not domination, of the AACC is further evidenced by
the absence of Japan, Taiwan, and China. Although overtures were made to
both the JSC and TCC, the AACC is viewed by the TCC as a thoroughly
Korean undertaking, while various members of the JSC professed ignorance
of the AACC’s existence. More recently—and once again with the
endorsement of the Venice Commission—the KCC has also proposed the
creation of an Asian Court of Human Rights, which it would play a leading
role in organizing.175

171
172

C ONSTITUTIONAL C OURT OF KOREA , supra note 88, at 143.
See 7th Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges Dealing With “Election Laws,”
KONRAD-ADENAUER-S TIFTUNG: R ULE L. P ROGRAMME ASIA , http://www.kas.de/rspa/en/
events/41710 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4B4H-64SF (noting the
adoption of the Jakarta Declaration, which established the Association of Asian Constitutional
Courts).
173 For a formal statement of the AACC’s objectives, see Statute, ASS’ N A SIAN CONST .
C TS . & EQUIVALENT INSTITUTIONS , http://www.aaccei.org/ccourt?act=statute, archived at
http://perma.cc/FVN7-Y7XD.
174 See The Constitutional Court of Korea to Host the AACC’s Inaugural Congress, ASS’ N A SIAN
C ONST. C TS . & EQUIVALENT INSTITUTIONS (May 16, 2012), http://www.aaccei.org/ccourt?
act=noticeView&bbsId=3100&bbsSeqn=245, archived at http://perma.cc/CW8D-AVCF.
175 See 3 RD C ONG. OF THE W ORLD C ONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL J USTICE ,
S EOUL C OMMUNIQUÉ (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/wccj/seoul/
WCCJ_Seoul_Communique-E.pdf (describing “the initiative of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Korea to promote discussions on human rights co-operation, including the possibility
of establishing an Asian human rights court”).
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International conferences are another part of the KCC’s strategy for
achieving prominence in the judicial world. Membership in the Venice
Commission contributed to the selection of South Korea to host the third
congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice (WCCJ) in
September of 2014.176 The Commission acts as the secretariat for the WCCJ
and reportedly favored an Asian venue after the ﬁrst two meetings in Cape
Town and Rio de Janeiro.177 After broaching the possibility with the KCC,
it chose South Korea over Indonesia to host the event.178 The KCC seized
upon this opportunity to promote itself and assert its leadership within the
region. Its eﬀorts to impress the foreign judges in attendance included a
multimedia campaign featuring Olympic ﬁgure skater and beloved national
icon Yuna Kim as the oﬃcial Goodwill Ambassador of the Constitutional
Court of Korea.179 It also capitalized upon the high-proﬁle forum of the
WCCJ to unveil its proposal for an Asian Court of Human Rights.180 As
with the AACC, the congress was held without the participation of Japan,
Taiwan, or China.
IV. THE TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation
The published opinions of the TCC give the superficial appearance of a
court that makes relatively little use of foreign law. Actual citation of foreign
law is rare, especially in majority opinions. Of the 644 constitutional decisions rendered from January 1949 to June 2008, only four majority opinions
(0.62%) cited foreign judicial precedent, and only eight (1.4%) cited a foreign
constitution or statute.181 Concurring and dissenting opinions are more likely
176 See Overview, 3 RD C ONGRESS W ORLD CONF . ON CONST . J UST ., http://
en.wccj2014.kr/eng/wccj3/overview.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
FHY5-U56C (describing the congress and its venue).
177 E-mail from Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of Korea, to author (Sept. 16, 2013,
20:32 EST).
178 See id.
179 See Yuna Kim’s Promotional Video for 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional
Justice (WCCJ), ALL THAT YUNA (Sept. 18, 2014), http://yunakimfan.com/2014/09/18/40786,
archived at http://perma.cc/VE7Z-MNPT (featuring English and Korean promotional videos in
which Yuna Kim introduces herself as “Goodwill Ambassador for the Constitutional Court of
Korea” and hails the conference for “bring[ing] together the top leaders of constitutional justice
such as presidents of constitutional courts and chief justices of supreme courts from almost 100
countries around the world”).
180 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
181 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557; see also Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Judges as
Discursive Agent: The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan (analyzing the
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than majority opinions to mention foreign law: out of 554 separate opinions
authored over the same period, 74 (13.4%) cited foreign precedent, while 121
(21.8%) cited foreign constitutions or statutes.182
The lack of explicit citation of foreign law is attributable at least partly
to the conventions of judicial opinion-writing in Taiwan. Traditionally,
opinions for the court are concise and do not contain footnotes. As a result,
any references to foreign law must take up limited space in the main text of
the opinion, which renders them conspicuous and awkward. By contrast,
separate opinions follow what one justice described as a “less rigid” form
that allows for footnotes.183 Consequently, separate opinions cite foreign
law more frequently than majority opinions, and 80% of those citations
appear in footnotes.
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage
The TCC’s published opinions barely hint at the full extent to which the
court investigates foreign law. For a majority of the justices, comparative
constitutional analysis is a virtually automatic practice. Multiple justices
indicated that they “consult foreign constitutional materials” in “almost
every case” or “ninety-plus percent” of the time.184 The rare exceptions are
cases in which foreign law is obviously unhelpful or irrelevant, such as a
separation-of-powers dispute involving the Examination Yuan, one of the five
branches of a convoluted governmental structure that is part of Sun-Yat Sen’s
intellectual legacy and unique to the Republic of China’s Constitution.185
TCC’s use of foreign precedent through 2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN P RECEDENTS BY
C ONSTITUTIONAL J UDGES , supra note 11, at 373, 381-86.
182 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557.
183 Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 19, 2010).
184 Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 12, 2010); Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; see
also, e.g., Interview with Justice K, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan ( Jan. 3, 2011) (deeming it “really obvious that Germantrained justices will investigate German law maybe eighty to ninety percent of the time”);
Interview with Clerk 2, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010) (observing that foreign legal research occurs in “almost
every case”). But see Interview with Justice I, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010) (indicating that the frequency of
foreign legal research is “deﬁnitely not ninety-plus percent of the time”).
185 See MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN art. 6 (2000) (Taiwan) (setting forth the powers
and composition of the Examination Yuan). Notwithstanding its defeat in mainland China at the
hands of the Communists, the Republic of China continues to control Taiwan and a number of
smaller neighboring islands. See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 540-43 (summarizing the history of
the Republic of China, and describing the competing claims to sovereignty over Taiwan).
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Even the justices who are relatively infrequent users of foreign law by
the standards of the TCC still use it frequently in absolute terms. The most
conservative estimate of foreign law usage was given by a law clerk who
indicated that the justice for whom he works, a career judge, consults
foreign law in one or two out of every six cases. It was widely (but not
universally) agreed that justices appointed from the career judiciary tend to
be more skeptical of the value and relevance of foreign law than those from
academic backgrounds.186 The justices who were not themselves former
academics tended to be more circumspect about the extent to which they
consult foreign law, saying only that “it depends on the case,”187 or that they
engage in comparative research “only if we think there is relevant foreign
law to guide us.”188
When hired, law clerks are often told that their “primary responsibility”
will be comparative legal research.189 For the small minority of cases that
are decided on the merits, comparative legal research is “the most basic
thing” that the clerks do and is required “probably 100% of the time.”190
Various clerks also reported that analysis of the TCC’s own precedent
typically comprises only a “very small portion” of the reports that they
prepare for the justices on each case; the “vast majority” of the typical
report is foreign legal research.191 Indeed, foreign constitutional law is taken
so seriously that the Taiwanese judiciary itself publishes and sells hardbound Chinese translations of case law from constitutional courts that are
considered most inﬂuential in Taiwan—namely, the U.S. Supreme Court,
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and, most recently, the ECtHR, but no
longer the JSC.192
186 Compare, e.g., Interview with Justice C, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010), Interview with Clerk 6, Law
Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25,
2010), Interview with Clerk 8, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010), and Interview with Clerk 9, Law Clerk to a Justice of
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010) (all indicating
that career judges are less inclined to use foreign law), with Interview with Justice B, supra note
183, and Interview with Clerk 3, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010) (arguing that career judges are no less inclined to use
foreign law).
187 Interview with Justice G, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010).
188 Interview with Justice I, supra note 184.
189 Interview with Clerk 1, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010); Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
190 Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 186.
191 Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 189; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
192 Sources inside the TCC attribute the Judicial Yuan’s recent discontinuation of the translation of JSC decisions to a “lack of resources,” Interview with Justice B, supra note 183, combined
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All agreed that consulting foreign constitutional materials is simply not
controversial, and that there is no meaningful correlation between a justice’s
“politics” in a “liberal” versus “conservative” sense and his or her willingness
to consider foreign law. As one clerk observed, “Conservatives use foreign law
too. They all use it.”193
C. Jurisdictions Considered
The major objects of comparative study for the TCC are Germany, the
United States, Austria, and Japan. However, interest in Japanese constitutional law is in sharp and conspicuous decline, as evidenced by the Taiwanese
judiciary’s decision to stop publishing translations of JSC decisions. Much as
in Korea, oﬃcials attributed the turn away from Japanese jurisprudence to the
JSC’s overwhelming conservatism in the area of constitutional law and
consequent failure to produce noteworthy constitutional jurisprudence.194 By
contrast, consideration of ECtHR and Korean jurisprudence remains rare
but is on the rise. From time to time, the TCC’s clerks survey countries in
the English-speaking world other than the United States. Historically, the
TCC enjoyed a close relationship with the South African judiciary in
particular: South Africa under apartheid was one of the few nations that
extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan and hosted Taiwanese judges on
an oﬃcial basis.195 Those ties, however, have lapsed, and neither the South
African Constitutional Court nor any other common law court apart from
with the fact that the inﬂuence of the JSC on Taiwanese constitutional law “is obviously declining,
severely,” Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. This decline was attributed, in turn, to a variety
of mutually reinforcing factors. One is the growing willingness and greater ability on the part of
the justices to “cut out the middleman” and look directly to U.S. and German law, from which
Japanese constitutional jurisprudence borrows heavily. Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
Another is the fact that few of the current justices or clerks have Japanese legal training, which
both reﬂects and accelerates the decline of Japanese inﬂuence. Third is a growing sense that the
JSC is simply too conservative and too willing to uphold government action for its decisions to be
of continuing interest or use to the TCC. On the increasingly rare occasions that a justice attempts
to argue in favor of the (invariably conservative) Japanese approach, other justices are said to
object that Japan is “not really an open, free country,” that there is consequently “no need to look
at what they’re saying,” Interview with Clerk 5, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010), and that Taiwan ought to look to
“more advanced or progressive countries.” Interview with Clerk 6, supra note 186; accord Interview
with Clerk 8, supra note 186; Interview with Clerk 4, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010). Yet another cause, related to the
immediately preceding one, is that Japanese legal scholarship has become a substitute for Japanese
case law because, compared to the case law, the scholarship is more “solid,” “fully developed,” and
“critical” and thus of greater use to the TCC. Interview with Clerk 4, supra.
193 Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 192.
194 See supra note 192.
195 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 548.

980

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 927

the U.S. Supreme Court was described by any of the justices or clerks
interviewed as a regular source of inspiration.
There is a strong relationship between the educational backgrounds of
the justices and the sources of foreign law that they prefer to cite. Justices
with German law degrees account for 87% of citations to German precedent
and 60% of citations to German constitutional or statutory provisions.196
Likewise, justices with some form of American legal training were responsible
for 61.7% of citations to American precedent.197 Moreover, the period during
which citations to the U.S. Supreme Court outnumbered citations to the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (1985 to 1994) coincided with the period
during which justices educated in the United States outnumbered justices
educated in Germany.198 These correlations are not diﬃcult to explain: in
Taiwan as elsewhere,199 judges are more likely to use what they know than
what they do not know.
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise
The TCC is highly knowledgeable about how courts elsewhere have
approached similar issues. If the justices fail to cite or adopt another court’s
approach to a particular question, they do so out of choice, not out of
ignorance. “If it’s been covered elsewhere,” assured one clerk, “they have
considered it. They might not follow [the foreign approach], but they’ll
consider it.”200 One justice put it bluntly: “We are already fully knowledgeable
about foreign law. The problem is translating this knowledge into our social
and political context.”201
For the most part, the justices and their clerks acquire their extensive
knowledge of foreign law in traditional ways: they study it in school, they
conduct research, and they talk to their colleagues. As of this writing, eleven
of the ﬁfteen justices hold either an LL.M. or Ph.D. in law from another
country; three have studied law in more than one foreign country. Seven
196
197
198

See id. at 558.
See id.
See Chang & Yeh, supra note 181, at 383, 384 tbl.1 (describing the educational background
and foreign citation habits of the justices during the TCC’s ﬁfth term).
199 See, e.g., Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 M E .
L. R EV. 211, 213 (1994) (noting a “deﬁnite link” between the use of American precedent by
Canadian Supreme Court justices and the training of those justices in the United States);
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 20 (“Judges, lawyers, and academics who go abroad for parts of
their education . . . naturally turn for inspiration and comparison to those jurisdictions whose
ideas are [already] familiar to them.”).
200 Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
201 Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010).
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have studied in Germany, four in the United States, two in Japan, and one
in mainland China. The fact that a majority of the justices are former law
professors contributes to the high level of foreign legal training.202 In
Taiwan—and indeed in most of East Asia, but not the United States—it is
common for constitutional law professors to possess a law degree from
overseas.203
The TCC does not have nearly the same range of resources for conducting
foreign legal research as the KCC, but Taiwan’s justices make the most of
what they have. Each justice is allotted only one law clerk, and there are no
shared clerks. The clerks do not serve fixed terms, but most serve for longer
than just one year.204 Many clerks are either concurrently enrolled in domestic
Ph.D. programs or preparing to apply for Ph.D. programs overseas. It is up
to each justice how to select his or her clerk, but an LL.M. is a de facto
hiring requirement, and many of the clerks receive part or all of their
graduate-level legal training overseas. In addition, some justices prefer to
hire clerks with strength in a particular language, typically either English or
German, that will be helpful for research purposes.205 The clerks, in turn,
rely heavily upon one another, thanks in part to the fact that they complement each other with diﬀerent language skills and foreign legal expertise.
Research on foreign law is now conducted “mostly” on the Internet and
through online research services such as Westlaw and its German equivalent, Beck Online.206

202 By statute, law professors constitute one of the ﬁve categories of persons eligible for
appointment to the TCC, and no single category is supposed to comprise more than one-third of
the court’s members. See Ssu Fa Yuan Tsu Chih Fa [Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan], art. 4, para.
1, 37 XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25399, 25400 (1957) (Taiwan). In practice, “flexible interpretation” of the categories, combined with the fact that many candidates fall under multiple categories,
has meant that a majority of the justices are former academics. Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 545-46
& 545 n.93. The TCC is not unusual among specialized constitutional courts in having designated
seats for legal academics. See Saunders, supra note 11, at 578 (noting that the “mode of appointment” to specialized constitutional courts “often includes a proportion of scholars with an interest
and some expertise in comparative law”).
203 See infra Table 1 (summarizing the extent to which constitutional law professors at elite
law schools in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States possess foreign
legal training).
204 For example, one justice had four diﬀerent clerks over the course of seven years, which is
a fairly typical level of turnover.
205 Of the justices who make a point of hiring clerks with particular linguistic aptitudes,
some seek out clerks who can compensate for their own weakness in a particular language, while
others prefer clerks who share the same linguistic strengths as they do, in order to help them
research the law of countries that they already tend to consult most frequently.
206 The TCC has librarians who do not help with substantive foreign legal research but will
acquire foreign law books upon request. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
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The litigants themselves are of limited use in helping the justices to
learn about relevant foreign law. Most petitioners are pro se,207 and the few
lawyers who do appear tend to be inexperienced at making constitutional
arguments of any kind, much less comparative ones.208 However, if the
justices feel that they need more information on a particular topic, they may
convene an unoﬃcial information-gathering session (shuo ming hui) at which
academics will discuss the topic and explain relevant foreign jurisprudence.209
These sessions serve as a functional substitute for both oral argument
(which occurs only in “extreme cases”)210 and amicus curiae brieﬁng (which
is not “against the rules” but “not the habit” either)211 but double as a
mechanism for learning about foreign law. Perhaps twice a year, the TCC
will also invite foreign scholars, most frequently from Germany, to conduct
informational seminars with the justices.212
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts
The TCC’s opportunities for engagement with foreign courts are severely
constrained. In a globalized world, the TCC is a rarity: it has been cut off
from regular interaction with other courts. The TCC has become a “natural
experiment in judicial isolation”213 due to mainland China’s largely successful
efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community.
The dwindling handful of countries with which Taiwan still enjoys
diplomatic relations214 are the few remaining places in the world where the
207
208

See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
See id. (characterizing the briefs ﬁled by attorneys with the TCC as weak); Interview with
Clerk 1, supra note 189 (describing the quality of briefs ﬁled with the TCC as “poor” and reﬂective
of a lack of experience with constitutional litigation, but noting that test cases are occasionally
brought on a pro bono basis by Lee & Li, a large law ﬁrm with superior resources); Interview with
Clerk 2, supra note 184 (concurring in Clerk 1’s assessment); Interview with Chien-Feng Wei,
Attorney, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010) (estimating that no more than ﬁve or six attorneys in
all of Taiwan regularly litigate constitutional cases, and indicating that he personally brings one or
two cases before the TCC per year); Interview with Nigel Li, Partner, Lee & Li, in Taipei, Taiwan
(Nov. 24, 2010) (concurring that very few attorneys in Taiwan regularly litigate constitutional
cases, and indicating that he personally handles roughly ten to twelve cases per year that result in
petitions to the TCC).
209 See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; see also Saunders, supra note 11, at 579 (noting
the TCC’s practice of holding “expert meetings in which scholars give their views on aspects of
comparative constitutional experience”).
210 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
211 Id.
212 Interview with Admin. Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei,
Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010).
213 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527, 538.
214 Taiwan has oﬃcial diplomatic ties with only twenty-three countries. See id. at 540 n.66.
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Justices of the Constitutional Court can expect a red-carpet welcome. South
Africa under apartheid was one such country; visiting members of the TCC
attended a party in their honor with members of the South African Constitutional Court and were even treated to a tour of the country.215 Today, the
members of the TCC can still look forward to a warm welcome if they visit
Panama or Burkina Faso. But such hospitality is disappearing in tandem
with Taiwan’s diplomatic relations.
Membership in international organizations also poses challenges for the
TCC and its justices. A case in point is the Korean-instigated formation of
the AACC, discussed above in Section III.E. A member of the KCC invited
the TCC to apply for membership, but after some internal discussion, the
TCC decided not to apply, partly for fear of the potential “embarrassment”
that might result if China were subsequently asked to participate.216 A
number of justices expressed concern that if the TCC were to join ﬁrst
(under its proper name, the “Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China”) and then China were to join subsequently, China might insist that
the TCC be forced to participate under a diﬀerent name or ejected from the
organization entirely—a possibility that they wished to avoid.217
Participation in international conferences can be equally problematic.
The website for the second congress of the WCCJ held in 2011 in Rio de
Janeiro, for example, boasted the sponsorship of the Venice Commission
and the participation of no less than eighty-eight constitutional courts and
ten regional court associations.218 Yet no one from the TCC was invited.219
Nor were the Taiwanese welcome when their Korean neighbors hosted an

215 See id. at 548; Interview with Justice E, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 3, 2010); Interview with Justice D,
Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei,
Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010).
216 See Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Justice I, supra note 184;
Interview with Judicial Admin., in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010). The justices were also aware
that Japan had already decided not to join, although its reasons for declining were not known.
217 To date, neither Taiwan nor China has joined the association.
218 See 2ND CONGRESS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, LIST
OF PARTICIPANTS (2011), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/WCCJ_List_of_
Participants.pdf (listing the representatives of the eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional
court associations that participated in the January 2011 meeting hosted in Rio de Janeiro by the
Federal Supreme Court of Brazil and sponsored by the Venice Commission).
219 See E-mail from Justice A, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, to author (Feb. 27, 2011, 09:31 PST) (on ﬁle with author); E-mail from Justice
H, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, to author
(Mar. 1, 2011, 04:16 PST) (on ﬁle with author).
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even larger number of courts at the third congress in 2014.220 In some cases,
Taiwanese judges have literally been turned away at the border, as occurred
in 1983 when the International Association of Judges met in Egypt221 and
again in 2004 at the biennial meeting of the International Association of
Women Judges held in Uganda.222
Eﬀorts by members of the TCC to visit constitutional courts in other
countries have also been frustrated by Chinese interference. The justices
ordinarily receive a travel budget that enables them to visit foreign courts
for research purposes; the choice of destination is left to them, and in a
typical year, a group of three or four justices will make use of the summer
recess to visit a constitutional court that they ﬁnd of particular interest or
relevance to their work.223 Some countries, such as Australia,224 Germany,225
Hungary,226 and South Korea,227 were identiﬁed as relatively hospitable and
trouble-free destinations, at least for a fortunate few justices. Other countries, however, have resorted to face-saving avoidance techniques. The
justices may be told, for example, that a visit to France’s Conseil constitutionnel
requires approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,228 or that the oﬃcials
needed to authorize passage through France happen to be on vacation.229
Similar episodes have occurred in Italy and Spain.230
Nor are countries with close historical or political ties to Taiwan necessarily more receptive to Taiwanese visitors. Notwithstanding Japan’s
primary responsibility for shaping Taiwan’s current legal system over ﬁve
decades of colonial rule, Japanese judges and oﬃcials were described as
“generally unwilling to meet” with Taiwanese visitors and more concerned
with the state of their relations with China than with their former colony.231
The fact that some Taiwanese judges have studied in Japan and are personally
220 See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (noting both the magnitude of the event
and the exclusion of the TCC).
221 Interview with Justice E, supra note 215.
222 According to a justice who attempted to attend the conference, the Taiwanese judges were
denied entry visas by Uganda because China had oﬀered to fund construction of a new building
for the judiciary and had made clear its desire that the Taiwanese delegation be barred from
attending. Interview with Justice I, supra note 184.
223 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
224 Interview with Justice I, supra note 184; Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216.
225 Interview with Justice C, supra note 186.
226 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
227 Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184 (describing an oﬃcial reception held at the South
Korean Constitutional Court for visitors from the TCC).
228 See Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216.
229 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556; Interview with Justice C, supra note 186.
230 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556-57.
231 See Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216.
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acquainted with Japanese judges means that judge-to-judge contact remains
possible, at least on an unofficial, individual basis.232 However, if official
visitors from the TCC are received at the Japanese Supreme Court at all, it is
generally by administrative officials or, at best, retired justices.233
As difficult as it can be for Taiwan’s judges to attend international
meetings or visit courts in other countries, playing the part of host can pose
even greater challenges. Inviting distinguished judges from other countries to
Taiwan is, in the words of one TCC justice, “very hard.”234 The President of
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example, indicated with regret that it
would be “difficult” for political reasons to accept an invitation from the
TCC,235 and a number of justices reported that their success in inviting
German constitutional jurists had been limited to retirees.236 On this count,
the members of the United States Supreme Court have proved braver: Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia have all visited the TCC.237 Even when
dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court, however, Taiwan’s justices are wary of
extending official invitations for fear that they are likely to be rebuffed.238
The TCC’s ties to the outside world are bolstered to some extent by the
fact that the former law professors on the court possess their own international
network of academic connections, but the use of these contacts does not always
bear fruit.239 The eﬀectiveness of academic backchannels is limited, moreover,
by Chinese efforts to thwart the participation of Taiwanese law professors in
foreign conferences and private scholarly organizations, as exemplified by the
expulsion of Taiwan’s national association of constitutional law professors
from the International Association of Constitutional Law in 1999.240
Finally, even when there are no political barriers to Taiwanese participation, a small country such as Taiwan is inherently easy for the organizers of
international gatherings to overlook or ignore. A case in point is Yale Law
School’s oft-noted global constitutionalism seminar, now entering its third
232
233
234
235
236

See id.
See Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 186; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.
Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 186.
See, e.g., Interview with Justice J, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 30, 2010); Interview with Judicial Admin., supra
note 216.
237 See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.
238 See id. (oﬀering by way of example the use of a Harvard professor as a go-between in an
ultimately unsuccessful eﬀort to bring Justice Souter to Taipei).
239 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556 (describing unsuccessful overtures made through
academic channels to arrange meetings with members of the Italian and Spanish Constitutional
Courts).
240 See id. at 550-52.
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decade, which brings together constitutional judges from around the world
on an invitation-only basis for closed-door discussions.241 On only one
occasion—in 1997—has a member of the TCC participated, and sources on
the TCC could identify only one other justice who has ever been invited.
V. THE HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation
Citations to foreign law are a staple of HKCFA opinions. Indeed, the
court cites foreign law more often than it cites domestic law. In cases
involving constitutional rights, fully three-quarters of its case citations are
to foreign and international courts,242 while one-third of its legislative
citations are to foreign legislation.243
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage
As its citations demonstrate, the HKCFA routinely gives serious
consideration to foreign law. Once discovered, relevant foreign case law is
unlikely to be ignored without explanation or acknowledgment. If the
HKCFA were to learn of a Canadian appellate decision on point, for
example, the justices would consider themselves entirely free to take a
diﬀerent approach but would also feel a “need to explain why.”244
Moreover, any usage of foreign law is likely to be explicitly disclosed.
The diﬀerences between common law and civil law courts help to
explain why the HKCFA is more transparent in its usage of foreign law
than the JSC, KCC, or TCC. First, like other common law courts, the
HKCFA issues opinions that are heavily laden with citations and thus oﬀer
an inherently more complete picture of the authorities considered.245
Second, the values of the adversarial system weigh in favor of disclosing
foreign law usage. In the words of one justice, “fundamental fairness”
requires that the parties have an opportunity to respond to any foreign cases
241 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 98 (citing the Yale Law School seminar as a forum for
global judicial dialogue); Alford, supra note 19, at 669 (same); McCrudden, supra note 6, at 511 (same).
242 Simon N.M. Young, Constitutional Rights in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, 27 CHINESE
(TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 67, 82 tbl.10 (2011) (analyzing all of the HKCFA’s constitutional
decisions over the first ten years of the court’s existence, from 1999 to 2009).
243 Id. at 82 tbl.11.
244 See Interview with Justice B, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of
Final Appeal, in H.K. ( June 6, 2014).
245 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (contrasting the approaches of common law
and civil law courts to the citation of case law).
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that the court has in mind.246 Consequently, the HKCFA aims for “full
disclosure” of all authorities considered as well as cited.247 Any foreign
authorities that the court considers but ultimately does not cite are
supposed to be included in the “list of authorities not cited” that
accompanies each decision.248 This practice of full disclosure does not
preclude “the odd footnote reference” to a previously undisclosed foreign
decision for the purpose of reinforcing a point already established by other
cases.249 If, however, the substance of the decision relies on a foreign case,
the court will “ask the parties if they have anything to say” about it.250
A combination of legal and normative factors are highly conducive to
judicial comparativism in Hong Kong. From a legal perspective, various
provisions of Hong Kong’s Basic Law contemplate or require judicial
comparativism of some form. Notwithstanding the fact that China is not a
common law country, article 84 expressly authorizes Hong Kong courts to
“refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions,”251 while article 8
provides that the “laws previously in force in Hong Kong,” including “the
common law,” “shall be maintained.”252 The Basic Law also obligates Hong
Kong courts to apply international human rights law: article 39
constitutionally entrenches the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and “international labour conventions.”253
The content of the ICCPR is further incorporated into domestic law by the
1991 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.254
At the same time, Hong Kong’s status as an autonomous “Special
Administrative Region” of China blunts some of the normative criticisms
commonly leveled elsewhere against comparativism. First, it makes little
sense to object in the context of Hong Kong that judicial comparativism

246 Interview with Justice A, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of
Final Appeal, in H.K. ( June 6, 2014); accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 244.
247 Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 244.
248 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Justice B, supra note 244.
249 Interview with Justice A, supra note 246.
250 Id.
251 X IANGGANG JIBEN F A art. 84 (H.K.).
252 Id. art. 8.
253 Id. art. 39.
254 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383; see Lam Siu Po v. Comm’r of
Police, [2009] 12 H.K.C.F.A.R. 237, 250C-D (C.F.A.) (H.K.) (opinion of Bokhary, J.) (observing
that the Bill of Rights Ordinance is “taken almost verbatim” from the ICCPR); GITTINGS , supra
note 66, at 275 (noting that the Bill of Rights Ordinance is “almost a carbon copy of the rights
listed in the ICCPR”).
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compromises national sovereignty.255 The whole point of Hong Kong’s
unique constitutional scheme, which was built upon formal guarantees of
autonomy negotiated between China and the United Kingdom, is to
insulate Hong Kong from the full exercise of Chinese sovereignty.256 The
authority of the Hong Kong judiciary to make continuing use of foreign and
international law is an important ingredient of Hong Kong’s precious
autonomy. Thus, even assuming arguendo that judicial comparativism
compromises national sovereignty, that may be cause for celebration rather
than criticism in Hong Kong.
Second, Hong Kong’s unusual circumstances also defeat the criticism that
comparativism invites judicial activism by expanding the range of materials
that can be used to justify the invalidation of laws.257 Such criticisms rest
upon the premise that judicial activism is illicit because it entails lawmaking

255 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (asserting that “inappropriate judicial reliance
on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncments [sic] threatens the sovereignty of the United
States”); R OBERT H. BORK , C OERCING VIRTUE: THE W ORLDWIDE RULE OF J UDGES 16
(rev. & expanded ed. 2003) (“By creating international law [the cosmopolitan left] hopes not only
to outﬂank American legislatures and courts but to have liberal views adopted at a diﬀerent level
and then imposed on the United States.”); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling
Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. R EV. 1255,
1303-10 (2005) (book review) (critically evaluating the use of foreign law in constitutional
interpretation from the perspective of “democratic sovereignty,” and arguing that “the invocation
of foreign constitutional law . . . is fundamentally at odds with democratic constitutional selfgovernment”); Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. R EV.
239, 261-63 (2003) (noting that concerns about the impairment of sovereignty are a recurring
theme of “criticisms of the use of non-U.S. law as a rule of decision,” and arguing that such
concerns are not valid).
256 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Sino–British Joint Declaration and its consequences for Hong Kong’s Basic Law).
257 See, e.g., B ORK , supra note 255, at 137-38 (deeming it “illegitimate” for courts to “seek
guidance” from foreign courts then insist that “legislatures obey” their decisions, and criticizing
comparativism as a form of judicial activism that turns judicial review into a “launching pad[]” for
the preferred reforms of cosmopolitan liberals); Alford, supra note 19, at 680 (“One wonders
whether a new Supreme Court nominee can openly embrace [comparativism] and not risk the
dreaded label of a judicial activist.”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reﬂections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’ L L. 69, 69 (2004) (“The most trenchant
critique of [judicial] use of international materials is that it serves as mere cover for the expansion
of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups . . . .”).
Whether comparativism actually leads to judicial activism in the form of more frequent
invalidation of laws is questionable. See Alford, supra note 19, at 675-76 (demonstrating with
examples that “[t]he Court frequently has relied on foreign authority” to uphold restrictions on
individual liberties, and predicting that “the Court will continue to receive invitations to reference
foreign experiences in order to uphold government restrictions on individual freedoms or curtail
the expansion of rights”); Ramsey, supra, at 76 (“[T]here is nothing necessarily rights enhancing
about international materials. In many areas, it seems likely that the United States is an outlier in
protecting rights that few other societies recognize.”).
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by unelected judges at the expense of democratic lawmaking processes.258 In
the context of Hong Kong, however, it is difficult to object to judicial
invalidation of government action as undemocratic or countermajoritarian
because Hong Kong’s legislature and chief executive are not fully elected but
instead chosen pursuant to a convoluted formula designed to ensure
compliance with Beijing’s wishes.259 The acts of pseudo-elected officials on
behalf of an authoritarian regime do not exactly cry out for judicial deference
in the name of democracy. Indeed, far from undermining democratic selfgovernance, vigorous judicial review might be said to operate as a partial
substitute for democratic governance by keeping Hong Kong’s government
within the kinds of legal limits that are prevalent in democratic countries, and
by giving the people of Hong Kong a reliable and transparent mechanism for
challenging government actions that affect them.
C. Jurisdictions Considered
The HKCFA relies most frequently on case law from the United
Kingdom. Roughly half of the case citations found in the HKCFA’s
constitutional rights jurisprudence are to British cases.260 Indeed, the
HKCFA cites cases from the United Kingdom with much greater frequency
than its own case law: whereas 48% of all citations are to case law from the
United Kingdom, only 11% are to the HKCFA’s own jurisprudence.261
Other popular jurisdictions include Canada and the United States, which

258 See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 G EO . L.J. 723, 727-30
(2009) (noting the preoccupation of American constitutional theory with the extent to which the
supposedly “counter-majoritarian” character of judicial review necessitates judicial restraint, and
reviewing empirical scholarship that casts doubt on the extent to which judicial review is actually
countermajoritarian).
259 See Albert H.Y. Chen, International Human Rights Law and Domestic Constitutional Law:
Internationalisation of Constitutional Law in Hong Kong, 4 N AT’ L TAIWAN U. L. R EV. 237, 273
(2009) (observing that the existence of a “democracy deﬁcit” in Hong Kong makes it impossible to
object to judicial use of international law on democratic grounds); supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (describing how the chief executive and half of the members of the legislature are
selected in ways that favor constituencies sympathetic to China and give Beijing an eﬀective veto
over the selection of candidates).
260 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10.
261 Id.; see also Andrew Byrnes, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights
(“The courts of Hong Kong manifest an excessive reliance on, and deference to, English decisions
at almost every level; they tend to follow, almost automatically, developments in England and have
considerably less time for developments elsewhere in the common law world.”), in P ROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVES 318, 355
(Philip Alston ed., 1999).
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together account for 9% of case citations,262 and Australia and New Zealand,
which collectively lay claim to 7%. Especially in the case of American case
law, however, the fact that cases are cited does not necessarily mean that
they are followed.263
Although it receives fewer citations than the British courts, the ECtHR
may be more inﬂuential than the raw citation numbers would suggest.
International courts and tribunals such as the ECtHR account for only 8%
of the HKCFA’s case citations,264 but scholars and judges alike have
observed that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR tends to receive serious
consideration from Hong Kong courts.265
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise
Legal and normative factors of the type mentioned in Section V.B help
to explain why the HKCFA might be especially willing to use foreign and
international law. They do not, however, directly explain the court’s high
level of foreign law expertise or ability to perform foreign legal research. A
variety of institutional factors contribute to the HKCFA’s heavy capacity
for comparativism as well as its taste for British law in particular. These
factors include: (1) the entrenchment of the legal system inherited from the
United Kingdom; (2) the direct participation of overseas judges and lawyers
in the work of the HKCFA; (3) the extent to which local judges and lawyers
are educated in the United Kingdom; and (4) the potential for assistance
262 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10; see also Johannes M.M. Chan, Hong Kong’s Bill of
Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to International and Comparative Jurisprudence, 47 INT’ L &
C OMP. L.Q. 306, 309-10 (1998) (noting that, in interpreting Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights
Ordinance, Hong Kong courts have made “few references to comparative jurisprudence from
jurisdictions other than Canada or the United States,” with the exceptions of the European Court
of Human Rights and the British Privy Council).
263 See Chan, supra note 262, at 310 (observing that the relatively few citations to cases from
the United States tend to be made “with reservations”); Young, supra note 242, at 82 (noting that
constitutional cases from Canada and the United States are “often considered” but “not always
followed”); cf. Byrnes, supra note 261, at 368-69 (reporting that Hong Kong courts “have felt
particularly comfortable in dealing with decisions under the Canadian Charter” of Rights and
Freedoms when asked to interpret the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, and that Canadian judicial
decisions tend to be both more accessible and more familiar to Hong Kong counsel than American
decisions).
264 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10.
265 See Chan, supra note 262, at 309 (reporting that Hong Kong courts make “extensive reference”
to ECtHR case law when interpreting the Bill of Rights Ordinance); Young, supra note 242, at 82
(describing the ECtHR as “[p]robably the most influential source” of foreign case law); Interview
with Justice A, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of Final Appeal, in H.K.
(May 4, 2014) (opining that Hong Kong courts may be more willing to cite ECtHR jurisprudence
than the jurisprudence of most foreign courts); Interview with Judge 1, Current or Former Judge
of the High Court of H.K., in H.K. (May 4, 2014) (same).
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with foreign legal research through the relatively new system of judicial
assistants.
1. The Entrenched Legacy of British Rule
An understanding of the HKCFA’s heavy expertise in foreign law, and
British law in particular, requires at least some background knowledge of
Hong Kong’s history and relationship with mainland China. From the mid1800s until China’s resumption of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong was a
British colony,266 and the Privy Council in London served accordingly as its
highest court.267 The establishment of the HKCFA in 1997 to replace the
Privy Council as Hong Kong’s highest court was ordained by the Basic
Law,268 which is technically a statute enacted by the National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but functions as a
constitution for the semi-autonomous Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR).269 Both the existence and the content of the Basic Law
reﬂect the terms of the Sino–British Joint Declaration, the treaty under
which the United Kingdom returned sovereignty over Hong Kong to China
in exchange for guarantees that Hong Kong would continue to enjoy a high
degree of autonomy in its internal aﬀairs.270
Several provisions of the Basic Law guarantee the continuity of Britain’s
legal legacy in Hong Kong notwithstanding the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty. As previously noted, article 8 preserves “[t]he laws previously in
force in Hong Kong” under British colonial rule—namely, “the common law,
rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law,”271
while article 87 expressly obligates courts in Hong Kong to apply that
preexisting body of law.272 Because Hong Kong is now part of China, judicial
application of the “laws previously in force in Hong Kong” and “the common
law” involves the application of what is now technically foreign law.
Judging from the frequency of citation to British law as well as the
accounts given by judges themselves, the Hong Kong judiciary has
266 See G ITTINGS , supra note 66, at 10. While the southern portion of Hong Kong was
originally ceded by China to Britain in perpetuity, the northern portion was instead leased for
ninety-nine years. See id.
267 See id. at 5.
268 X IANGGANG JIBEN F A art. 81 (H.K.).
269 See G ITTINGS , supra note 66, at 46-50 (explaining why, notwithstanding objections from
mainland Chinese oﬃcials and scholars, the Basic Law “ﬁts the deﬁnition of a constitution” and is
consequently “commonly referred to in Hong Kong” as a “mini-constitution”).
270 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
271 X IANGGANG JIBEN F A art. 8 (H.K.).
272 Id. art. 87.
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succeeded at maintaining the continuity of the legal system.273 It is a mark
of this continuity that Hong Kong judges—most of whom received their
legal training in the United Kingdom—do not necessarily conceptualize
British law as foreign. When asked why Hong Kong courts make such
heavy use of foreign law, one justice responded that he did not think of
English or Australian cases as foreign law but rather as simply “the common
law,” a system of principles and reasoning that transcends national
boundaries and encompasses Hong Kong.274 It is necessary to consider
English and Australian cases, he explained, because one determines
“whether one is right” by “comparing conclusions reached by other judges
applying the same system of law in similar cases.”275
2. Participation of Overseas Judges and Lawyers
Articles 82 and 84 of the Basic Law explicitly authorize the recruitment
of judges “from other common law jurisdictions,”276 while article 94 does
the same for the legal profession by allowing the licensing of “lawyers from
outside Hong Kong to work and practise in the Region.”277 The ostensible
rationale for allowing foreign judges to serve on the HKCFA was not to
increase the court’s aptitude for comparativism, but rather to compensate
for the lack of experience with ﬁnal appellate courts among Hong Kong
judges.278 Whatever the reason for their inclusion, however, one would be
hard-pressed to imagine a more eﬃcient and eﬀective way to ensure foreign
legal expertise on a court than to appoint foreign judges.
The HKCFA hears appeals in ﬁve-judge panels279 but has historically
had only four permanent members, including the Chief Justice.280 By
statute, the ﬁfth justice is selected by the Chief Justice from a roster of local
273 One member of the HKCFA recalled the experience of conducting a trial that spanned the
days immediately before and after the British handover of Hong Kong to China. He noticed only one
change between June 30, 1997 (the last day of British rule), and July 1, 1997 (the first day of Chinese
rule): the royal coat of arms in the courtroom had been replaced by the red bauhinia seal of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
274 Interview with Justice B, supra note 244.
275 Id.
276 X IANGGANG J IBEN FA art. 82 (H.K.). Within the judiciary, only the Chief Justice of the
HKCFA and the Chief Judge of the High Court must be Chinese citizens. Id. art. 90.
277 Id. art. 94.
278 See G ITTINGS , supra note 66, at 189.
279 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 484, 5, § 16 (H.K.). Applications for leave to appeal are decided by three-judge panels. Id. § 18.
280 By statute, the minimum number of permanent justices (including the Chief Justice) is four,
but nothing in the statute appears to preclude the appointment of more than four permanent justices.
Id. § 5(1),(5). In practice, the HKCFA has not had more than four permanent justices at a time.
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and foreign non-permanent judges.281 The list of local non-permanent
judges consists primarily of retired members of the HKCFA itself, while
the list of foreign judges is drawn exclusively “from other common law
jurisdictions.”282 It is unnecessary for the foreign judges to possess prior
exposure to Hong Kong law; indeed, anyone who possesses prior experience
as a lower court judge in Hong Kong is ineligible for appointment as a
foreign judge.283
In practice, the Chief Justice ordinarily chooses a visiting foreign judge
to occupy the last seat.284 The majority of these foreign judges have hailed
from the United Kingdom, with Australia and New Zealand providing the
remainder.285 In all forty-ﬁve of the constitutional cases decided by the
HKCFA through 2009, the permanent judges of the court were joined by a
former or sitting member of the British House of Lords, the Privy Council,
or the Australian High Court.286 Thus far, no Canadians or South Africans
have served as visiting judges on the HKCFA.287 One factor that
contributes to the heavy representation of British judges is the United
Kingdom’s longstanding practice of allowing its best active-duty judges to

281 Id. §§ 9, 16. Like the permanent justices, the local and foreign “non-permanent” justices
are appointed by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive on the recommendation of a judicial nominating
commission. Whereas permanent justices serve until retirement age (at which point they may be
renewed for a limited period of time), non-permanent justices face no retirement age and serve
exclusively for ﬁxed, renewable terms. Id. §§ 7–9.
282 Id. §§ 5(3), 9.
283 See id. at 4, § 12(4) (deeming ineligible for appointment as a “judge from another common
law jurisdiction” anyone who has ever been “a judge of the High Court, a District Judge or a
permanent magistrate, in Hong Kong”).
284 See Young, supra note 242, at 81 (reporting that all 45 constitutional cases decided by the
HKCFA through 2009 included the participation of a former or sitting member of the Australian
High Court, the British House of Lords, or the Privy Council); Simon N.M. Young & Antonio
Da Roza, Judges and Judging in the Court of Final Appeal: A Statistical Picture, H.K. LAWYER, Aug.
2010, at 1, 3, available at http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/129553/1/HKLawyer-JudgesJudgingAug2010.pdf (reporting that an overseas judge participated in 97% of all cases heard by the
HKCFA from its creation in 1997 through 2010).
285 See Young, supra note 242, at 79, 80 tbl.9 (listing the overseas judges who participated in
the HKCFA’s constitutional cases over the ﬁrst ten years of the court’s existence, and noting that
they all hailed from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand). At present, the list of
non-permanent justices consists of six retired Hong Kong judges, four retired Australian judges,
one retired judge from New Zealand, and seven active and retired judges from the United
Kingdom. See List of Judges and Judicial Oﬃcers (Position as at 23 February 2015), H.K. J UDICIARY,
http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/organization/judges.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/UKB4-7BV4.
286 See Young, supra note 242, at 81.
287 See supra note 285 (discussing the nationalities of the HKCFA’s past and present nonpermanent justices).
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serve concurrently on overseas courts.288 An extreme example is Lord
Neuberger, who currently serves as a non-permanent justice of the HKCFA
as well as the chief justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court.289 In
practice, however, the availability of active British judges is constrained by
their domestic duties.290
The tendency of parties to hire prominent foreign counsel in high-stakes
constitutional cases further exposes the HKCFA to foreign law. By their
own account, the justices “rely heavily on counsel” to bring relevant foreign
precedent to their attention.291 Because the most sought-after human rights
lawyers to appear before the HKCFA tend to hail from the United
Kingdom, the HKCFA can be assured of learning about British law at a
minimum.292
3. The Foreign Education of Lawyers and Judges
Until the 1970s, Hong Kong lacked either law schools of its own or a
supply of locally trained lawyers.293 Consequently, most of the lawyers in
Hong Kong with suﬃcient experience to be plausible candidates for
appointment to senior positions in the judiciary—including all of the
permanent justices of the HKCFA—have studied law in the United
Kingdom. Although the passage of time may eventually bring about a
predominance of locally trained judges at the most senior levels, this has not
yet come to pass.
The fact that all of the permanent members of the HKCFA (and all but
one of its non-permanent members) received their legal education outside

288 See Interview with Johannes Chan, Dean, Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, in Taipei, Taiwan
( June 10, 2014) (identifying the United Kingdom’s historical tradition of dispatching personnel to
assist its colonies and dominions as a reason for its willingness to share active judges with the
HKCFA).
289 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; List of Judges and Judicial Oﬃcers (Position as
at 23 February 2015), supra note 285 (listing both the permanent and non-permanent members of
the HKCFA).
290 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (noting that the HKCFA does not recess in
August because that is the only time when the U.K. Supreme Court’s schedule permits Lord
Neuberger to hear cases in Hong Kong).
291 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265.
292 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (citing Baron Pannick, QC and Michael
Fordham, QC as examples).
293 See id. (noting that Hong Kong lacked any local law graduates prior to 1973); see also
About Us, FACULTY OF LAW, U. H.K., http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/index.php (last visited Feb.
28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5JU9-2QDL (indicating that the University of Hong Kong,
home to Hong Kong’s ﬁrst law school, lacked any kind of law department until 1969 and lacked an
autonomous law school until 1978).
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Hong Kong294 has helped to ensure a high level of sophistication about
foreign law. Even a gradual transition to locally trained judges, however,
seems unlikely to signiﬁcantly diminish the prevalence of foreign legal
expertise on the bench given the heavily international character of Hong
Kong law schools. For example, the members of the University of Hong
Kong Faculty of Law—the oldest of the three local law schools—hail from
seventeen diﬀerent countries, and less than half are ethnically Chinese (a
category that includes professors from mainland China and Taiwan as well
as Hong Kong).295
4. Research Assistance
Because both the justices themselves and the lawyers who appear before
them tend to be well versed in foreign law, the HKCFA is not reliant on its
clerks for foreign legal expertise. Nevertheless, the clerks—known as
judicial assistants—do provide additional support for the comparative
enterprise.
The use of law clerks is a relatively new phenomenon in Hong Kong.
The HKCFA hired its ﬁrst judicial assistants roughly a decade ago, and
their responsibilities are still evolving.296 As of this writing, the number of
judicial assistants is expanding from ﬁve to eight.297 Judicial assistants serve
one-year terms298 and do not work exclusively for individual justices or even
the HKCFA. Instead, they rotate between the HKCFA and the appellate
division of the High Court and spend perhaps half of their time at the
HKCFA performing legal research.299
Unless instructed otherwise, a judicial assistant is likely to approach a
research assignment by investigating both British and Hong Kong law. If
the relevant law in those jurisdictions is unclear or conﬂicting, additional
294 The exception is Justice Patrick Chan, who studied law at the University of Hong Kong
and served as a permanent justice of the HKCFA until 2013, at which time he became a nonpermanent member of the court. See Patrick Chan ( Judge), WIKIPEDIA , http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Patrick_Chan_( judge) (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/35H9-7SVN.
295 See Interview with Johannes Chan, supra note 288 (estimating that no more than thirtyﬁve to forty percent of the law school’s faculty are ethnically Chinese).
296 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265; Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, Judicial
Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., in H.K. ( June 6, 2014).
297 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (noting the planned expansion of the number
of judicial assistants to eight); Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note 296.
298 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265; Interview with Judicial Assistant 2, Judicial
Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., in H.K. ( June 6, 2014).
299 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note
296 (indicating that “about half the job is legal research”); Interview with Judicial Assistant 2, supra
note 298 (describing a system of three-month rotations between the High Court and the HKCFA).
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jurisdictions such as Australia or Canada may also be considered.300 Of the
current crop of ﬁve, three have foreign law degrees (two from England and
one from Australia). However, the committee of judges responsible for
hiring the judicial assistants does not place a premium on foreign legal
expertise, and the proportion of assistants with foreign training varies
considerably from year to year.
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts
When it comes to interaction with foreign judges, the Hong Kong
judiciary is a model of transparency and recordkeeping. Its annual report,
available in both English and Chinese from its website, lists in
chronological order every foreign visitor to the judiciary, ranging from a
“14-member delegation of the Judicial Research and Training Institute of
the Republic of Korea” to a “10-member delegation led by Mr Sherali
Rahmanov, Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Uzbekistan.”301 Likewise, the report lists visits by members of the Hong
Kong judiciary to destinations and institutions outside Hong Kong.302
Several judges indicated that the report’s listing of interaction with foreign
jurists can be trusted as comprehensive.303
The HKCFA’s overall level of interaction with foreign courts and
judges can fairly be described as high. Although the report does not always
distinguish between visits to the judiciary as a whole and visits to the
HKCFA in particular, it is clear that one or more members of the HKCFA
have at least monthly in-person interaction with some combination of
300 See Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note 296; E-mail from Judicial Assistant 2,
Judicial Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., to author ( June
10, 2014, 13:01 EST) (on ﬁle with author).
301 See Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013: Highlights of Events in 2013, H.K. J UDICIARY ,
http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/annu_rept_2013/eng/highlights.html (last updated
Feb. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/DHS4-7X7F. The report also includes aggregate
statistics for the number of discrete visits and visitors in three separate categories, “Local,” “The
Mainland,” and “Overseas,” but these overall ﬁgures distinguish neither between visitors to the
judiciary as a whole and visitors to the HKCFA, nor between judicial and non-judicial visitors. See
Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013: Number of Visits and Visitors to the Judiciary, H.K.
J UDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/annu_rept_2013/eng/visiters.html (last
updated Feb. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UA9V-YXGQ.
302 Inspection of the report reveals, for example, that on May 23, 2013, Chief Justice Ma
delivered a talk entitled “Courage and the Law: Upholding the Dignity of the Individual” at the
University of Zurich, while on the following day, a magistrate judge named Lin Kam-hung
attended a maritime law seminar in Shenzhen. See Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013:
Highlights of Events in 2013, supra note 301.
303 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Justice B, supra note 244; Interview with Judge 1, Current or Former Judge of the High Court of H.K., in H.K. (June 6, 2014).
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foreign or mainland Chinese jurists, above and beyond what is entailed by
the inclusion of a foreign judge on every panel. Hong Kong is also part of
what has been described as an “informal circuit of judges” among
Commonwealth countries and has become—alongside England, Australia,
and New Zealand—a primary exporter of judges, “particularly to smaller
jurisdictions in the Caribbean and Paciﬁc regions.”304
VI. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM
Explanations for judicial comparativism can be divided into what might
be called “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations. Demand-side
explanations focus on the preferences that judges have with respect to
comparativism (or, put diﬀerently, their demand for foreign legal expertise). Supply-side explanations focus on the extent to which judges possess
the resources and capabilities needed to engage in comparativism (or, in
other words, the supply of foreign legal expertise available to judges). To
fully understand the occurrence of comparativism, it is necessary to investigate both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Judges will not
engage in comparativism, or any other practice, unless they possess both the
inclination and the ability to do so. Moreover, supply and demand cannot
be discussed independently of one another because they are interdependent.
Over time, demand increases supply by incentivizing investment in the
necessary institutional infrastructure, while supply increases demand by
lowering the cost to judges of engaging in comparativism.
Most discussion of comparativism tends to dwell on the demand side of
the equation, to the neglect of the supply side. There is little agreement,
however, over what motivates judges to seek out foreign law. The most
conventional explanation for judicial comparativism, in the sense of being
the explanation typically oﬀered by judges themselves, casts judicial motivations in a ﬂattering light: judges practice comparativism because they
believe that it enriches their knowledge and thus the quality of their
decisionmaking.305 The explanation advanced by opponents of comparativism
304 Simon N.M. Young, The Hong Kong Multinational Judge in Criminal Appeals (noting also
that “Canadian and American judges do not appear to be involved” in this international ﬂow of
judges), in C RIMINAL APPEALS 1907-2007: ISSUES AND P ERSPECTIVES 130, 132 (Chris Corns
& Gregor Urbas eds., 2008).
305 See, e.g., Bryde, supra note 11, at 296; Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 819; Kirby,
supra note 19, at 186; La Forest, supra note 199, at 218, 220 (“[L]ittle pockets of particular expertise
develop in foreign courts . . . . [T]he use of foreign material aﬀords another source, another tool
for the construction of better judgments . . . . [F]rom time to time a look outward may reveal
refreshing perspectives.”); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 26-27; Anthony Mason, The Place of
Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong,
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posits a less noble set of judicial preferences: judges resort to foreign law,
critics argue, for the purpose of justifying ideologically desired results that
lack sufficient support in domestic law.306
Although empirical research suggests that there is at least an element of
truth to the less charitable view,307 scholars have identiﬁed a much broader
range of reasons why courts may develop a taste for comparativism.308 The
level of judicial interest in foreign law could, for example, be a function of
the adequacy of domestic jurisprudence. A court faced with a relatively
sparse body of domestic jurisprudence might use foreign law to perform a
gap-ﬁlling function. This might be the case for a relatively new court, a
court confronted with regime change (such as democratization) that fundamentally alters its own role and calls for reexamination of its existing
jurisprudence, or a court faced with a relatively new constitution.309 This
37 H.K. L.J. 299, 302 (2007) (“In many instances, relevant choices have been made, sometimes
diﬀering choices, by courts of other jurisdictions. Apart from these choices, the reasoning behind
the choice may provide useful assistance.”); Rehnquist, supra note 14, at 412 (“[N]ow that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts
begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative
process.”); Breyer, supra note 14. See generally Law, supra note 47, at 147 (summarizing, with examples,
“the justifications given by most judges, most of the time, for engaging in comparativism”).
306 See, e.g., B ORK , supra note 255, at 137-38 (denouncing comparativism as a means by which
cosmopolitan liberals advance their preferred reforms); Black et al., supra note 24, at 21, 43
(hypothesizing, and ﬁnding empirical evidence, that the members of the U.S. Supreme Court “cite
transnational sources of law to prop up the logic of their opinions” and “create the illusion that
[they are] acting with considerable supporting precedent” when reaching ideologically motivated
decisions or overruling precedent); Ramsey, supra note 257, at 69 (cautioning that judicial
comparativism can “serve[] as mere cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic
advocacy groups”).
307 See Black et al., supra note 24, at 35 (ﬁnding as an empirical matter that U.S. Supreme
Court justices are more likely to cite “transnational law” when reaching decisions that they favor
on ideological grounds, striking down statutes, or overruling precedent); Erik Voeten, Borrowing
and Nonborrowing Among International Courts, 39 J. L EGAL S TUD . 547, 567, 572 (2010) (ﬁnding that
separate opinions by ECtHR judges that cite external legal sources “almost always argue in favor
of a more expansive” interpretation of rights, and concluding that “the use of external decisions is
driven in part by the individual ideologies of judges”).
308 See, e.g., H IRSCHL , supra note 11, at 21-22 (listing “globalization and increased interconnectivity,” “instrumentalism,” “the importance of professional networks that judges operate in,”
and “structural features” among the various explanations oﬀered by scholars for the phenomenon
of “global constitutional dialogue,” and emphasizing the role of “sociopolitical context” in shaping
“whether and where the judicial mind travels in its search for pertinent foreign sources”);
McCrudden, supra note 6, at 516-27 (identifying ten factors that might promote judicial comparativism including, inter alia, the type of political regime in which the foreign court is situated, and
the sympathy of the audience toward foreign law references).
309 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 14, 42-43 (noting that “[n]ewly established or transforming
legal systems frequently use comparative reasoning as a source of inspiration and external authority,”
and that such use may decline once “a system starts believing in its own self-suﬃciency”); Chen, supra
note 259, at 272 (“Without an indigenous tradition of constitutional protection of human rights, it
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period of jurisprudential scarcity is likely to coincide, moreover, with a
period of political and institutional flux that raises an abundance of unusually
important or contentious constitutional questions,310 which may only
increase the court’s need for authority of some kind to justify and legitimate
its decisions.311
From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear whether courts in mature
legal systems will necessarily make less use of foreign law. There are at least
three distinct possibilities that point in diﬀerent directions. The ﬁrst
possibility might be called the substitution hypothesis: to the extent that
foreign law ﬁlls a void left by a lack of homegrown jurisprudence that
coincides with a period of heightened need for legal authority, judicial
comparativism might be expected to decline over time as domestic law
oﬀers an increasingly adequate substitute for foreign law.312 A second
[has been] natural for Hong Kong to draw on external resources for support and guidance.”);
Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a 'Worldwide Rights Culture': An Empirical Study of the
Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982–2010) (ﬁnding empirically that,
following Canada’s adoption of a new constitution in 1982, the Canadian Supreme Court’s “citation
of foreign law declined between the end of the 1990s and the end of the 2000s,” and attributing
this decline to the development of “suﬃcient domestic jurisprudence” and consequent reduction in
reliance on “foreign sources”), in THE USE OF FOREIGN P RECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL
JUDGES, supra note 11, at 39, 54; Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of
Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & S OC. INQUIRY 763, 790 (2002) (“[L]egislatures
in new democracies are typically underdeveloped and unable to carry out what might otherwise be
their natural function of norm replacement. One would thus expect courts in democratic
transitions to play a special role of looking abroad to transform their constitutional orders.”);
Mason, supra note 305, at 302 (noting the “natural attraction” of comparative law for a “newlyestablished court which has not yet developed its own corpus of jurisprudence”); McCrudden,
supra note 6, at 523-24; Saunders, supra note 11, at 574, 582 (noting that “[f]oreign law may lose its
authority . . . as local jurisprudence develops,” and citing Germany, South Africa, and Hungary as
examples of countries where judicial use of foreign jurisprudence has declined “as the local
jurisprudence becomes established”).
310 See, e.g., G INSBURG, supra note 63, at 30, 106-246 (observing that, “in the context of new
democracies and political transitions,” “by deﬁnition the institutional structure of the political
system is in a period of transition,” and chronicling the landmark constitutional cases faced by
courts in Taiwan, Mongolia, and Korea in the aftermath of democratization); Shannon Ishiyama
Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 C OMP.
P OL. S TUD . 1188, 1193-94 (2001) (observing that, in the aftermath of major constitutional change,
both the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court were faced with many
“highly contentious” and “literally ‘unprecedented’” situations).
311 Cf. Smithey, supra note 310, at 1192, 1204, 1207 (hypothesizing that judges search more broadly
for support for their opinions in the face of opposition, and finding consistent with this hypothesis
that the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court were more likely in their
early years to cite foreign law in cases involving novel or “particularly contentious questions,” such as
those decided by a fractured court or involving the overturning of government action).
312 See B OBEK , supra note 11, at 14-15 (noting a decline in judicial use of foreign law in
Germany and central European post-communist countries after an “initial boom of comparative
inspiration,” and suggesting that the decline may be attributable to a growing sense of “self-
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possibility might be called the habituation hypothesis: comparativism is habitforming and becomes increasingly well accepted and difficult to dislodge over
time. Yet another possibility might be called the circumvention hypothesis:
judges engage in comparativism precisely because there is domestic law on
point that they wish to avoid or circumvent. When precedent stands in the
way of a court’s objectives, the court must turn elsewhere for support, and
the use of foreign law may help the court to overcome the obstacle posed by
domestic law.313
Use of foreign law can also be a way for a court to elevate its status and
promote acceptance of its decisions among domestic audiences by identifying
itself with high-prestige courts and countries.314 The practice of looking to a
handful of prestigious and influential countries for guidance may be perceived
not as a form of illicit judicial activism, but rather as a constraint upon judicial
discretion and thus a source of legitimacy.315 Courts that need to consolidate
suﬃciency”); id. at 43 n.12 (identifying Germany and South Africa as countries in which judicial
references to foreign sources diminished as domestic law accumulated); Smithey, supra note 310, at
1199-1200, 1206 (ﬁnding in both Canada and South Africa a “small but signiﬁcant” negative
relationship between the number of constitutional cases previously decided and the degree of
foreign law citation in subsequent constitutional cases, but also reporting that this relationship
failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance in the case of Canada once additional variables were
introduced into the analysis).
313 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 24, at 35 (reporting that the Supreme Court becomes more
likely to cite “transnational law” when it is overruling precedent or striking down laws).
314 See, e.g., W OJCIECH SADURSKI , C ONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ENLARGEMENT
OF EUROPE 23 (2012) (observing that “being aligned with a prestigious and powerful European
tribunal, endowed with a high degree of legitimacy derived from states’ international obligations,
is extremely welcome in conﬂict-prone and democratically weak domestic contexts,” and noting for
example that the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice of citing ECtHR case law may
advance both its domestic legitimacy and foreign reputation); Black et al., supra note 24, at 39
(ﬁnding empirically that the “transnational law” citation habits of U.S. Supreme Court justices
favor “those countries most likely to be deemed legitimate by the American public and by elites”—
namely, stable, democratic, wealthy, English-speaking countries); Kalb, supra note 11, at 440
(arguing that use of foreign jurisprudence “may allow for a borrowing of their perceived legitimacy
by a court lacking in its own”); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 570 (observing the awareness of the
TCC that “following in the footsteps of powerful and prestigious countries” helps Taiwan to
“generate badly needed support and acceptance among the international community”); Saunders,
supra note 11, at 580 (suggesting that a new constitutional court may make use of foreign jurisprudence to “augment [its] authority” and “establish its place in the constitutional order”); cf. Gregory
A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. P OL. S CI .
R EV. 178, 189-91 (1985) (ﬁnding that within the United States, prestige diﬀerentials among state
supreme courts are a signiﬁcant predictor of “intercourt communication,” measured in terms of the
degree to which one state supreme court cites another).
315 See, e.g., Kalb, supra note 11, at 439-41 (arguing that strategic judicial citation of foreign law in
transitional democracies can have the eﬀect of legitimating courts and bolstering judicial independence); Sydney Kentridge, Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication: The South African Experience
(suggesting that use of comparative jurisprudence helps to ensure that judges do not simply make a
constitution “mean whatever [they] want it to mean”), in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A
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their authority have the most to gain from making strategic use of foreign
law in this manner. Therefore, all other things equal, relatively new courts
and courts in new or transitional democracies might be expected to engage
more heavily in comparativism.316
Our four East Asian case studies offer fresh perspective on these
hypotheses. Although the substitution hypothesis makes logical sense, it
does not appear to be the case that courts resort to comparativism only in
the absence of suﬃcient domestic jurisprudence. The example of Canada is
sometimes cited as support for the substitution hypothesis: it has been
argued that two or three decades of judicial experience with the 1982
Charter of Rights and Freedoms led to a decline in the Canadian Supreme
Court’s use of foreign constitutional jurisprudence.317 However, nearly as
much time has elapsed in South Korea and Taiwan since democratization
and the emergence of vigorous judicial review, yet the accumulation of over
a quarter-century of domestic jurisprudence does not appear to have
curtailed the practice of comparativism by either the KCC or TCC. Thus, at
least for Korea and Taiwan, the habituation and circumvention hypotheses
are more consistent with the evidence than the substitution hypothesis. It
may be that the explanatory power of the substitution hypothesis turns at
least partly on institutional factors that vary from court to court. For example,
substitution of domestic for foreign jurisprudence may be less likely if a court
has the time and resources to conduct both foreign and domestic legal
research and thus is not forced to choose one at the expense of the other. The
KCC, at least, fits this description.

NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?, supra note 11, at 329, 330; Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings
and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269, 273 (2003) (citing the
argument made by Domingo Sarmiento, future president of Argentina, that Argentinian courts ought
to adhere strictly to American constitutional precedent in order to ensure that their case law does not
simply reflect personal opinion); Voeten, supra note 307, at 553 (“Citing external sources . . . signals
that legal reasoning is shared by others and thus is not arbitrary.”).
316 See Kalb, supra note 11, at 448.
317 See H IRSCHL , supra note 11, at 33-34 (reviewing evidence of a “jurisprudential maturation” eﬀect in Canada, Hong Kong, and India); Gentili, supra note 309, at 54 (attributing a decline
in the Canadian Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law to the growing availability of domestic
precedent); Smithey, supra note 310, at 1199-1200, 1206 (ﬁnding evidence that foreign law citation
in Canada and South Africa decreased as domestic precedent increased). But see Harding, supra
note 16, at 411-12 (arguing that “the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of foreign law has not
diminished with the establishment of a uniquely Canadian body of law, but rather has increased in
frequency and diversity”); La Forest, supra note 199, at 212, 217 (arguing that Canadian courts are
characterized by “modern and expanding reliance on foreign materials,” but also acknowledging
that “recourse to American materials [may] become less necessary in the [constitutional] context as
[Canada] develop[s] a more extensive and distinctive domestic jurisprudence”).
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It is also clear from the case studies that many judges value comparativism as a means of enhancing rather than undermining the legitimacy of
judicial review. Whereas constitutional comparativism has attracted ﬁerce
criticism in the United States,318 popular reaction may actually encourage
the use of foreign law in places such as Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. As
a member of the TCC noted, the ability to say “this is how it’s done
elsewhere” and “we used a foreign mainstream standard” can, in especially
controversial or politically sensitive cases, provide a “kind of safe harbor”
from criticism that a court is fashioning answers out of whole cloth to suit
its own whims.319 Judicial comparativism can have these legitimating eﬀects,
moreover, even if judicial style disfavors the explicit citation of foreign law.
Those in the legal community have little diﬃculty recognizing the telltale
signs of foreign jurisprudence.320 No footnote is necessary, for example,
when the TCC suddenly introduces the terminology of “clear and present
danger”321 in a case involving public demonstrations.322 As one justice
observed: “Yes we say it in Chinese, but people know what it means in
English.”323
No discussion of comparativism would be complete without at least
some discussion of a variable that ﬁgures prominently in the comparative
law literature—namely, the distinction between common law and civil law
jurisdictions. Neither legal tradition appears to be inherently more conducive to comparativism than the other: within East Asia, one ﬁnds examples
of both civil law and common law courts (the KCC and TCC on the one
hand; the HKCFA on the other) that engage heavily in constitutional
comparativism. That does not mean, however, that membership in a
particular legal family has no implications for the practice of judicial
comparativism. The eﬀects of this variable are seen not in whether comparativism is practiced at all, but rather in how it is practiced.
First, common law courts tend to be more transparent about comparativism than civil law courts, in the sense that they are more likely to reveal
their use of foreign law by explicitly citing it in their opinions.324 The
318
319
320

See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
Interview with Justice J, supra note 236.
See Kalb, supra note 11, at 424 (observing that the adoption of “key foreign concepts”
renders the inﬂuence of foreign sources “easy to detect in many decisions,” even if the sources
themselves have not been explicitly identiﬁed).
321 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
322 J.Y. Interpretation No. 445, 1998 SHIZI 15 (Constitutional Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (Taiwan).
323 See Interview with Justice J, supra note 236 (discussing the sudden appearance of the
“clear and present danger” test in Interpretation No. 445).
324 Cf. Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, The Use of Foreign Precedents: A Limited Practice, An Uncertain Future (noting an “almost perfect correlation” between whether a constitutional
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HKCFA’s citation practices render its opinions a more reliable indicator of
foreign law usage than those of the KCC, TCC, or JSC. Second, membership
in a particular legal family appears to have a substantial eﬀect on which
jurisdictions tend to be chosen for comparison. In East Asia, those jurisdictions that borrowed directly or indirectly from the German legal tradition
continue to look toward Germany, whereas a history of British colonialism
instead yields enduring jurisprudential ties to other Commonwealth
nations. The result is what Alan Watson calls “transplant bias”: courts do
not “systematically search” for the most informative or relevant foreign
models but instead return time and time again to a handful of favored
examples.325 These examples will not necessarily be the most intellectually
illuminating or substantively comparable ones but will instead reﬂect such
factors as historical legacy and global prestige.326
VII. DIPLOMATIC EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM
Judges sometimes engage with foreign law and foreign courts for reasons
that have little to do with the performance of legal or adjudicative functions. Their motivations can instead be more diplomatic than legal in
character. Scholars may disagree over the normative desirability of judicial
diplomacy,327 but as an empirical matter, judicial diplomacy is already
occurring. And it is occurring because constitutional courts have both
opportunities and incentives to practice it. Diplomacy may not be the
primary responsibility of courts, but it is not entirely alien to them either.
Judicial diplomacy is an ambiguous term that could describe any of three
conceptually distinct types of behavior, the last of which demands particular
attention. First, ordinary diplomats may make instrumental use of courts, or
court explicitly cites foreign law and whether the court belongs to the common law or civil law
tradition), in THE USE OF FOREIGN P RECEDENTS BY C ONSTITUTIONAL J UDGES , supra note
11, at 411, 412.
325 Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. P A . L. R EV. 1121,
1146-47 (1983).
326 See id. at 1147; see also HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 23, 41-68 (describing the Israeli Supreme
Court’s tendency to rely heavily on American and Canadian jurisprudence, while ignoring other,
potentially more relevant bodies of law, as a strategy for identifying itself with high-prestige courts).
327 Compare J ACKSON , supra note 19, at 123 (noting the possibility that judges may act as
“diplomats,” but arguing that courts should not view constitutional adjudication as a “positive
opportunity to advance national interests” or promote their own international inﬂuence), with Noah
Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES , Sept. 28, 2008, (Magazine), at 57, 66
(arguing that “the fact that the Constitution aﬀects our relations with the world requires the
justices to have a foreign policy of their own,” and that the Supreme Court should “weigh national
and international interests” and consider how the Constitution is perceived abroad when engaging
in constitutional interpretation).
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seek to inﬂuence courts, in the course of conducting otherwise conventional
diplomacy. The work of the courts may be used as a selling point in the
quest for international leadership or acceptance, as in the case of State
Department publications that educate international audiences about the
U.S. Supreme Court328 or Israeli mailings of prominent Israeli Supreme
Court decisions to American legal academics.329 Relatedly, diplomats may
also seek to encourage courts to factor foreign policy considerations into
their decisions, as when oﬃcials repeatedly drew the Supreme Court’s
attention to the damaging impact of racial segregation on international
perceptions of the United States in the context of the Cold War.330
Second, judicial diplomacy might refer to the modes of interaction that
courts adopt with one another.331 For reasons ranging from the jurisdictional
to the geopolitical, courts may find themselves employing stereotypically
diplomatic tactics and instruments when dealing with foreign counterparts.
The bywords for this kind of behavior are negotiation and agreement rather
than adjudication and enforcement, tact and secrecy rather than transparency
and justification. Multinational litigation can trigger judicial diplomacy of
this sort: inter-court agreements for resolving global bankruptcies, for
example, have been described as the equivalent of “case-speciﬁc, private
international insolvency treaties.”332
This variety of judicial diplomacy also surfaces as a strategy for navigating sensitive situations with a high risk of public embarrassment. For
example, Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition requires the TCC to
employ a diplomatic touch when interacting with foreign courts. If it wishes
to invite foreign judges to Taiwan, it may try to avoid placing its guests in
328
329

See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
See Letter from Yariv Ovadia, Consul for Commc’ns & Pub. Aﬀairs, Consulate Gen. of
Isr. in L.A., Cal., to author (Mar. 8, 2005) (on ﬁle with author) (introducing a mailing of Israeli
constitutional case law on the subject of torture to American legal scholars).
330 See MARY L. DUDZIAK , C OLD WAR C IVIL R IGHTS: R ACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79-111 (2000) (describing both the arguments made on foreign policy
grounds against racial segregation by both Justice Department and State Department oﬃcials, and
the manner in which the State Department subsequently seized upon the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as “the counter to Soviet propaganda it had been
looking for”).
331 See, e.g., S LAUGHTER , supra note 12, at 94-95 (reporting that the lack of international
treaties or guidelines governing global bankruptcies has forced courts to create “their own
regimes” consisting of “court-to-court agreements”); id. at 86 (noting that “courts are adapting the
general notion of international comity, or the comity of nations, to ﬁt the speciﬁc needs of courts”
and “judges are actually negotiating with one another to determine which national court should
take control over which part of multinational lawsuits”).
332 Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33
TEX. INT’ L L. J. 587, 589 (1998).
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an awkward position by holding a conference at a university then inviting
judges to attend the conference, rather than asking foreign judges to visit
the TCC itself in their oﬃcial capacity.333 Similarly, the mere existence of
formal relations or other agreements with other courts may demand conﬁdentiality in order to prevent Chinese interference.334
The third and potentially most controversial form of judicial diplomacy—
and the focus of the present discussion—is the judicial pursuit of foreign
policy goals. The U.S. Supreme Court is a case in point. From time to time,
members of the Court have alluded to the desirability of inﬂuencing
international audiences in particular ways.335 A particularly revealing
example is Justice Breyer’s explanation-cum-apology for his heavily criticized
decision to cite the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in an Eighth Amendment
case.336 His comments warrant reproduction in full:
Look, let me be a little bit more frank, that in some of these countries there
are institutions, courts that are trying to make their way in societies that
didn’t used to be democratic, and they are trying to protect human rights,
they are trying to protect democracy. They’re having a document called a
constitution, and they want to be independent judges. And for years people
all over the world have cited the Supreme Court, why don’t we cite them
occasionally? They will then go to some of their legislators and others and
say, “See, the Supreme Court of the United States cites us.” That might
give them a leg up, even if we just say it’s an interesting example. So, you
see, it shows we read their opinions. That’s important.337

333 See Interview with Justice M, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan ( June 13, 2014).
334 See id.
335 See, e.g., Kersch, supra note 45, at 789 (“The job before us . . . is to try to transfer
knowledge from one nation to another, so that, despite cultural, historical, or institutional barriers,
we can create fairer, more eﬀective judicial systems, including safeguards of institutional integrity
where they are now lacking.” (quoting a speech given by Justice Breyer at NYU Law School));
Toobin, supra note 14, at 50 (“Why should world opinion care that the American Administration
wants to bring freedom to oppressed peoples? . . . If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt
our idea of freedom, it does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other nations
and other peoples can deﬁne and interpret freedom in a way that's at least instructive to us.”
(quoting Justice Kennedy)).
336 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citing, inter alia, Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zim. v. Att’y-Gen., [1993] 1
Zim. L. Rep. 239, 240, 269); see also Anderson, supra note 255, at 1306-07 (suggesting that Justice
Breyer’s citation backﬁred by lending legitimacy not to the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, but instead
to “Robert Mugabe’s wicked regime”).
337 Breyer & Scalia, supra note 14.
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Extrajudicial remarks of this sort reveal a dimension of judicial motivation that is not made explicit in judicial opinions. What Justice Breyer
describes is a form of judicial statecraft or diplomacy, directed at such goals
as the promotion of judicial independence and the rule of law in other
countries.338 Some may object that the Court has no business pursuing
foreign policy objectives, much less citing foreign law.339 But it already does
so. In collaboration with the State Department340 and through the Federal
Judicial Center,341 the Court works to improve the administration of justice
and promote the rule of law in other countries.
The U.S. Supreme Court is far from alone in practicing judicial diplomacy of this ilk. Worldwide, it has become commonplace for judges to
address themselves to foreign as well as domestic audiences. In a survey of
supreme court judges from common law jurisdictions, almost one-ﬁfth of
respondents identiﬁed “the international community, broadly conceived” as
part of the audience for their judgments.342 With the reactions of the
international community squarely in mind, constitutional courts have
played a self-conscious role in bolstering or rehabilitating the international
legitimacy of marginalized regimes343 and global superpowers344 alike.
338 See Alford, supra note 19, at 669 (noting the willingness of certain justices to use foreign
law not simply to “resolve cases and controversies,” but also to “perform functions akin to foreign
diplomats,” and describing Justice Kennedy in particular as “an evangelist for freedom abroad”);
Kersch, supra note 45, at 784-85 (observing that “[i]nternational and transnational support” from
judges in “well-established, advanced western democracies” can be “a life-line” for judges in
“[p]ost-communist and post-colonial states” who “are often subjected to intense political
pressures”); Scalia–Breyer Conversation, supra note 43, at 523 (“The United States Supreme Court
has prestige in this area. Foreign courts refer to our decisions. And if we sometimes refer to their
decisions, the references may help those struggling institutions.” (quoting Justice Breyer)).
339 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 670 (quoting former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez’s
admonishment that “[t]he Judiciary is not supposed to have a foreign policy independent of the
political branches”).
340 For an example of glossy literature extolling the virtues of constitutionalism and the rule
of law (and the Supreme Court as exemplar of said virtues), see BUREAU OF INT’ L INFO.
P ROGRAMS , U.S. DEP’T OF S TATE, THE U.S. S UPREME C OURT: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
THE LAW (2013).
341 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
342 See Flanagan & Ahern, supra note 11, at 15-16.
343 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1181-82 (citing Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan as
examples of “marginal states” that “have courted foreign approval and enhanced their legitimacy
by engaging in constitutional conformity”); Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction
of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & S OC’ Y R EV. 781, 783 (1990)
(arguing that Israeli Supreme Court decisions concerning the occupied territories have not only
“enhanced the court’s own legitimacy,” but also “legitimized Israeli rule over the territories”);
Smithey, supra note 310, at 1196 (observing that South African judges were “explicit about their use
of foreign precedent to underscore the legitimacy of the new constitutional regime”); see also
J ACKSON, supra note 19, at 255-56 (noting that the use of “good faith, public reasoning” by
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Comparativism is just one of a number of strategies for conducting
judicial diplomacy. Other common strategies include hosting international
conferences, translating opinions for a broader audience, and participating in
international organizations, but these are not the only possibilities. The KCC,
for example, has adopted a creative, multi-pronged approach: its efforts to
exercise international leadership have ranged from the relatively conventional
moves of participating in the Venice Commission345 and organizing the
AACC346 to the more unorthodox moves of hiring a celebrity athlete as
goodwill ambassador347 and creating foreign-language cartoons for children.348
In some cases, these alternative strategies may be more eﬀective or
prudent than citing foreign law. For the U.S. Supreme Court, overt comparativism has the obvious drawback of inviting heavy criticism, and the fact that
it occurs in service of foreign policy goals hardly makes it more palatable.
Courts such as the KCC and TCC face a different problem: their opinionwriting conventions tend to favor relatively minimal citation of case law,349
which makes it harder for them to curry favor with foreign courts by citing
foreign jurisprudence. Given this limitation, the KCC’s resort to alternative
strategies is unsurprising.
For other courts, however, importing foreign jurisprudence may be the
best or most appropriate strategy available. The HKCFA illustrates how
judicial comparativism in particular can be especially well suited to advancing
political and economic interests at the international level. Hong Kong faces
the challenge of maintaining its status as a global ﬁnancial center and
protecting the basic freedoms of its citizens despite the fact that it is at the
mercy of the authoritarian, often oppressive regime in Beijing.350 Given the
constitutional courts “may contribute to [a] state’s stature and negotiating power in the international community”).
344 See DUDZIAK , supra note 330, at 90-114 (discussing the impact of Cold War geopolitical
considerations on the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); supra
note 22 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Judicial Center’s Oﬃce of International
Judicial Relations).
345 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
347 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting Yuna Kim’s appearance in multilingual
promotional materials for the KCC).
348 See Virtual Tour: Cartoon for Children, C ONST . C T . K OREA , http://www.ccourt.go.kr
/home/english/virtualtour/cartoon01.jsp (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
Y4PE-V3BL (introducing younger audiences to the work of the KCC via a series of Englishlanguage cartoons on the “Children’s Constitutional Court”).
349 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing citation practices in the civil law world).
350 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, Protesters in Hong Kong Ease Sit-In at Government Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 6, 2014, at A10 (“Real decision-making power on the side of
the authorities rests in Beijing with China’s president, Xi Jinping.”).
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lack of democratic governance in Hong Kong, the judiciary and the
HKCFA in particular bear disproportionate responsibility for (1) protecting
the basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents; (2) upholding the
autonomy of Hong Kong from the PRC under the “one country, two
systems” constitutional rubric;351 (3) defending the rule of law in Hong
Kong from mainland Chinese encroachment or the appearance thereof; and
(4) reassuring both domestic and international audiences, including the
foreign businesses and investors that are the lifeblood of the economy, that
Hong Kong remains autonomous and deserving of conﬁdence.
The HKCFA’s heavy reliance on foreign law advances all of these goals.
As Sir Anthony Mason, a non-permanent member of the HKCFA and
former Chief Justice of Australia, has explained:
For a newly established court of ﬁnal appeal, like the [HKCFA], comparative law has an added attraction. It is important that the Court’s decisions
should be seen to conform to internationally accepted judicial standards.
Indeed, for Hong Kong there is a double attraction: Hong Kong’s reputation as an international ﬁnancial centre depends upon the integrity and
standing of its courts. Further, in the context of Hong Kong’s relationship
with the central government in Beijing, it is important that the decisions of
the Hong Kong courts reﬂect adherence to the rule of law in accordance
with internationally adopted judicial standards.352

351 See Chen, supra note 259, at 272-73 (observing that the “internationalisation” of Hong
Kong’s constitutional law is “at once a good in itself and a good means to enable Hong Kong to
resist ‘mainlandization,’” and arguing that for purposes of “fortify[ing] Hong Kong against those
forces coming from the mainland that may erode the freedoms and way of life that the people of
Hong Kong cherish,” “there is everything to be gained, and nothing to lose, by attaching Hong
Kong as ﬁrmly and closely as possible to the international system for the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms”).
352 Mason, supra note 305, at 302-03; see also, e.g., YASH GHAI , H ONG K ONG’ S N EW C ONSTITUTIONAL O RDER : THE R ESUMPTION OF C HINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC
LAW 323-24 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that continuity with English law was seen as necessary to
“reassure the business community” and “enhance the court’s prospects of independence”);
Anselmo Reyes, The Performance Interest in Hong Kong Contract Law (“In the mind of investors, if
the Hong Kong court were seen as too readily diverging from the common law applicable before
July 1997, there would be concern that Hong Kong law was mutating into something unknown and
uncertain. Rational or not, investors’ perceptions might then lead to doubts about the continuance
of the rule of law in Hong Kong and that could jeopardize the free market strategy that is the
cornerstone of Hong Kong’s well-being. In short, Hong Kong’s history is such that any change in
the common law system, let alone radical change, risks being perceived by the outside world as
introducing an element of capriciousness in the operation of the law.”), in R EMEDIES FOR
BREACH OF C ONTRACT (Mindy Chen-Wishart et al. eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1)
(on ﬁle with author).
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The beneﬁts of tethering Hong Kong law to foreign law are in some sense
analogous to the beneﬁts of pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S.
dollar. Just as the currency peg stabilizes the Hong Kong dollar, the tethering of Hong Kong constitutional jurisprudence to the jurisprudence of a
select handful of Commonwealth jurisdictions promotes the stability and
continuity of Hong Kong Law. This stability and continuity, in turn, help
to sustain foreign and domestic conﬁdence in the quality and integrity of
Hong Kong’s judiciary and legal system.353 The challenges that Hong Kong
faces in maintaining its international competitiveness and signaling its
autonomy from China are ever-present background considerations that
motivate judges to err on the side of citing more foreign law rather than
less.354
VIII. INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM
Unlike the explanations discussed above in Parts VI and VII, institutional explanations for comparativism give due attention to the capabilities
as well as the preferences of judicial actors. The institutional environment
in which lawyers and judges ﬁnd themselves shapes both their ability and
their desire to engage in comparativism.
The impact of institutional variables on judicial ability to practice
comparativism is straightforward. Courts will not use what they lack the
ability to use, and by deﬁnition, a court that lacks the resources and mechanisms necessary to learn about foreign law in a systematic way will make at
most limited use of foreign law. It is no coincidence that, among the ﬁve
courts summarized in Table 1, there is a strong correlation between each
court’s institutional capacity for comparativism and the extent to which
each court actually practices comparativism. Institutional capacity alone
may not guarantee that judges will engage in comparativism, but it is a
necessary condition: enthusiasm for foreign law on the part of individual
judges makes little diﬀerence if it is not paired with the time and resources
needed to investigate foreign law.

353 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 265 (observing that the tethering of Hong Kong
law to foreign law has a “conservatizing inﬂuence” on Hong Kong law and helps to reassure
foreign audiences that Hong Kong remains a part of the common law world); Interview with
Justice A, supra note 265 (agreeing that the practice of comparativism by Hong Kong courts has
the eﬀect of boosting foreign conﬁdence in Hong Kong’s legal system).
354 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 265 (quoting a high-ranking Hong Kong judge’s
advice to continue citing “all these U.K. cases,” even when it does not appear necessary to do so,
because the practice reassures the rest of the world that Hong Kong’s legal system remains up to
international standards).
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The impact of institutional variables on judicial preferences is less obvious
but becomes apparent when we consider a key feature of the institutional
environment in which courts operate—namely, the systems in place for
training legal elites. Legal education inculcates skills and values that shape not
only the capabilities, but also the preferences of legal elites. A system of legal
education that fails to promote knowledge of foreign law is unlikely to produce
lawyers and judges with either the ability or the desire to use foreign law.
Together, judicial comparativism, institutional capacity, and comparative legal education form a positive and self-sustaining feedback loop: each
element stokes the development of the others. First, comparative legal
education simultaneously stimulates judicial interest in foreign law and
enhances the ability of courts to make use of foreign law. Second, judicial
comparativism simultaneously generates demand for comparative legal
education and gives courts a reason to invest in institutional mechanisms for
learning about foreign law. Third, the existence of such institutional
mechanisms simultaneously facilitates judicial comparativism and creates
prestigious employment opportunities that incentivize lawyers to obtain
comparative legal training, which completes the feedback loop.
It is thus a mistake to say that courts acquire institutional capacity only
if judges are already interested in comparativism, or that institutional
factors are merely epiphenomenal to judicial preferences. The level of
judicial interest in comparativism is not logically antecedent to the level of
institutional capacity for practicing comparativism. Rather, judicial interest
in comparativism is endogenous to the institutional environment. By
manipulating the institutional variables that regulate the supply of lawyers
and judges with exposure to foreign law, it is possible to inﬂuence judicial
demand for foreign legal expertise, and vice versa.
The relevant institutional variables can be divided into two categories:
those involving the internal design of courts, and those involving legal
education. This distinction is somewhat artiﬁcial, however, because the
eﬀects of institutional design and legal education are strongly interdependent.
A. The Role of Institutional Design
Judicial usage of foreign law cannot occur without judicial awareness of
foreign law. Judges cannot make use of foreign examples that they simply do
not know. In theory, there are two ways in which judges might gain the
necessary awareness. The first is through judge-to-judge, or “J2J,”
interaction.355 The second is through institutional mechanisms built into the
355

Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 535 (quoting a member of the TCC).
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court itself, such as the availability of foreign-trained law clerks or the establishment of a research arm that specializes in foreign law. But these two
mechanisms are not equally eﬀective.
In practice, J2J interaction has proven neither necessary nor suﬃcient
for judges to become sophisticated about foreign law.356 Comparison of
Taiwan and the United States highlights the inadequacy of J2J interaction
as a means for learning about foreign law. Opportunities for members of the
TCC to interact with foreign judges are heavily constrained, whereas the
members of the U.S. Supreme Court receive a steady stream of foreign
visitors and are in high demand overseas. It would be diﬃcult to argue,
however, that American justices know more than Taiwanese justices about
foreign law. Conferences and cocktail chatter with members of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht are poor substitutes for a doctorate in German
law.357 By most accounts, the interactions that judges have with one another
at international conferences and events are “likely to be brief”358 and
dominated by “[s]mall talk” with insuﬃcient time for “substantive discussion.”359 It may be that the members of the U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless learn from such interactions. If so, however, that may simply reﬂect a
relatively low baseline level of knowledge.
Mechanisms for acquiring foreign legal expertise that are built into a
court’s institutional structure are vastly more eﬀective at promoting judicial
comparativism than sporadic face-to-face interaction with foreign judges.
Comparison of the JSC, KCC, TCC, and U.S. Supreme Court reinforces
the commonsensical conclusion that courts with the institutional capacity to
learn about foreign law make greater use of foreign law. Conversely, courts
that lack such capacity are at a decisive disadvantage. Put simply, courts
cannot do what they cannot do. Even a judge who wants to make comparative arguments will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to do without any institutional support
either inside or outside the court.360

356 See B OBEK , supra note 11, at 49 (reporting that the type of knowledge obtained from
judicial meetings, networks, and associations “tends to be superﬁcial, selective, and random” and
“is rarely of any use for national judicial decision-making”); id. at 74 (arguing that the impact of
“informal exchanges and encounters . . . on judicial decision-making” has been “markedly
exaggerated” in the debate over the propriety of judicial comparativism).
357 Cf. id. at 49 (observing on the basis of experience as a Czech judicial administrator that
“most often, judges prefer to talk amongst themselves about anything other than their cases”).
358 Interview with Justice B, supra note 244 (indicating that a participant would be “lucky to
speak to one person for one hour”).
359 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 567 (quoting members of the TCC).
360 See Breyer, supra note 14 (observing that “[n]either I nor my law clerks can easily ﬁnd
relevant comparative material on our own,” and urging law professors to “supply that demand” by
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Institutional capacity can be broken down into two components, institutional design and resources. Table 1 summarizes the design characteristics
and resources that shape each court’s capacity for foreign legal research. As
this Table highlights, neither the JSC nor the U.S. Supreme Court boasts
anything resembling the array of mechanisms and resources for foreign legal
research available to the KCC or TCC. It is no coincidence that neither the
JSC nor the U.S. Supreme Court rivals the KCC or TCC in their use of
foreign law. All else being equal, if the resources available to a court include
an array of foreign law specialists—as in South Korea and Taiwan—the
result will be opportunistic usage of foreign law. Conversely, if resources
for performing foreign legal research are scarce—as in the United States
and, to a lesser degree, Japan—comparative analysis is likely to be less
frequent.
In some cases, institutional mechanisms may be introduced for the
purpose of facilitating comparativism. The KCC clearly falls in this category
with its extensive array of researchers and advisers who are either hired for
their foreign legal expertise or dispatched to study law overseas.361 Institutional features need not be intentionally designed to promote comparativism, however, in order to have that eﬀect. Consider the design of the
TCC, which heightens the court’s capacity for comparativism but in ways
more subtle than the design of the KCC. Two of the most relevant design
characteristics of the TCC are facially neutral but have a heavy impact
when paired with the right resources.
The ﬁrst design characteristic is the heavy representation of legal
academics on the court, which is guaranteed by law.362 On its face, the fact
that a majority of the TCC’s members are former law professors might
seem inconsequential for the use of foreign law. However, the fact that
constitutional scholars in Taiwan overwhelmingly possess foreign legal
training renders their presence a de facto guarantee of the TCC’s ability to
engage in comparativism.363 By contrast, although Japanese law professors

equipping “the law students, who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts” with the
skills needed to make comparative arguments).
361 See supra subsections III.D.2-4, III.D.6 (discussing the qualiﬁcations and expertise of the
Constitutional Research Oﬃcers, the Constitutional Researchers, the Academic Advisers, the
researchers at the CRI, and the foreign correspondents contracted by the CRI).
362 See infra Table 1 (breaking down the composition of the TCC by professional background);
supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining the abundance of legal academics on the TCC).
363 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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also tend to be knowledgeable in foreign law,364 they typically hold no more
than one of the ﬁfteen seats on the JSC.365
The second design characteristic, which interacts with the ﬁrst, is the
manner in which law clerks are recruited. Although Taiwan’s justices are
limited to one clerk each, they are free to select clerks of their own liking.
By itself, the vesting of clerkship hiring in individual justices has little or no
inherent tendency to facilitate comparativism: the KCC makes heavy use of
foreign law notwithstanding the fact that its members have no say over who
their clerks will be, while the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have free
rein in clerk selection yet rarely engage in comparativism. The clerk
recruitment method matters in the case of the TCC, however, because those
making the hiring decisions are interested in foreign law and able to recruit
from a pool of likeminded potential clerks. Any institutional design characteristic that gives individual justices control over resources also enables
them to indulge their own proclivities, and in the case of the TCC, those
proclivities happen to include comparativism.366 Fortunately for the justices, Taiwan’s educational system generates an ample supply of law graduates
with the necessary linguistic and comparative expertise.
Now consider, by contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court. Unlike its counterparts in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, it simply lacks the necessary
institutional capacity to learn about foreign law in anything approaching a
routine and systematic manner. There is no expectation or requirement,
formal or informal, that the Justices have prior experience with foreign law,
and they typically have no formal training in foreign legal systems.367 Nor,
364 See infra Table 1 (reporting the number and proportion of constitutional scholars at top
Japanese law schools with foreign legal training).
365 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. As of this writing, the only former law professor
on the JSC is Justice Kiyoko Okabe, who taught family law after lengthy service as a career judge.
See OKABE Kiyoko, S UP. CT. J APAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/about/justice/okabe/
index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/824S-XEZE.
366 Cf. Tokuji Izumi, Concerning the Japanese Public’s Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 1769, 1779 (2011) (suggesting, based on his experience as a member of the JSC,
that enabling Japanese justices to select their own clerks “would invigorate the Court’s deliberations,
which in turn could lead to an increase in the Court’s production of important jurisprudence”).
367 Three of the four former academics on the Court as of this writing studied abroad over
the course of their formal educations, but none focused on law during their time abroad. Justices
Breyer and Kagan both hold degrees from Oxford, but not in law. See Elena Kagan, OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
F6XK-KF7W (indicating that Justice Kagan’s ﬁeld of study at Worcester College, Oxford, was
philosophy); Stephen G. Breyer, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen_g_breyer (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PYU8-QY8B (indicating that Justice Breyer studied
economics at Magdalen College, Oxford). Justice Scalia spent his junior year as an undergraduate
at the University of Fribourg but focused on history, economics, and literature. See JOAN
BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND C ONSTITUTION OF S UPREME C OURT
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unlike some courts, does the U.S. Supreme Court even attempt to compensate for these deﬁciencies by hiring clerks or researchers with the kind of
training, experience, or even language abilities, that might help ﬁll the
resulting knowledge gaps.368 Instead, the Court makes do with the help of
recent graduates of America’s top law schools—which generally do not
require their students to learn about foreign law—and an obscure arm of the
Library of Congress called the Directorate of Legal Research.369
These meager resources are no match for justices who have studied law
overseas or spent decades publishing scholarly articles about foreign law, or
a cadre of experienced professional researchers with foreign law degrees or,
for that matter, an entire research institute dedicated to the study of

J USTICE ANTONIN S CALIA 25 (2009). Justice Ginsburg did not study abroad but published
repeatedly on the subject of Swedish civil procedure during her time as a law professor. See, e.g.,
R UTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS , C IVIL P ROCEDURE IN SWEDEN (1965);
Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 805 (citing various scholarly works by then-Professor
Ginsburg on Swedish law).
368 See, e.g., Bentele, supra note 11, at 244 (noting that justices of the South African Constitutional Court “have the beneﬁt of up to ﬁve clerks selected from applicants around the world” in
addition to two South African law clerks); Somek, supra note 91, at 284 n.1 (attributing the Israeli
Supreme Court’s prowess at comparative constitutional analysis in part to its “practice of
employing clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”);
supra subsection III.D.2 (discussing the practices of the “constitutional research oﬃcers” and
foreign law specialists employed by the KCC).
A court need not employ clerks or justices who are literally foreign in order to possess high
institutional capacity for learning about foreign law. Although the Canadian Supreme Court does
not make a point of hiring clerks from other countries, it enjoys both an innate knowledge of, and
capacity for learning about, foreign law that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks. The unwritten rules
governing the allocation of seats on the Canadian court on the basis of geography guarantee that a
sizeable portion of the justices are native francophones with a civil law background. See F.L.
Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in Transition, in APPOINTING
J UDGES IN AN AGE OF J UDICIAL P OWER: C RITICAL P ERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
W ORLD 56, 59 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). So, too, are a sizeable fraction of
the court’s clerks. The infrastructure for this legal and linguistic diversiﬁcation is both intellectual
and historical: Canada’s law schools provide a combination of common law and civil law training in
a combination of English and French. See Aline Grenon & Louis Perret, Globalization and
Canadian Legal Education, 43 S. TEX. L. R EV. 543, 549-52 (2002) (describing how certain
Canadian law schools ensure “direct access to Canada’s legal and linguistic duality” by oﬀering
both civil law and common law instruction in both oﬃcial languages).
369 See Alford, supra note 18 (noting that in 2004, the Library of Congress received from
“judicial agencies” 165 “research requests” pertaining to foreign law); Michael Ravnitzky, The
Directorate of Legal Research at the Library of Congress: A Treasure Hidden Under a Bushel Basket,
LLRX.COM (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.llrx.com/features/lclegalresearch.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/RS8C-7UWG (describing the Directorate of Legal Research as a “research department
contained within the Library of Congress” that “receives scant mention . . . even among the legal
research community”).
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comparative constitutional law.370 The result, as described by Justice Breyer,
is hardly surprising: “Neither I nor my law clerks can easily ﬁnd relevant
comparative material on our own.”371 If Justice Breyer—a seasoned scholar,
a longtime champion of comparativism,372 and the most widely traveled
member of the Court373—cannot ﬁnd the comparative material that he
needs, what hope is there for the rest of the Court? Comparativism requires
more than a willingness or desire on the part of individual judges to use
foreign law. It also requires institutional support. When it comes to
comparativism, the old adage does not hold true: where there is a will, there
is not necessarily also a way.
B. The Role of Legal Education
Institutions cannot operate without resources, and no resource is more
crucial to comparativism than an adequate supply of lawyers who know
foreign law. Mechanisms for recruiting judges or clerks with training in
foreign law make little diﬀerence if no one possesses the necessary training.
Without the support of Taiwanese legal education, for example, neither the
appointment of legal academics as justices nor the hiring of experienced law
clerks would ensure the TCC’s engagement with foreign law. The recruitment
practices of the TCC promote judicial comparativism because they tap into a
deep talent pool of academics and law graduates with exposure to foreign law.
Similar mechanisms would be unlikely to succeed in the United States
because American legal education fails to produce the necessary talent.
Vicki Jackson has argued that there are a number of ways in which the U.S.
Supreme Court might acquire the capacity to learn about foreign law in a
fair, transparent, and accurate manner.374 These include brieﬁng procedures
that guarantee adequate and balanced participation by a combination of
court-appointed experts and knowledgeable amici curiae,375 the hiring of
foreign lawyers as clerks,376 and more generally eﬀorts to ensure that it “has
370 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that the Korean Constitutional Court,
Peruvian Constitutional Court, and Argentinian Supreme Court all possess their own foreign law
research institutes).
371 See Breyer, supra note 14. When asked by the author, one of the Justices conﬁrmed that the
Court lacks personnel knowledgeable about foreign law, and that this lack of expertise discourages
comparativism.
372 See Law, supra note 15, at 653-54 & n.4 (citing various opinions and public pronouncements
by Justice Breyer).
373 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
374 See JACKSON , supra note 19, at 190-91.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 189.
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within its institutional apparatus personnel with suﬃcient education and
expertise to assist in research on issues of foreign or international law.”377
Even if the Court were willing to implement such institutional reforms,
however, most of them presuppose a supply of foreign legal expertise that
largely does not exist in this country. The United States does not boast an
enormous pool of scholars who specialize in comparative constitutional law
or attorneys with training in foreign constitutional law. Nor is it easy to
import the necessary expertise, as Congress has by statute barred the hiring
of foreign lawyers as law clerks.378
Legal education generates the expectations, values, and resources needed
for judicial comparativism to ﬂourish. In East Asia, law schools serve as
both a source of substantive expertise in foreign law and a vehicle for
normalizing and valorizing the use of foreign law. Legal education in Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong embodies the view that the study of foreign
law is relevant, worthwhile, and conventional. The educational background
of constitutional law professors at elite law schools might be considered a
rough proxy for the extent to which legal education supports constitutional
comparativism. All but one of the professors who teach constitutional law at
Korea’s top three law schools have studied law in another country.379 The
same is true of all eight of the constitutional law professors at Taiwan’s
leading law school and of every tenure-track constitutional law professor at
all three of Hong Kong’s law schools.380 Even in Japan, where judicial
comparativism is less prevalent, most legal scholars possess deep knowledge
of at least one foreign jurisdiction.381 In the area of constitutional law
specifically, one-quarter to two-thirds of the constitutional law faculty at the
University of Tokyo, Keio University, and Waseda University possess some
kind of foreign legal training.382 Schools of this ilk, in turn, produce the lion’s
377 Id. The Korean Constitutional Court is pursuing such a strategy to a dramatic extent by
establishing its own research institute to be staﬀed by scholars who are ﬂuent in foreign languages.
See supra subsection III.D.6.
378 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 704, 123 Stat. 3034,
3205-06 (2009) (providing that “no part of any appropriation . . . shall be used to pay the
compensation of any oﬃcer or employee of the Government of the United States” who is not a
citizen, a permanent resident “seeking citizenship,” a refugee who plans to pursue citizenship, or “a
person who owes allegiance to the United States”).
379 All six of the full-time faculty identified on Seoul National University’s website as teaching
constitutional law, and all five of the constitutional law professors identified on Yonsei University’s
website, have studied law overseas. Five of the six constitutional law professors at Korea University
have foreign legal training. See infra Table 1.
380 See infra Table 1.
381 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
382 The fact that so many Japanese constitutional scholars have studied law abroad at some
point is all the more remarkable in light of the traditional propensity of Japanese law schools to
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share of the career judges, elite academics, and government oﬃcials who
eventually become constitutional court justices.
By contrast, a system of legal education that simultaneously celebrates the
exceptionalism and superiority of domestic law and relegates all consideration
of foreign law to upper-year elective courses that are perceived as lacking
practical applicability is not a system that will generate a meaningful supply
of lawyers and judges with much appetite or aptitude for comparativism.383
For law schools to highlight and reinforce the status of comparative law as an
endeavor distinct from, and secondary to, the ordinary work of lawyers and
judges is to ensure that comparative law will be perceived as unimportant or
irrelevant by judges. The result is the “vicious circle” described by former
Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak: “[J]udges d[o] not tend to rely on comparative law; lawyers d[o] not cite comparative law to judges; law schools d[o]
not stress comparative law; scholars d[o] not emphasise comparative law;
judges d[o] not tend to rely on comparative law; etc.”384 Judicial behavior and
legal education are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Judicial indifference to comparative arguments gives law schools little incentive to stress
comparative law, but law schools are simultaneously responsible for educating
judges to be indiﬀerent to comparative law.
This hypothetical system of legal education bears more than a passing
resemblance to American legal education. There is no meaningful pool of

recruit professors directly out of their undergraduate legal studies. Until recently, law was an
exclusively undergraduate subject in Japanese universities. See Chen, supra note 144, at 32-33;
Shigenori Matsui, Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan, 62 J. L EGAL EDUC. 3, 4,
10-11 (2012) (describing Japan’s adoption in 2002 of three-year graduate law schools alongside the
existing four-year undergraduate curriculum in law); Setsuo Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka, Legal
Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 ASIAN–PAC. L. & P OL’ Y J. 1, 24 (2000). At
present, Japanese universities have both undergraduate law faculties and graduate law schools,
which overlap to varying degrees. Matsui, supra, at 11. At Keio University, one of the graduate law
school’s three constitutional law professors has studied in the United States, while all three of the
constitutional law specialists in the undergraduate law faculty have studied abroad. At Waseda
University, two of the three constitutional law professors in the graduate law school and two of the
ﬁve in the undergraduate law faculty have studied abroad. The University of Tokyo’s graduate law
school has three constitutional law specialists, one of whom has spent time in the United States as
a visiting scholar. The undergraduate law faculty shares the same three constitutional law
professors as the graduate law school, plus a constitutional theorist who has not studied abroad.
These tallies are based on a survey of the relevant law school websites in various languages
conducted by the author’s multilingual research assistants circa August 2014.
383 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 576 (observing that the indiﬀerence of American law
schools to comparative training precludes an “adequate supply of outstanding judges and clerks”
with expertise in foreign law and serves as an “obstacle to the emergence of robust judicial
comparativism”).
384 Aharon Barak, Comparison in Public Law, in J UDICIAL R ECOURSE TO F OREIGN LAW:
A NEW S OURCE OF INSPIRATION?, supra note 11, at 287, 287.
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talent in the United States from which either potential clerks or judicial
candidates with substantial foreign legal expertise can be recruited. Nor is
foreign legal training made more attractive by the prospect of an academic job,
as in East Asia or much of the rest of the world. Although law school hiring of
teaching candidates who hold both a J.D. and a Ph.D. is accelerating, wouldbe law professors who obtained their law degrees in the United States do
not go overseas for their Ph.Ds., and recent hiring trends oﬀer little
evidence that teaching candidates are rewarded by the job market for having
foreign legal training.385 The dearth of such training on the part of the
nation’s law professors, meanwhile, tends to mean that little knowledge of, or
interest in, foreign law will be imparted to the next generation of lawyers.386
Although legal education is an important determinant of judicial
comparativism, its precise impact is diﬃcult to pin down because it
interacts in complex ways with many other variables. Legal education is
deeply embedded in its social, political, and economic environment, meaning
that it both shapes and is shaped by its environment. Consequently, the
eﬀect of legal education cannot be neatly isolated from the eﬀect of other
environmental factors. There can be little doubt, for example, that the
extent to which a country’s system of legal education fosters comparativism
is inﬂuenced by market forces. All else being equal, lawyers from smaller
countries have stronger economic incentives to learn foreign law: the sheer
size of the American and Japanese economies387 means that American or
Japanese lawyers who ignore foreign law sacriﬁce fewer opportunities than
Korean or Taiwanese or Hong Kong lawyers who do the same. Student
demand for comparative law presumably translates into increased educational oﬀerings in comparative law. One could argue, therefore, that the
emphasis in Korea on English ﬂuency and knowledge of American law
merely reﬂects the fact that those skills are prized by both foreign and
385 See Lawrence Solum, Entry Level Hiring Survey 2010, LEGAL THEORY BLOG
(Apr. 12, 2010), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/04/entry-level-hiring-survey-2010.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7MM3-BDVR (listing the educational credentials of those hired into
tenure-track teaching positions at American law schools in 2010); Lawrence Solum, 2009 Entry Level
Hiring Report, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 26, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/
04/2009-entry-level-hiring-report.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S58K-XXRT (doing the same for
2009).
386 Cf. Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 37
(1995) (arguing that American courts eschew international law partly because it is both “unknown”
and “unusual” to American judges and lawyers).
387 See INT ’L MONETARY F UND , W ORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE (2013),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/download.aspx (identifying
the United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as having the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfteenth, and twentyseventh largest economies in the world, respectively).
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domestic employers.388 Conversely, one might conclude that American law
schools oﬀer little comparative training simply because American law
students generally do not view such training as highly beneﬁcial to their
employment prospects.389
It would be a mistake, however, to view legal education as merely
epiphenomenal to market forces, or to conclude that a lack of supply simply
reﬂects a lack of demand. For a variety of reasons ranging from regulatory
ﬁat390 to sheer confusion, the legal education industry responds imperfectly
to economic conditions, and to the extent that it does respond, its responses
are the product of internal debate over what those conditions happen to be
and how best to respond. The result is that the standard American law school
curriculum is hardly a faithful reflection of either student or employer
demand. Run-of-the-mill legal employers in this country may not be
clamoring for lawyers well versed in Chinese or German law, but they are
unlikely to view presidential immunity or equal protection doctrine as
enormous moneymakers either. From a market perspective, it seems just as
arbitrary to make constitutional law mandatory as to make comparative law
optional.391 Indeed, market forces might even favor comparative law over
constitutional law: ongoing weakness in the domestic employment market
for lawyers,392 combined with the growth of transnational legal practice and

388 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the professional opportunities
that English ﬂuency and American legal training create for Korean attorneys).
389 See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 132 (noting the “chicken-and-egg problem” that “[l]aw
schools do not invest major resources in international and comparative law oﬀerings in part
because domestic legal employers do not place much value on such training”).
390 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 12 (2012) (listing various accreditation requirements that prevent certain cost-cutting or price-cutting measures by law schools).
391 The obvious rejoinder is that law schools mandate constitutional law because the Multistate Bar Examination includes a constitutional law component. However, that merely begs the
question of why bar examiners see ﬁt to test constitutional law notwithstanding its irrelevance to
the majority of legal practice, which in turn implicates the role of legal education in deﬁning what
is considered important by lawyers.
392 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Is Law School Worth the Cost?, 63 J. L EGAL EDUC . 173, 174
(2013) (characterizing the job market for law graduates as “bleak” and “not likely to improve any
time soon”); David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 9, 2011, § 3, at 1 (noting,
inter alia, the disappearance of “some 15,000 attorney and legal-staﬀ jobs at large law ﬁrms” from
2008 through the end of 2010). But see, e.g., Ronit Dinovitzer et al., Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical
Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. L EGAL EDUC. 211, 223-24 (2013) (arguing that
“the conventional story of crisis is vastly oversimpliﬁed,” and that the availability of high-salary
positions at large law ﬁrms for new graduates is a misleading measure of the economic value of
legal education); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J.
L EGAL S TUD . 249, 251, 253-59 (2014) (concluding on the basis of extensive statistical analysis that
“law school remains a lucrative investment,” and estimating “a dramatic increase in earnings for
law degree holders of approximately $57,200 per year,” after controlling for hours worked).
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overseas employment opportunities,393 may render foreign legal expertise an
increasingly sensible investment. Neither legal educators nor bar examiners
nor educational accreditation bodies are mere slaves to market demand. For
better or for worse, they make choices with profound consequences for the
ability of judges and lawyers to navigate an increasingly globalized world,
and the choices they make are not necessarily optimal from a strictly
economic perspective.
CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL NETWORKS
Judicial behavior is shaped not only by legal and political constraints,
but also by institutional constraints. Comparativism is no exception.
Institutional constraints on comparativism can take a variety of forms,
ranging from docket pressures that limit opportunities for exploration394 to
underinvestment in basic research tools.395 It is diﬃcult to think of any
institutional variable that plays a larger role in determining the prospects
for comparativism, however, than legal education. An environment in which
lawyers and judges are unfamiliar with foreign law is an environment in
which courts will lack either the taste or the capacity for foreign legal
research and judicial comparativism will be at best sporadic.
Comparativism is especially dependent upon institutional support because
it is resource-intensive. A typical law clerk armed with a copy of the Federalist
Papers and little else may be reasonably well equipped to engage in what
passes for originalism,396 while textualism may call for little more than access
393 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research
Agenda for Further Study, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 7-11 (2007) (describing empirically the
global expansion of top law firms); Not Entirely Free, Your Honour, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 46
(discussing how a “talented graduate from any of the world's top law schools can expect a life of
globe-trotting”).
394 See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing the docket pressures faced by the
JSC and the implications of such pressures for a court’s capacity to conduct foreign legal research).
395 See E-mail from Clerk 2, Current or Former Court Attorney to a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, to author (May 7, 2014, 8:57 AM EST) (on ﬁle with author) (noting that
the “court library is virtually bare,” “Westlaw access is limited to AmJur and Corpus Juris,” and
clerks have “no access” to the work of other courts “except through Google”); E-mail from Clerk 3,
Current or Former Court Attorney to a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, to author
(May 7, 2014, 11:20 AM EST) (on ﬁle with author) (describing the court library’s collection as
“prehistoric,” and noting that access to the sole Westlaw subscription in each justice’s chambers is
rationed according to “oﬃce policy”).
396 See, e.g., JACK N. R AKOVE , O RIGINAL M EANINGS : P OLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
M AKING OF THE C ONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of “originalist
evidence” as “a mix of ‘law oﬃce history’ and justiﬁcatory rhetoric”); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Aﬀair, 1965 S UP. C T. R EV. 119, 156 (describing the “law-oﬃce history” on
display in the Court’s opinions as “disastrous” from a historian’s perspective).
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to a handful of vintage dictionaries. But there is no obvious and equivalent
shortcut that American judges can use to perform even a watered-down
version of comparativism. No amount of personal enthusiasm or international
travel on the part of the Justices is likely to make up for the fact that—unlike
the members of the Korean Constitutional Court—they lack a full-time staﬀ
of comparativists to navigate literally an entire world of foreign law.397 Nor is
technology alone the solution. Anyone can operate an Internet search engine
and locate foreign legal materials,398 but very few can digest the results.399
Critics of comparativism400 and sophisticated comparativists401 alike have
drawn attention to the perils of invoking foreign law without the knowledge
needed to place that law in context. The requisite understanding of context is
not simply a Google search away. Neither the competence nor the confidence
to engage in comparativism can easily be acquired without meaningful
investment in infrastructure and education.
What distinguishes comparativism even more sharply from other judicial practices, however, is the fact that it is not merely a type of legal
argumentation, but also a form of judicial diplomacy. Scholars may disagree
over the normative desirability of judicial diplomacy,402 but as an empirical
matter, it is already commonplace. Why else, for example, would courts in
non-English-speaking countries go to the trouble and expense of translating

397 See Breyer, supra note 14 (urging American law professors to help solve the problem by
equipping “the law students, who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts” with the
skills needed to make comparative arguments).
398 See HIRSCHL , supra note 11, at 3 (noting that “[v]irtually all reputable peak courts across
the globe maintain websites where thousands of rulings . . . may be browsed with ease,” and that
new online portals allow easy retrieval and comparison of “the entire corpus of constitutional texts
around the world”).
399 See Law, supra note 47, at 153-54 (observing that an online search for information on rare
genetic disorders inundates the user with information that is of little use without advanced
scientiﬁc training, and querying whether there is “any reason to doubt that online comparative
research performed by judges and clerks without prior training in foreign law would be plagued by
precisely the same problems”).
400 See, e.g., Scalia–Breyer Conversation, supra note 43, at 528-29 (“One of the diﬃculties of
using foreign law is that you don’t understand what the surrounding jurisprudence is. So that you
can say, for example, ‘Russia follows Miranda,’ but you don’t know that Russia doesn’t have an
exclusionary rule.” (quoting Justice Scalia)).
401 As Sir Anthony Mason—an unusually experienced comparativist who has served on the
highest courts of Australia, Hong Kong, and Fiji—has observed, the public law of other countries
“cannot be understood or applied in the absence of a comprehensive understanding of its political,
historical, social and cultural context.” Mason, supra note 305, at 305; see also id. at 306 (observing that
even a judge already familiar with multiple jurisdictions “may feel that he or she lacks the understanding of other systems of law needed to embrace judicial decisions of those other systems”).
402 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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their opinions into English and maintaining English-language websites?403
Why would any court operate an entire research institute for the purpose of
conducting foreign legal research that has no direct bearing on actual
cases?404 Why would a court invest considerable resources in launching
international organizations and hosting international conferences?405 Why
do judges who are already highly sophisticated about foreign law, and who
learn relatively little of substance from actual dialogue with foreign jurists,
nevertheless place a premium upon participating in such dialogue?406 Why
would judges ever cite foreign law to a greater degree than they themselves
consider necessary?407 Without the concept of judicial diplomacy, all of these
practices are somewhat mystifying. But the idea that courts pursue diplomatic
objectives and compete for prestige and influence makes sense of all of them.
The phenomenon of judicial diplomacy poses an obvious challenge to
traditional conceptions of the role and function of constitutional courts. But
its arrival on the global scene seems inevitable. Constitutional courts have
long occupied the grey area between law and politics.408 In the face of
globalization, it should come as no surprise that they have begun to blur the
distinction between law and diplomacy as well. The more that courts
interact with one another, the less likely that they will concern themselves
403 The JSC, KCC, and TCC, for example, all operate English-language websites that feature
English translations of their decisions. See Decisions, C ONST. C T. KOREA , http://
english.ccourt.go.kr (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://www.perma.cc/3BAE-RG48
(select “Decisions” from the title bar); Interpretations, J UD . YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A3C2-LAJQ;
Judgments of the Supreme Court, S UP. C T. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judgments/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3BAE-RG48.
404 See supra subsection III.D.6 (discussing the KCC’s Constitutional Research Institute).
405 See supra Section III.E (describing the KCC’s role in organizing and hosting various
international judicial groups and conferences).
406 See supra text accompanying notes 358-59 (observing that various members of the JSC,
KCC, and TCC were all hard-pressed to identify cases in which J2J interaction had taught them
“something truly new or unfamiliar” about foreign law).
407 See supra note 354 and accompanying text (describing a high-ranking Hong Kong judge’s
encouragement to err on the side of citing British law, even if citation is not strictly necessary, as a
way of reassuring external audiences that the legal system in Hong Kong continues to meet
international standards).
408 Hans Kelsen’s rationale for advocating separate constitutional courts, and for excluding
human rights from constitutions, was that constitutional adjudication (and rights adjudication in
particular) commingles law and politics and contaminates the judiciary by turning judges into
lawmakers. See Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535, 554-55 (2008) (describing Kelsen’s acknowledgment of the “political
nature” of constitutional law and the character of constitutional adjudication as “lawmaking”);
Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—And Why It May Not Matter, 101
M ICH . L. R EV. 2744, 2767-68 (2003) (noting Kelsen’s opposition to adjudication of rights claims
for fear that “judges would become the lawmakers” and thereby invite “political backlash”).
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only with the reactions of domestic audiences, and the more likely it
becomes that they will behave in ways intended to inﬂuence those in other
countries. Sustained interaction among judges of talent and ambition is
bound to give rise to a desire for recognition and prestige on the part of
some participants.409 Meanwhile, the multiplication of hybrid political
arrangements that combine traditional states with supranational governance
and autonomous regions410 increasingly places courts in the position of
having to formulate quasi-diplomatic strategies for deﬁning and navigating
novel relationships among competing sovereigns.
Judicial diplomacy and judicial dialogue are both metaphors for the
cross-border interaction that transpires among courts, but they emphasize
very diﬀerent aspects of that interaction. Whereas the dialogue metaphor
implies communication among open-minded peers for the sake of mutual
learning and reasoned problem-solving,411 the diplomacy metaphor evokes a
world in which competing courts jockey for inﬂuence and prestige and the
outcome of their competition depends on factors that are more geopolitical
than intellectual in nature. The dialogue metaphor certainly paints the more
ﬂattering picture of judicial behavior, but it does not capture the whole
truth. Transnational judicial interaction in the twenty-ﬁrst century is not
simply an exercise in collective learning or intellectual debate. It is also, as
the diplomacy metaphor suggests, an exercise in power politics.
The political and diplomatic dimensions of transnational judicial interaction are highly evident in East Asia. For the HKCFA, heavy reliance on
foreign jurists and foreign law is a way of asserting and reinforcing the
autonomy from the PRC that Hong Kong is supposed to enjoy pursuant to
409 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among
Men (arguing that social interaction causes people first to compare themselves to others, then to seek
superiority over others) (“Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at
himself, and public esteem acquired a price.”), reprinted in THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY
POLITICAL WRITINGS 113, 166 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1755).
410 See James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order (coining the term “fragmegration”
to describe the ongoing “clash between globalization, centralization and integration on the one hand,
and localization, decentralization and fragmentation on the other,” which has resulted in a “bifurcated
system” that combines traditional nation-states with a competing “multicentric system” of both
supranational and local authorities), in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 70, 70-73 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002).
411 See S LAUGHTER , supra note 12, at 70 (describing a “growing dialogue” among constitutional court judges “around the world on the issues that arise before them” that “both contribute[s]
to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues and improve[s] the quality of their particular
national decisions”); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 531 (“The metaphor of dialogue
is . . . attractive because it both implies and promises that all participants are both entitled and
empowered to speak. . . . Dialogue is supposed to be inclusive, and it is supposed to involve
mutual engagement. Therein lies much of its appeal.”).
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treaty arrangements. For the TCC, eﬀorts to interact with other courts
become delicate exercises in diplomacy because such interaction circumvents
Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition and runs the risk of antagonizing the
PRC. For the KCC, mastery of foreign law and engagement with international organizations are elements of a multi-pronged strategy aimed at
winning regional and global influence.
Such inﬂuence will not be easily won. Any court that wishes to claim the
mantle of constitutional leadership in East Asia must contend with the twin
titans of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme
Court.412 A current jurisprudential map of the region would depict a tug-ofwar between two constitutional superpowers, with Germany regaining the
upper hand in Taiwan while the United States gains strength in Korea. But
the KCC’s prospects are improved by the fact that the JSC is a fast-fading
competitor. Notwithstanding the formidable historical advantages conferred
by the colonial imposition of Japanese law, the loss of interest in Japanese
constitutional law among Japan’s closest neighbors is palpable.413
Even if judicial diplomacy can help a well-funded court from a midsized country such as Korea to become more inﬂuential and prestigious
within a particular region, success on a worldwide scale may remain elusive.
The globalization of constitutional law is characterized not only by the
emergence of generic or universal elements, but also by the persistence of
distinct constitutional families.414 Judging from the patterns of judicial
comparativism seen in East Asia, it is diﬃcult for constitutional courts to
exercise inﬂuence outside their own networks.415 This appears to be true for
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which is prominent and well-respected yet lacks
a dedicated following outside the civil law world that is commensurate with
412 See Overview, supra note 176 (announcing that the KCC used its hosting of the World
Conference on Constitutional Justice as an opportunity to promote “beyond Asia” a “Korean system
of constitutional justice” that “diﬀers from the German or U.S. models”); Telephone Interview with
Unnamed Oﬃcial, supra note 127 (reporting that former KCC Chief Justice Lee Kang-Kook viewed
the courts of Germany, Austria, and the United States as embodying “mainstream constitutional
jurisprudence,” and noting a “general consensus” in Korean constitutional circles that the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht and U.S. Supreme Court are the “big two”).
413 See supra Section III.C (discussing the KCC’s growing indiﬀerence to Japanese constitutional jurisprudence); supra note 192 and accompanying text & Section IV.C (describing the
declining inﬂuence of Japanese constitutional jurisprudence in Taiwan).
414 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1221-26, 1243 (concluding on the basis of an empirical
analysis of constitutional drafting patterns that global constitutionalism is characterized by both “a
strong and growing generic component” and an ideological divide between two families of
constitutions, one of which draws heavily upon the “Anglo-American legal tradition”).
415 See Chang & Yeh, supra note 44, at 1175 (“Trans-regional discourse [among constitutional
courts] is rare, and even if it does occur, it usually takes place between courts of the same legal
family, civil law or common law.”).
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its reputation.416 Likewise, the Canadian Supreme Court and South African
Constitutional Court are both praised for their global inﬂuence,417 yet
neither has established a foothold in East Asia outside the common law
outpost of Hong Kong.418 Just as the inﬂuence of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms on constitutional drafting appears to be conﬁned
largely to the common law world,419 it may be that the Canadian Supreme
Court and South African Constitutional Court carry little weight beyond a
niche market of other common law courts in the English-speaking world.
The traditional cleavage between civil law and common law countries has
not disappeared in the face of globalization but instead lingers in the form of
jurisprudential networks and spheres of influence. It is consequently a grave
error for English-speaking scholars to assume that the practice of comparativism in their own countries resembles the practice of comparativism in the
rest of the world. Scholars have already noted the existence of a “Commonwealth model of constitutionalism” defined by distinctive forms of judicial

416 The influence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is, of course, not exclusively limited to civil law
countries. See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 47 (noting the Israeli Supreme Court’s citation of
constitutional jurisprudence from Germany in addition to a variety of common law countries); Navot,
supra note 90, at 145 fig.4 (reporting that 5.5% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s foreign law citations are
to Germany). Not even Israel, however, oﬀers especially strong evidence that civil law courts enjoy
influence outside the civil law world. First, Israel is not a purely common law jurisdiction but instead
has both common law and civil law characteristics. See JuriGlobe–World Legal Systems: Mixed Legal
Systems, U. OTTAWA, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/sys-mixtes.php (last visited Feb.
28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VJG7-ZLNL (classifying Israel as possessing a “mixed system”
of civil law, common law, Jewish law and Muslim law). Second, notwithstanding its mixed legal
heritage, Israel still exhibits a bias in favor of other common law jurisdictions, with Germany
constituting the exception to the rule. See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 43 (noting that the Israeli
Supreme Court most frequently cites “American, Canadian, British, and German rulings”); Navot,
supra note 90, at 145-47 (highlighting the dominance of citations to common law jurisdictions, and
deeming the Israeli Supreme Court’s “minimal number of references to continental
courts . . . surprising in view of the fact that several constitutional-institutional issues that the ISC
addressed are addressed by European countries as well”).
417 See sources cited supra note 98.
418 Even in Hong Kong, references to South African jurisprudence are rare. See Young, supra
note 242, at 82 tbl.10 (reporting that only 2% of the HKCFA’s case law citations are to “other
national courts,” a category that includes all courts in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and
all parts of Europe apart from the United Kingdom); Interview with Justice B, supra note 244
(indicating that Canadian and South African decisions are cited less frequently than other
jurisdictions because they are “not cited as often to us by counsel,” but that Canada is still cited
“more than South Africa”).
419 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 818-21 (ﬁnding “robust and growing constitutional
similarity between Canada and other members of the common law family” and concluding that
“Canada is, at least to some degree, a constitutional trendsetter among common law countries,” but
ﬁnding no evidence that Canada is emulated by “the rest of the world”).
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review420 and packages of constitutional rights.421 The indiﬀerence of
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese courts to the leading lights of the common
law world underscores yet another characteristic of the Commonwealth
model—namely, membership in a somewhat insular jurisprudential network
that not everyone necessarily cares to join.422
The ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court may be the only courts that
truly bridge the divide between these two jurisprudential networks. At
present, they are the only common points of reference for constitutional
courts throughout East Asia. In the case of the ECtHR, there is no shortage
of explanations for this crossover appeal. First, the court itself belongs to
both networks: its jurisdiction and its expertise span a combination of civil
law and common law countries.423 Second, the ECtHR is a mouthpiece for
constitutional jurisprudence in an entire region of the world. To follow the
ECtHR is to follow the practice of not just one or two countries, but fortyseven countries,424 many of which are highly prestigious in their own right.
Any appeal to the existence of widely shared norms or practices is thus
420 Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 8 INT ’ L
J. C ONST. L. 167, 167-68 (2010) (identifying a “new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism”
in the form of institutional variants of judicial review that seek to reconcile parliamentary and
judicial supremacy).
421 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 821 (ﬁnding evidence of a constitutional “split
between common law countries and the rest of the world” in the form of the emergence of a
“Commonwealth model of constitutionalism” that encompasses “not only a set of institutional
mechanisms for reconciling judicial and legislative power, but also a set of substantive rights
guarantees and limitations”); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1170, 1221-25 (ﬁnding as an empirical
matter that constitutions divide ideologically into “statist” and “libertarian” camps, the latter of
which is characterized by the inclusion of historically “Anglo-American” rights provisions that
“epitomize a common law tradition of negative liberty and, more speciﬁcally, judicial protection
from detention or bodily harm at the hands of the state”).
422 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 84-87, 95 (discussing the strong tendency of British courts
to cite courts from other Commonwealth countries rather than other European countries, “even when
interpreting European laws of a unified European asylum system,” and observing that “in the cases in
which English judges have a choice left as to the authority they wish to rely upon . . . their attention
remains fixed on the English-speaking common law countries outside of Europe”); Flanagan &
Ahern, supra note 11, at 21 (reporting that eleven out of forty-three respondents to a survey of
supreme court judges from common law jurisdictions indicated that “in a judgment about domestic
rights,” they would cite foreign law only from other common law jurisdictions); Gentili, supra note
309, at 57-59 & 57 tbl.2, 59 graph 4 (reporting that roughly 95% of the Canadian Supreme Court’s
citations to foreign precedent are to decisions from common law jurisdictions).
423 See EUR . C OURT OF H UMAN RIGHTS , J UDGES OF THE C OURT SINCE 1959 (2015),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List_judges_since_1959_ENG.pdf (listing all
judges who have served on the ECtHR since 1959, including a number from Ireland and the
United Kingdom).
424 See Our Member States, C OUNCIL EUR ., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/ourmember-states (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8BSG-V7FP (listing the
member states of the Council of Europe).

2015]

Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy

1027

bolstered if the jurisprudence of the ECtHR can be invoked. Third, the
substantial overlap between the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), which the ECtHR is charged with enforcing, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)425 means that courts
faced with the task of interpreting the ICCPR or analogous instruments
have a natural reason to consider the case law of the ECtHR.426
The crossover appeal of the U.S. Supreme Court, by comparison, cannot
be taken for granted. Not only does the Supreme Court lack the aforementioned advantages of the ECtHR, but there is also mounting evidence that
the global inﬂuence of American constitutionalism is in decline.427 The
persistence of the Court’s inﬂuence in a particular corner of the globe is
open to a number of possible explanations. It may be that East Asia is
atypically receptive to American inﬂuence, for example, or that foreign
interest in American constitutional jurisprudence still has a long way to fall
before it disappears. The latter view is more than plausible. The U.S.
Supreme Court pioneered the practice of judicial review and continues to
boast one of the most extensive bodies of constitutional jurisprudence in the
world. Even if constitutional courts elsewhere have indeed grown increasingly lukewarm toward its work, the recognition and prestige that it earned
over the course of two centuries are unlikely to dissipate overnight.
It is increasingly clear, however, that the Court faces greater competition than ever for the attention of foreign audiences. Other courts are now
at least as eager to export their own jurisprudence, and the forces of globalization only make it easier for them to do so. Whether the U.S. Supreme
Court’s inﬂuence overseas will endure in the face of old rivals and new
challengers alike is likely to depend on factors as diverse as the availability
of overseas scholarships,428 the attractiveness of the U.S. legal market, and
425 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 845 (“The ECHR, like the ICCPR, primarily features
traditional, first-generation civil and political rights.”).
426 See, e.g., Lam Siu Po v. Comm’r of Police, [2009] 12 H.K.C.F.A.R. 237, 263B (C.F.A.)
(H.K.) (deeming the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on article 6(1) of the ECHR “of immediate relevance”
to interpretation of article 14.1 of the ICCPR “notwithstanding certain diﬀerences in wording”).
427 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 766-68, 799-804 (summarizing the existing literature
on the declining inﬂuence of American constitutional jurisprudence, and documenting empirically
the declining inﬂuence of the U.S. Constitution on constitutional drafting practices); id. at 768 &
n.18 (reviewing various empirical studies to the eﬀect that “citation to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions by foreign courts is in fact on the decline”); Liptak, supra note 98 (reporting that foreign
courts are paying decreasing attention to American jurisprudence, particularly in the area of
constitutional rights).
428 German and American investment in the education of foreign lawyers has paid tangible
dividends in Taiwan. Historically, the prevalence of citations to German law as opposed to U.S.
law has tracked the balance of power on the TCC between former Deutsche Akademischer Austausch
Dienst scholars (funded by Germany) and former Fulbright scholars (funded by the United States).
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the status of English as the lingua franca of law and commerce. But a little
judicial diplomacy could not hurt either.

See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 576-77 & 577 n.18. Germany also invests in the training of
foreign lawyers via the government-funded Humboldt Foundation, which counts various
prominent foreign jurists among the recipients of its fellowships. See, e.g., Press Release, Alexander von Humboldt Found., Humboldtian Elected President of Hungary ( June 7, 2005), available at
http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/33749.html (hailing the election of Laszlo Solyom,
former chairman of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and former Humboldt Fellow, as
President of Hungary).

12,000+429
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See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (reporting docket statistics for the KCC as of 2013).
431 Justices of the Constitutional Court: Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, supra note 89.
432 Young & Da Roza, supra note 284, at 1 (reporting that, over its ﬁrst thirteen years of existence, the HKCFA “disposed of approximately 1162 applications for
leave [to appeal], averaging 89 applications per year” and “decided 325 cases, averaging about 25 cases per year”).
433 The Justices’ Caseload, supra note 87.
434 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
435 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
436 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 547–48.
437 See Young, supra note 242, at 69.
438 The Justices’ Caseload, supra note 87.
439 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 484, 3-4, §§ 5(5), 10 (H.K.). The minimum of four permanent justices includes the Chief Justice. Id. § 5.
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Appointed by
Cabinet446

Japan
Retention election
after initial
appointment then
at 10-year intervals
thereafter;
mandatory
retirement at 70440
Appointed by
President; 1/3
nominated by
National Assembly;
1/3 nominated by
Chief Justice of
Supreme Court447

South Korea
6 years; subject to
reappointment;
mandatory retirement
at 65 (70 for President
of KCC)441

Nominated by
President; confirmed
by Legislative
Yuan448

Taiwan
8 years; cannot be
reappointed to
consecutive term442

Appointed by Chief
Executive on
recommendation of
judicial nominating
commission

Hong Kong
PJ: Guaranteed tenure
until age 65, with
possibility of up to 2
additional 3-year
terms443
HKNPJ, ONPJ:
Renewable 3-year
terms; no age limit444

Nominated by
President;
conﬁrmed by Senate

United States
Life445

441

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79 (Japan).
Constitutional Court Act, Act No. 4017, Aug. 5, 1988, art. 7 (S. Kor.), translated in 1 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 93 (Korea Legislation Research
Inst. 1997 & Supp. 51).
442
The President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan are also members of the Constitutional Court (the President doubles as the Chief Justice) but do not
enjoy the constitutional guarantee of an eight-year term. Minguo Xianfa Zengxiu Tiaowen art. 5 (2005) (Taiwan).
443
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 484, 3–4, § 14(b) (H.K.).
444
Id. §§ 14(3), 14(4).
445
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges of both “the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Oﬃces during good behaviour”).
446
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 1 (Japan). Technically, the Chief Justice is appointed by the Emperor but is “designated by the
Cabinet.” Id. art. 6(2).
447 Constitutional Court Act, Act No. 4017, Aug. 5, 1988, art. 6(1), amended by Act No. 7622, July 29, 2005 (S. Kor.), translated in 1 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA, supra note 441.
448 MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN art. 5 (2005) (Taiwan).
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Japan
None

South Korea
Must be at least 40
years old and have at
least 15 years of
experience as (1)
judge, prosecutor, or
attorney; (2) a public
or private employee
in a “law-related
area” with a license
to practice law; or (3)
a legal academic of
assistant professor
rank or higher at an
accredited university
with a license to
practice law449

Taiwan
Must fall in one of ﬁve
categories:
(1) Supreme Court
justice with 10+ years
experience; (2)
legislator with 9+ years
experience; (3) law
professor with 10+ years
experience; (4) served
on ICJ “or have
published authoritative
works in the ﬁelds of
public or comparative
law”; (5) be “highly
reputed in the ﬁeld of
legal research and have
political experience”; no
more than 1/3 of all
justices may be drawn
from any given
category450

Hong Kong
PJ: (1) Sitting local
judge, or (2)
barrister with 10+
years of local
experience
HKNPJ: (1) Retired
local judge, or (2)
barrister with 10+
years of local
experience451
ONPJ: active or
retired judge from
“another common
law jurisdiction”
who is “ordinarily
resident outside
Hong Kong”452

United States
None

449 Constitutional Court Act, Act No. 4017, Aug. 5, 1988, art. 5(1) (S. Kor.), translated in 1 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
supra note 441; see CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, supra note 441, at 110.
450 Ssu Fa Yuan Tsu Chih Fa [Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan], art. 4, para. 1, 37 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN
25399, 25400 (1957) (Taiwan); see Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 545–46 n.93 (discussing the statutory eligibility requirements for appointment to the
TCC). In practice, law professors have comprised a majority of the court because they have been appointed under multiple categories. See id. at 546; supra
note 202.
451 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 484, 4, § 12(3) (H.K.). Sitting members of the Court of Appeal are also eligible for
appointment as non-permanent justices. Id.
452 Id. § 12(4).
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None

37

High

Clerks assigned to each
justice

Shared clerks

Clerk experience
High

(1) 25-30 permanent
clerks
(2) 5-10 temporary
clerks from various
agencies
(3) 5-7 researchers
specializing in foreign
law

3.5 (2 permanent clerks
and 1.5 temporary
clerks on loan from the
Supreme Court and
Ministry of Justice)

No panels

South Korea

Medium

None

1

No panels

Taiwan

Low

Varies; expanding from
5 to 8

None; may be
introduced on a trial
basis

Cases decided by a
panel of 5, usually
consisting of the Chief
Justice, 3 PJ, and 1
ONPJ

Hong Kong

Low

None

4453

No panels

United States

453

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 31 (2006) (observing that the
number of law clerks per justice has risen from two to four over the last fifty years); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 23 tbl.1.1 (2006) (summarizing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s use of law clerks).

Most cases decided
by petty bench of 5
justices; major
cases decided by
grand bench of all
15 justices

Use of merits panels

Japan
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6/15
2/15

Medium
None

Career judges on court

Academics on court

Interaction with foreign
courts and judges

Dedicated mechanism(s)
for foreign legal research
(1) Researchers hired
for their doctoral-level
expertise in foreign law
(2) Professors assigned
to clerk teams
(3) Dedicated
“Constitutional
Research Institute”
(4) Network of foreign
correspondents

High

0/9

7/9

Yes; shared clerks are
divided into 3 teams
(civil/political rights,
economic/property
rights, and social welfare
rights)455

South Korea

None

Low

8/15

5/15

None

Taiwan

None

High

PJ: 1/4
HKNPJ,
ONPJ: 0/18

None

None

Hong Kong

None

High

4/9

None

None

United States

455

454

Law, supra note 79, at 1579.
Prior to early 2013, the shared Constitutional Research Oﬃcers were divided into four teams (public beneﬁts, criminal, economic rights, and political rights). See
Telephone Interview with Unnamed Oﬃcial, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea (Aug. 29, 2013).

Yes; all clerks are
divided into 3
teams (civil,
criminal, and
administrative)454

Specialized clerks

Japan
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Low

Roughly half,
including at least
one Germantrained and one
French-trained
clerk

Foreign law usage by
parties and/or their
attorneys

Foreign-trained clerks
Majority
(1) Clerks are eligible
for court-sponsored
overseas study
(2) Additional
researchers are hired
speciﬁcally for their
expertise in foreign
law
(3) Research Institute
personnel all have
foreign training

Law ﬁrms tend to hire
foreign law experts for
cases that receive oral
argument (i.e., highproﬁle cases)

4/9
US: 3
Germany: 1

South Korea

Most

Low

Majority
UK: 2/5
Australia: 1/5

High

PJ: 4/4 (UK)
ONPJ: 1/1 (UK,
Australia, or New
Zealand)

11/15456
Germany: 7
US: 4
Japan: 2
China: 1457

Hong Kong

Taiwan

None

Low

0/9

United States

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

456 Justice Beyue Su obtained an M.B.A. in the United States and subsequently served as a chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer at an American company. See Justices of the
Constitutional Court, JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=125 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
P3HR-6TAD. She is included in the count of eleven foreign-trained justices. Id.

2/15
US: 2

Foreign-trained justices

Japan
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5%459
5-10%

South Korea
Seoul National
University: 6/6 (100%)
Korea University: 5/6
(83%)
Yonsei University: 5/5
(100%)

Majority opinions:
1-2%
Separate opinions:
13-22%460

Taiwan
National Taiwan
University: 8/8
(100%)

100%

Hong Kong
University of Hong
Kong: 10/10 (100%)
Chinese University of
Hong Kong: 8/8
(100%)
City University of
Hong Kong: 3/3 (100%)

Less than 0.3%461

United States
Harvard: 2/28 (7%)
Stanford: 1/16 (6%)
Yale: 2/19 (11%)

Foreign law research
Occasional
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Rare
458 As of this writing, all three of the Japanese universities listed in the table possess both graduate law schools and undergraduate law faculties.
The ﬁgures reported in this table reﬂect the total number of constitutional law professors across both the graduate and undergraduate programs. For a
breakdown of the graduate versus undergraduate faculty at each school, see note 382 above.
459 See Ejima, supra note 71, at 277, 283 (counting 11 cases in which foreign law was cited, out of a total of 234 constitutional cases decided from
1990 through mid-2008).
460 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557.
461 This count reﬂects citations to foreign cases in constitutional decisions rendered by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts as of 2010. See Sperti,
supra note 16, at 405.

Foreign law citation

Foreign-trained
constitutional scholars
at elite law schools

Japan
University of
Tokyo: 1/4 (25%)
Keio University:
4/6 (66%)
Waseda University:
4/8 (50%)458
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U.S.
Germany
ECtHR (rising)

Jurisdictions most
frequently considered

465

464

463

XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 84 (H.K.).
Id. arts. 8, 87.
Id. art. 39.
Id. arts. 82, 84.

None

Constitutional provision(s)
addressing judicial usage of
foreign or international law

South Korea

Germany
U.S.
Japan (high but
declining)
ECtHR (low but
rising)
France (legislation,
not case law)

None

High

Taiwan

Germany
U.S.
Austria
Japan (declining)
ECtHR (rising)
Korea (low but rising)
France (rare)
Switzerland (rare)

None

High

Hong Kong

U.K.
Canada
U.S.
Australia
New Zealand
ECtHR
South Africa (rare)

(1) Courts may “refer to
precedents of other
common law
jurisdictions”462
(2) Courts must apply
“common law” that was
“previously in force”
under British rule463
(3) ICCPR, ICESCR,
and “international
labour conventions”
“remain in force”464
(4) Foreign judges
permitted465

High

United States

N/A

None

Low
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462

High

Japan

Acceptance of foreign law
usage
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